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.IZED 

::)EMOC]R.ACY 


:-.ii:r'.iiiiMi5iaiain«3!33*n«»iin>ita«Mi 


ALBERjr  STICKNEY 


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THE  GIFT  OF 

MAY  TREAT  MORRISON 

IN  MEMORY  OF 

ALEXANDER  F  MORRISON 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 


ORGANIZED 
DEMOCRACY 


BT 


ALBERT  STICKNEY 


BOSTON  AND  NEW   YORK 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

^U  mttvMe  pxe^^,  €ambrtli0c 

1906 


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COPYRIGHT  1906  BY  ALBERT  STICKNEY 
ALL   RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Published  October  iqob 


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7-fh 


"  OoD  said,  I  am  tired  of  kings, 
I  suffer  them  no  more ; 
Up  to  my  ear  the  morning  brings 
The  outrage  of  the  poor. 

"  r  will  have  never  a  noble ; 
No  lineage  counted  great ; 
Fishers  and  choppers  and  ploughmen 
Shall  constitute  a  State." 
(^  Embrsoh. 

(^  "  But  a  democratic  nation  may  be  imagined,  organized  differently  from  the 

^  American  people.    Is  it,  then,  impossible  to  conceive  a  government  really 

X  established  upon  the  will  of  the  majority,  but  in  which  the  majority,  repress- 

ing its  natural  instinct  of  equality,  should  consent,  with  a  view  to  the  order 
and  stability  of  the  State,  to  invest  a  family  or  an  individual  with  all  the 
Q  attributes  of  executive  power  ?  Might  not  a  democratic  society  be  imagined 

"  in  which  the  forces  of  the  nation  would  be  more  centralized  than  they  are 

in  the  United  States  ;  where  the  people  would  exercise  a  less  direct  and  less 
irresistible  influence  upon  public  affairs,  and  yet  every  citizen,  invested  with 
certain  rights,  would  participate,  within  his  sphere,  in  the  conduct  of  the 
government  ?  "  —  Tocquevillb. 


CO 

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CONTENTS 

I.   Machine  Politics 1 

II.    Organized  Democracy 23 

ni.   The  Cost  of  Machine  Politics      •     .     .  116 

rV.   The  Necessity  of  Reorganization      •     .  200 

V.   General  Considerations 221 


»  i       3  t        >       i  .  ,'■ 


»        •  •    •  ^  > 

> » • » •  • 


ORGAJ^IZED  DEMOCRACY 
CHAPTER  I 

MACHINE     POLITICS 

Modern  political  history,  in  its  most  important 
aspect,  has  been  the  story  of  the  struggle  for  polit- 
ical freedom,  freedom  of  thought,  speech,  and  ac- 
tion; for  the  right  of  each  people  to  govern  itself 
in  its  own  way;  to  make  its  own  free  choice  of  its 
political  institutions,  and  its  rulers.  Putting  the 
statement  in  a  slightly  different  form,  the  most 
important  feature  of  modem  political  histor}'  has 
been  the  struggle  of  democracy  against  monarchy. 
The  struggle  has  not  yet  ended.  It  has,  how- 
ever, already  reached  such  a  stage  of  advancement 
that  democratic  institutions  have  fully  vindicated 
their  right  to  survive,  by  the  practical  results 
which  they  have  achieved,  after  the  severest  test 
in  the  laboratory  of  experience.  Democratic  insti- 
tutions have  already  proved,  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  most  competent  judges,  that  they  accomplish 


2  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  end  of  govejrE.meiit,'  the  greatest  good  of  the 
greatest  number,  better  than!  institutions  of  any 
other  kind.  •  .  .  ..i .  • .  •.• 

Democratic  institutions,  however,  are  still  in 
their  infancy,  are  still  almost  in  their  rudimen- 
tary stage  of  development.  Only  during  the  last 
century  can  they  be  said  to  have  been  put  to  the 
test  of  actual  experiment  on  any  large  scale.  Prior 
to  our  National  Constitution  of  1787  democratic 
institutions  had  been  in  operation  only  in  small 
communities;  generally  in  single  cities,  in  peoples 
of  small  numbers.  Their  form  with  us,  to-day, 
is  almost  the  same  as  the  earUest  that  was  ever 
put  in  use.  There  has  been  sUght  change  in  the 
matter  of  form. 

Consequently,  it  is  a  virtual  certainty  that  the 
political  institutions  of  this  American  people  — 
to-day  —  are  susceptible  of  improvement.  It  can 
hardly  be,  that  the  first  experiments  in  democracy 
were  a  final  complete  success.  Human  inventions 
are  always  at  first  imperfect.  At  first,  they  take 
imperfect  forms.  They  require  repeated  modifi- 
cation before  they  can  accompUsh  their  best  re- 
sults. Democratic  institutions  furnish  no  excep- 
tion in  this  respect  to  the  universal  law.  They  are 
still  imperfect.  They  still  have  defects.  Those 
defects  can  be  ascertained,  and  remedied. 


MACHINE  POLITICS  S 

In  recent  times,  we  have  attached  too  little  impor- 
tance to  political  institutions.  Institutions  are  the 
machinery  of  politics.  The  political  results  that  any 
people  can  accomplish  are  limited  by  its  political 
machinery.  We  cannot  get  a  speed  of  sixty  miles 
an  hour  with  a  two-wheeled  ox  cart  on  an  old- 
fashioned  corduroy  road.  No  more  is  it  a  possi- 
bility for  us  to  get  wise  and  efficient  administra- 
tion of  our  pubUc  affairs  from  our  present  form 
of  democratic  government.  It  served  our  politi- 
cal needs  passably  in  our  early  days,  when  we  were 
a  small  people,  with  small  aggregates  of  men  and 
money;  when  public  treasuries  were  small;  when 
public  affairs  throughout  were  on  a  small  scale. 
But  it  is  no  longer  equal  to  our  political  needs. 

We  can  go  further.  Not  only  do  our  political 
institutions  require  improvement,  but  we  may 
almost  say  that  our  present  poUtical  institutions 
are  not  genuinely  democratic.  It  is  the  very  essence 
of  democracy,  that  a  people  should  be  able  to  make 
its  own  free  choice  of  its  rulers.  If  it  cannot  do 
that,  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  its  institutions  are 
really  democratic.  But  who  will  say  that  this 
American  people  to-day  really  makes  its  own  free 
choice  of  its  rulers  ?  Do  what  we  will,  toil  as  hard 
as  we  may,  we  do  not  get  the  men  of  our  own 
free  choice  for  the   high   places  in  our  different 


4  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

governments.  No  doubt,  we  do  occasionally  suc- 
ceed in  electing,  to  some  single  oflBce,  some  one 
man  who  happens,  for  the  time,  to  be  "  popular." 
No  doubt,  too,  we  do  occasionally  defeat  one  or 
the  other  political  "  party,"  at  some  single  election. 
But  we  never  succeed  in  putting  the  control  of  our 
public  affairs  in  the  hands  of  any  large  number  of 
men  of  our  own  choice;  men  who  in  our  judgment 
are  the  fittest  men  to  be  charged  with  the  respon- 
sibilities of  government.  Democracy  means,  if  it 
means  anything,  a  government  where  the  supreme 
power  in  the  State  is  the  will  of  the  people.  But 
who  would  venture  to  say  that  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple is  with  us — to-day — the  supreme  power  in  the 
body  politic  ? 

What  is  the  reason  ? 

We  must  concede  that,  under  our  present  form 
of  government,  we  have  enough  of  the  process  of 
popular  election.  Indeed,  it  might  almost  be  said 
that  we  have  little  else.  One  election  is  hardly  fin- 
ished, with  its  distribution  of  the  spoils  of  victory, 
when  we  begin  preparation  for  the  next.  Our  politi- 
cal "  campaigns  "  come  but  once  a  year.  But  they 
seem  never  to  end.  Our  political  life  is  a  per- 
petual series  of  popular  elections.  The  work  has 
already  become  so  burdensome,  and  so  mechan- 
ical, that  it  is  now  gravely  proposed  to  have  the 


MACHINE  POLITICS  5 

citizen's  part  in  the  process  done  by  the  mere 
pressing  of  a  button.  Under  the  old  theory  of 
democratic  institutions,  voting  was  supposed  to 
call  for  the  exercise  of  thought,  of  intelligence,  of 
judgment,  on  the  part  of  the  citizen.  He  was  sup- 
posed to  pass  his  judgment  on  the  fitness  of  men 
for  high  public  station,  when  he  exercised  the  elec- 
tive franchise  and  deposited  his  ballot  at  the  polls. 
But  we  have  now  at  last  succeeded  in  reducing 
the  function  of  the  citizen  to  the  act  of  placing 
"his  mark"  against  one  of  several  lists  of  names, 
in  the  making  of  which  he  has  virtually  no  voice. 
It  is  now  further  proposed,  to  make  his  action 
even  more  completely  mechanical,  and  reduce  it 
to  the  touching  of  a  button.  Verily,  "machine 
politics  "  could  no  further  go. 

What  is  the  reason  for  this  situation  ? 

We  turn  government  into  an  election  machine. 
Our  political  life  is  a  never-ending  series  of  popu- 
lar elections  —  so-called.  Each  year  we  put  up 
a  large  number  of  our  highest  public  offices  to  be 
filled  by  the  process  of  popular  election.  These 
public  offices  constitute  so  many  election  prizes. 
They  bring  into  being  large  organizations  of  men, 
which  we  term  "  parties,"  which  are  really  formed 
for  the  purpose  of  capturing  these  annual  collec- 
tions of  election  prizes.     The  fact   that  elections 


6  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

come  every  year,  with  each  year  a  fresh  collection 
of  official  vacancies,  makes  the  work  of  these  or- 
ganizations continuous.  Thereby  the  organiza- 
tions are  made  permanent.  Their  leaders  come  to 
possess  what  amounts  to  a  power  of  appointment 

—  of  all  public  officials.  We  please  ourselves  with 
the  fancy,  that  our  high  public  officials  are  chosen 
by  the  people,  through  the  process  of  popular  elec- 
tion. In  fact,  they  are  selected  by  the  machine 
politicians,  through  what  amounts  to  a  power  of 
appointment.  The  citizen  becomes  a  mere  at- 
tachment to  some  party  "machine."  The  pro- 
cess of  popular  election  becomes  little  more  than 
a  form.  No  doubt  the  people,  that  is,  the  mass 
of  citizens,  does  have  an  option  between  two  or 
more  "tickets,"  each  made  by  some  group  of  ma- 
chine politicians,  or  by  their  leaders.  But  that  is 
all.  That  is  far  from  giving  to  "the  people"  its 
own  free  choice.  The  process  of  popular  elec- 
tion, as  we  now  operate  it,  fails  to  fulfill  its  legiti- 
mate function,  that  of  securing  an  expression  of 
the  will  of  the  people.  The  action  of  the  citizen, 
and  of  the  people,  becomes  almost  mechanical. 

The  cause  of  the  difficulty  will  be  found  to  lie 

—  mainly — in  our  use  of  the  separate  individual 
ballot,  in  combination  with  our  system  of  short 
fixed  terms  of  office. 


MACHINE  POLITICS  7 

The  separate  ballot  virtually  compels  the  cit- 
izen to  vote  for  the  candidates  of  some  large  or- 
ganization.   Otherwise  his  vote  will  be  lost. 

The  system  of  fixed  terms  of  years  for  the 
tenure  of  our  high  pubhc  officials  furnishes  our 
large  collection  of  annual  vacancies;  and  thus 
calls  into  existence  these  standing  armies  of  pro- 
fessional politicians,  that  we  term  "  parties."  The 
ordinary  citizen,  if  his  vote  is  to  count,  is  —  in 
practice  —  compelled  to  vote  for  the  candidates 
of  one  or  another  of  these  "parties."  He  joins 
one.  Under  all  ordinary  circumstances,  he  votes 
his  regular  party  ticket. 

The  theory  of  our  present  political  system  is, 
that  the  use  of  the  process  of  popular  election,  at 
short  fixed  intervals  of  time,  for  large  numbers 
of  high  public  officials,  by  the  separate  individ- 
ual ballot,  keeps  the  supreme  control  of  public 
affairs  directly  in  the  hands  of  the  citizens;  and 
in  that  way  ensures  "government  of  the  people." 

Under  this  theory,  the  highest  public  officials 
are  elected  by  the  separate  secret  ballot,  for  fixed 
terms  of  years, — usually  short,  —  on  the  idea  that 
the  mass  of  voting  citizens,  at  the  end  of  each 
official  term,  are  to  signify  their  approval,  or  dis- 
approval, of  the  public  action  of  each  separate 
official;    by  reelecting  him,    if    his  action  meets 


8  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

tbeir  approval;  by  electing  some  other  man  in  his 
plaee,  if  his  acticm  meets  their  disapproval.  In 
this  way,  the  citizens  are  supposed  to  keep  the 
supreme  control  of  public  affairs  directly  in  their 
own  hands;  to  enforce  responsibility  to  the  people; 
and  secure  "government  by  the  people." 

The  theory  is  plausible.  Some  such  form  of 
donocratic  government  is  practically  the  only  one 
that  has  ever  been  tried.  Even  to-day  it  is  the 
(Mily  form  oi  democratic  government  which  is 
ctMisidered  practicable  by  the  large  majority  of 
believers  in  democracy. 

The  soundness  of  tiie  theory  could  not  have 
been  succesfully  challenged,  until  its  practical 
results  had  been  made  evident  by  our  own  large 
political  experience. 

Let  us  see  what  that  experience  shows. 

In  small  communities,  with  small  numbers  of 
voting  citizens,  and  small  numbers  of  public  offi- 
cials, where  public  affairs  are  on  a  small  scale, 
the  results  are  endurable. 

Laige  communities,  however,  with  their  large 
numbers  of  voting  citizens  and  elective  offices, 
pot  the  theory  to  a  different  test.  The  work  of 
operating  the  election  machinerv  becomes  so  ex- 
tensive, and  so  intricate,  that  the  ordinary  citizen 
cannot  take  the  time  required  for  its  performance. 


!kL\CHIXE   POLITICS  9 

When  we  consider  these  large  constituencies  of 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  voting  citizens,  such  as 
we  now  have  in  many  of  our  cities,  of  millions, 
such  as  we  have  in  some  of  the  states,  of  fifteen 
millions  and  upwards,  such  as  we  have  in  a  pre- 
sidential election,  then  it  is  easily  seen  that  the 
operation  of  the  process  of  popular  election,  by 
separate  direct  indi\'idual  ballot,  where  the  entire 
body  of  citizens  vote  in  their  own  persons,  gets 
far  beyond  the  powers  of  the  ordinary  busy  mem- 
bers of  the  community'.  Large  constituencies  in- 
volve the  necessity  of  equally  large  organizations, 
for  the  purpose  of  nominating  candidates  and 
influencing  votes  for  the  support  of  those  candi- 
dates. City  and  count}'  elections  require  oi^an- 
izations  covering  the  cities  and  counties.  State 
organizations  must  cover  the  states.  National 
organizations  must  cover  the  entire  nation.  The 
practical  result  is,  that  the  work  of  operating  the 
election  machinery  attains  such  magnitude  and  in- 
tricacy, that  it  far  transcends  the  capacities  of  the 
community's  workers,  whose  time  always  is,  and 
must  be,  given  mainly  to  their  private  affairs. 
Consequently,  the  work  of  operating  the  election 
machinery  falls  into  the  hands  of  men  who  make 
it  their  special  occupation,  who  give  to  it  substan- 
tiallv  their  entire  time.     Those  men  become  pro- 


10  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

fessionals.  The  rest  of  the  citizens,  with  their 
best  efforts,  are  only  amateurs.  The  professionals 
beat  the  amateurs.  The  main  body  of  the  citi- 
zens, in  the  hands  of  these  professional  opera- 
tors of  our  election  macliinery,  become  mere  at- 
tachments to  one  or  the  other  part  of  the  great 
election  machine.  In  practice,  the  professionals 
have  the  entire  control  of  the  selection  of  candi- 
dates. The  utmost  that  the  voting  citizen  can  do, 
if  he  wishes  his  vote  to  count,  is  to  vote  for  one 
or  another  "  ticket,"  made  by  one  or  another  group 
of  these  professionals.  He  joins  one  or  another 
of  these  large  election  organizations.  As  a  rule, 
he  follows  its  leaders,  regularly  and  loyally.  In 
general,  men  do  not  like  to  desert.  Nor  do  they 
like  deserters.  It  becomes,  therefore,  the  almost 
universal  rule,  that  each  individual  citizen  ad- 
heres, under  all  ordinary  circumstances,  to  one 
or  the  other  of  these  permanent  organizations 
of  professionals  ;  and  votes  mechanically  —  year 
after  year  —  his  regular  "party  ticket."  Occa- 
sionally, in  his  disgust  with  the  acts  of  his  own 
"party,"  he  may  vote  for  the  candidates  of  the 
other  "  party."  But  this  seldom  happens.  Almost 
invariably  he  will  vote  his  regular  "party  ticket." 
The  result  is  that  the  citizen  has  no  real  power, 
no  real  weight,  in  the  selection  of  public  officials. 


MACHINE  POLITICS  11 

or  in  the  control  of  their  policies.  Practically 
he  becomes  a  mere  political  puppet,  in  the  hands 
of  the  machine  politicians.  Practically  he  sur- 
renders his  political  freedom,  with  the  exercise 
of  his  political  judgment,  and  his  poUtical  con- 
science. 

The  theory  is,  that  by  the  direct  separate  secret 
ballot  we  secure  to  the  citizen  complete  political 
freedom,  and  complete  political  power.  The  fact 
is,  we  have  established  the  most  wonderful  and  in- 
genious system  of  political  slavery  that  the  world 
has  yet  seen.  Framed  by  the  citizens  themselves, 
for  the  express  purpose  of  keeping  the  supreme 
control  of  public  affairs  in  their  own  hands,  in 
order  to  ensure  direct  governmental  responsibil- 
ity to  the  citizens  in  their  own  persons,  the  actual 
practical  result  is,  to  create  an  irresponsible  oli- 
garchy of  machine  politicians ;  an  arbitrary  office- 
holding  class;  composed  of  men  not  selected  by 
the  people,  and  not  responsible  to  the  people.  In 
substance,  in  its  practical  operation,  our  govern- 
ment is  not  democratic. 

But  we  have  another  singular  feature  of  the 
situation.  The  men  who  "go  into  politics,"  as 
the  phrase  is,  do  so,  in  the  large  majority  of  cases, 
for  the  reason  that  they  need  the  salaries.  In 
other  words,  they  are  not  the  successful  men  in 


12  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  regular  private  callings.  No  doubt,  a  large 
number  of  single  individuals  enter  public  life 
from  praiseworthy  motives;  with  an  earnest  wish 
to  do  good  public  service.  But  the  large  majority 
of  the  men  who  do  the  daily  work  of  the  election 
machine  do  it  because  they  have  the  time  for  it, 
because  their  services  are  not  in  demand  in  the 
private  occupations.  Our  office-holding  class  is 
largely  composed  of  men  who  have  failed  in  pri- 
vate life.  Their  services  are  not  in  demand,  by 
reason  of  their  lack  of  the  requisite  intelhgence, 
industry,  or,  it  may  be,  honesty.  The  result  is,  to 
a  large  extent  we  are  governed  by  an  oligarchy 
of  the  unemployed. 

It  may  be  said  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  citi- 
zen to  take,  and  give,  the  time  which  is  required 
for  the  operation  of  this  elaborate  machinery. 
But  that  has  been  found  in  actual  experience  to 
be  impracticable.  The  large  majority  of  our  citi- 
zens, by  reason  of  the  limitations  of  time  and 
means,  are  compelled  to  select  some  one  line  of 
work,  and  give  to  it  their  entire  energies.  Espe- 
cially, in  these  modem  days,  it  is  a  practical 
impossibility  with  the  large  majority  of  men,  that 
they  should  give  proper  attention  to  the  engross- 
ing work  of  any  private  business  or  profession, 
and  at  the  same  time  take  an  active  part  in  the 


MACHINE  POLITICS  13 

operation  of  the  election  machine.  Either  occupa- 
tion is  exclusive.  No  doubt  the  citizen  owes  it  to 
the  state  to  give  to  public  affairs  the  time  needed 
for  the  operation  of  the  machinery  of  government. 
The  citizen  should  —  no  doubt  — give  to  the  state 
the  time  necessary  for  the  full  discharge  of  his 
civic  duties.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the 
citizen's  civic  duties  must-  be  established  with  a 
due  regard  to  his  individual  capacities,  and  the 
legitimate  demands  of  his  private  affairs.  There  is 
our  present  difficulty.  It  is  with  us  —  to-day  — 
an  impossibility  for  busy  working  men  to  take  an 
active  part  in  the  operation  of  our  election  machin- 
ery, for  the  mere  reason  that  our  present  poHti- 
cal  system  puts  on  the  citizen  a  burden  which  he 
cannot  carry.  It  taxes  him  beyond  his  capacities. 
Many  men  have  made  the  attempt  to  take  an  ac- 
tive part  in  "practical  politics."  Sooner  or  later 
they  generally  find  themselves  compelled  to  aban- 
don either  politics  or  the  work  of  their  own  private 
calling.  But  with  most  men  this  abandonment  of 
the  work  of  their  private  calling  is  an  impossibihty. 

It  may  be  thought  that  the  situation  here  stated 
is  peculiar  to  the  United  States,  and  is  due  to  ex- 
ceptional conditions  existing  with  us. 

That  view  will  not  stand  the  test  of  careful  ex- 
amination. The  results  here    stated   are   the   in- 


14  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

evitable  consequence  of  any  attempt,  in  any  form, 
to  keep  the  control  of  public  affairs  in  the  hands 
of  the  entire  mass  of  citizens,  in  any  large  com- 
munity, by  any  combination  of  the  separate  ballot 
and  the  system  of  term  elections. 

Let  us  give  it  further  consideration. 

No  means  has  ever  yet  been  devised,  nor,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  is  it  possible  that  any  can  be  devised, 
whereby  the  final  supreme  control  of  public  men 
and  public  measures  can  be  kept  directly  in  the 
hands  of  the  entire  mass  of  citizens,  except  the 
process  of  periodic  popular  election  by  the  citi- 
zens' direct  individual  votes.  No  way  exists  for 
controUing  an  employee  except  the  possession  of 
the  power  to  discharge  him.  If  that  power  is  to 
be  exercised  by  the  citizens  in  their  own  persons, 
it  can  only  be  by  the  use  of  the  direct  separate 
ballot.  In  order  to  give  to  that  control  any  prac- 
tical value,  the  opportunity  for  such  a  discharge 
must  come  with  a  fair  degree  of  frequency.  But 
it  is  impossible  that  the  citizens  should  be  voting 
on  their  public  servants  every  day,  or  at  irregular 
intervals.  They  are  compelled  to  make  such  vot- 
ing periodic.  They  are  compelled  to  adopt  the 
terra  system.  Consequently,  the  only  method  by 
which  we  can  make  so  much  as  a  formal  attempt 
at  keeping  pubhc  servants  and  pubhc  affairs  under 


MACHINE  POLITICS  15 

the  direct  control  of  the  citizens  in  mass,  is,  that 
the  highest  pubhc  servants  should  be  elective, 
and  should  submit  to  the  process  of  reelection, 
periodically,  at  the  end  of  short  fixed  terms  of 
years.  So  far  as  my  reading  goes,  no  other  way 
has  ever  been  tried,  or  suggested.  No  other  seems 
possible. 

The  result  which  has  come  in  this  country 
must  necessarily  come  in  any  large  community, 
where  the  attempt  is  made  to  keep  the  final  con- 
trol of  pubhc  men  and  pubhc  measures  in  the 
hands  of  the  citizens  in  mass.  As  matter  of  fact, 
that  result  has  come,  whenever,  and  wherever,  the 
system  of  short  elective  terms  has  been  tried. 
Whenever  in  large  communities  the  attempt  is 
made  to  keep  the  control  of  public  officers  and 
pubhc  affairs  directly  in  the  hands  of  the  citi- 
zens, it  must  be  through  the  process  of  frequent 
periodic  popular  election;  in  other  words,  by  a 
term  system,  where  the  citizens  vote  directly,  in 
their  own  persons,  for  high  pubhc  officials  in  con- 
siderable numbers,  at  short  fixed  intervals  of  time. 
The  inevitable  result  is  the  estabhshment  of  these 
large  election  organizations  of  professional  poli- 
ticians, which  are  formed,  and  exist,  in  order  to 
capture  the  control  of  the  pubhc  work  and  the 
public  treasuries. 


16  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

It  may  be  said  that  under  this  system  of  short 
terms  the  citizens  do,  at  least,  have  it  in  their 
power  to  remove  any  elective  public  oflBcial  at  the 
end  of  his  term. 

But  of  what  practical  value  is  the  possession  of 
that  power,  when  the  new  men,  who  will  be  put  in 
the  places  of  the  officials  removed,  will  always  — 
or  practically  always  —  be  the  nominees  of  the 
same  body,  or  some  other  body,  of  professional 
politicians  ?  The  decisive  point  is  that,  in  the  long 
run,  at  all  ordinary  times,  the  highest  public  offi- 
cials will  necessarily  and  certainly  be  selected  by 
the  machine  politicians.  One  body  of  machine 
politicians  is  no  better  and  no  worse  than  another. 
They  may  give  themselves  different  names.  They 
may  give  us  different  "  platforms."  But  the  men 
in  all  these  organizations  are  necessarily  of  the  same 
kind.  They  are  trained  in  the  same  school.  They 
use  the  same  methods.  Consequently,  it  makes 
little  or  no  practical  difference  that  the  citizens 
have  it  in  their  power,  at  short  intervals  of  time, 
to  oust  one  set  of  professionals  and  put  another  in 
its  place.  It  still  remains  the  fact,  that  the  term 
system  does  not  give  to  the  citizens  the  real  choice 
of  their  own  rulers,  and  the  control  of  their  own 
public  affairs. 

No  doubt  to  a  certain  extent  public  officials  are 


MACHINE  POLITICS  17 

kept  under  some  degree  of  restraint  by  the  possi- 
bility of  removal  through  an  adverse  election  at  the 
end  of  their  term. 

But  what  real  value  is  to  be  attached  to  that  ?  The 
fact  still  remains,  that  the  successors  will  be  the 
appointees  of  the  machine  politicians.  Our  public 
officials  have  now  well  learned  that  fact.  No  man 
—  in  ordinary  times  —  can  get  a  nomination,  or 
an  election,  to  public  office,  except  by  the  permis- 
sion of  the  macliine  poHticians.  All  public  officials, 
therefore,  are  under  their  control.  Occasionally 
it  will  happen  that  a  mayor,  a  governor,  or  even 
a  president,  may  for  a  time  attempt  to  resist  the 
will  of  the  professionals,  in  an  effort  to  serve  the 
highest  public  interests.  But  in  the  long  run,  in 
the  vast  majority  of  instances,  the  politicians  will 
control.  Public  officers  are  well  aware  of  that  fact. 
They  have  well  learned  that,  when  the  annual  elec- 
tion comes,  the  citizen  must,  and  will,  "rally," 
around  one  or  another  "party  standard."  If  some 
single  official  has  made  himself  obnoxious  to  the 
voters  by  his  especially  bad  record,  the  profession- 
als lay  him  aside,  and  put  in  his  place  some  other 
man,  of  good  general  reputation,  who  is  generally 
as  submissive  to  their  control  as  liis  predecessors. 
Our  public  officials  know  that  political  advance- 
ment is,  in  general,  possible  only  by  the  permis- 


18  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

sion  of  the  operators  of  the  election  machine.  Con- 
sequently, our  public  officials  are  controlled  by 
those  operators. 

Another  result  follows. 

The  operation  of  these  large  election  organiza- 
tions requires  the  expenditure  of  large  amounts 
of  money,  running  each  year  into  many  millions 
of  dollars.  Naturally,  and  inevitably,  the  party 
managers  who  are  compelled  to  raise  these  large 
amounts  of  money  procure  them  from  the  large 
financial  and  industrial  interests  that  are  subject 
to  legislative  and  other  official  action.  The  great 
campaign  funds  come  from  those  large  interests. 
The  result  is,  that  legislation,  with  other  public 
official  action,  in  all  our  governments,  local,  state, 
and  national,  one  just  as  much  as  another,  is 
largely  controlled  by  the  men  who  supply  the 
money  for  the  "legitimate  campaign  expenses," 
as  the  phrase  is,  of  these  great  election  organiza- 
tions. There  is  no  express  contract  to  that  effect. 
It  is  seldom  that  money  is  paid  directly  to  a  pub- 
lic official,  to  pay  for  any  specific  official  act.  Such 
payments  are  needless.  The  action  of  public  offi- 
cials is  controlled  through  payments  of  money  to 
the  managers  of  the  election  machine.  It  is  quite 
unnecessary  to  buy  the  servant,  when  one  has  in 
his  regular  pay  the  master.      We  give  ourselves 


MACHINE  POLITICS  19 

much  alarm  over  the  occasional  purchase  of  a  few 
individual  voters.  But  what  are  we  to  say  of  the 
purchase  —  in  effect  —  of  votes  by  the  hundred 
thousand  —  by  the  million  ?  Yet  that  is  what  is 
actually  accomplished,  when  men  purchase  the 
"influence"  of  the  powerful  machine  pohticians. 
Single  politicians,  or  single  groups  of  politicians, 
who  control  the  selection  of  our  highest  public  offi- 
cials, practically  buy  and  sell  the  votes  of  us  citi- 
zens, by  the  hundreds  of  thousands  and  the  mil- 
lions. Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  childish, 
trifling,  for  us  to  consider  the  matter  of  buying  and 
selling  a  few  individual  votes,  of  individual  voters. 
We  talk  to-day  of  "party  government."  "Party 
government "  with  us  to-day  means  nothing  more 
or  less  than  government  by  one  or  the  other  part  of 
the  election  machine.  Government  by  the  election 
machine  means  government  by  money.  In  short, 
what  we  have  accomplished  at  the  present  day,  in 
the  way  of  establishing  democratic  institutions,  may 
almost  be  summed  up  in  one  phrase:  We  have 
achieved,  not  democracy,  but  plutocracy. 

Let  me  not  be  misunderstood.  In  most  cases  the 
financial  and  industrial  interests  which  thus  control 
public  officials,  do  so  not  of  their  own  free  will. 
They  do  it  largely  under  compulsion.  They  are 
not  free  agents.    In  general,  capitalists  would  pre- 


20  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

fer  to  secure  their  lawful  rights  by  lawful  means. 
These  large  amounts  of  money,  which  they  pay  to 
the  machine  pohticians,  they  pay  by  virtue  of  neces- 
sity, generally  in  self-defense.  Most  moneyed  men 
would  prefer  not  to  make  the  payments,  if  they 
could  avoid  it;  if  they  could  secure  the  rightful  pro- 
tection of  the  law  by  other  means.  Our  machine 
politicians  are  the  successors,  under  new  names 
and  new  conditions,  of  the  old  feudal  barons,  who 
levied  blackmail  as  payment  for  peace;  for  per- 
mission to  the  working  portion  of  the  community 
to  follow  their  daily  occupations,  and  do  their  daily 
work,  in  peace. 

It  may  be  conceded,  and  it  is  my  belief,  that  even 
our  present  form  of  plutocracy,  taking  it  as  a  whole, 
gives  us  better  working  results  than  any  form  of 
hereditary  government.  Nevertheless,  plutocracy 
is  not  democracy.  Our  object,  under  our  present 
form  of  government,  is  to  secure  genuine  "gov- 
ernment by  the  people."  But  "  government  by  the 
people  "  surely  means  something  better  than  govern- 
ment by  the  election  machine,  under  the  control 
of  money,  even  if  the  macliinc  has  two  parts,  under 
the  name  of  "parties;"  and  even  if  we  have  it  in 
our  power  occasionally  to  change  one  "party"  for 
the  other. 

Our   political   experience   has   now   well   estab- 


MACHINE  POLITICS  21 

lished  this  political  law.  Any  attempt,  in  any  form, 
to  keep  the  selection  of  public  servants,  and  the 
control  of  public  affairs,  directly  in  the  hands  of 
the  citizens  in  mass,  must  necessarily  and  cer- 
tainly bring  the  result  which  it  has  brought  wuth 
us.  Necessarily  —  and  certainly  —  it  will  place 
the  control  of  public  affairs  in  the  hands  of  an  oH- 
garchy  of  irresponsible  machine  politicians.  Neces- 
sarily —  and  certainly  —  those  politicians  will  be 
under  the  control  of  money.  Practically  the  system 
will  result  in  the  virtual  disfranchisement  of  the 
honest  and  industrious  portion  of  the  community. 
In  short,  the  attempt  at  mass  rule,  in  any  form, 
gives  as  its  practical  result  the  tyranny  of  the  elec- 
tion machine. 

It  is  a  tyranny  of  a  new  kind,  the  tyranny  of  an 
institution.  It  enslaves  the  entire  community,  gov- 
ernors and  governed.  It  destroys  political  freedom, 
for  both  citizen  and  the  public  servant.  Take  our 
public  servants  as  they  are  to-day;  chosen  as  they 
are,  and  trained  as  they  are,  and  the  fact  is,  that 
the  large  majority  of  them  would  prefer  to  give  us 
an  honest  and  efficient  administration  of  our  pub- 
lic affairs.  But  they  are  not  free  men.  They  are 
the  appointees,  and  the  slaves,  of  the  election  ma- 
cliines.  They  are  in  the  same  position  with  us 
citizens.    They  have  no  freedom  of  action. 


22  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

The  proper  name  for  our  system  of  short  elec- 
tive terms  of  office  is  that  it  is  a  system  of  tenure 
by  election. 

Thereupon  we  may  state  an  unfailing  political 
law :  Tenure  by  election  turns  government  into  an 
election  machine. 

We  must  seek  further,  then,  if  we  expect  to  real- 
ize, in  practice,  the  result  which  is  meant  by  the 
phrase  "government  of  the  people,  by  the  people, 
for  the  people."  We  must  work  on  other  lines,  if 
we  expect  to  make  democracy  a  practical  success. 


CHAPTER  II 

ORGANIZED    DEMOCRACY 

Evert  people,  every  body  politic,  under  govern- 
ment of  any  form,  must  be  organized.  That  means 
that  in  every  political  community,  under  any  form 
of  government,  public  work  must  be  specialized. 
Each  kind  of  pubhc  work  must  be  done  by  men 
specially  selected  for  that  kind  of  work.  The  de- 
gree and  form  of  the  specialization  will  vary  in 
different  conmaunities.  But  in  every  community, 
whatever  be  the  form  of  its  government,  public 
work  must  be  specialized.  In  other  words,  there 
must  be  organization. 

Democracy  is  no  exception  to  this  law.  Even 
under  a  "government  by  the  people,"  even  in  the 
smallest  communities,  there  must  be  the  division  of 
labor,  specialization.  In  other  words,  even  a  demo- 
cracy must  be  organized. 

What,  then,  is  organized  democracy? 

Let  us  begin  our  attempt  to  answer  this  question 
by  stating  what  it  is  not. 

It  most  certainly  is  not  government  by  every- 


24  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

body.  It  is  not  government  by  rotation;  govern- 
ment by  tlie  entire  mass  of  citizens,  turn  and  turn 
about;  one  man  taking  a  hand  at  some  kind  of 
public  work  for  a  few  years,  and  then  some  other 
man,  equally  ignorant  and  inexperienced,  taking 
his  place  for  a  few  later  years.  The  attempt  at  gov- 
ernment of  that  kind,  as  our  experience  has  now 
demonstrated,  gives  "machine  politics,"  and  not 
democracy.  We  cannot  get  democracy  by  perpet- 
ual periodic  changes  in  the  persons  of  our  public 
officials ;  by  any  process  of  perpetual  periodic  re- 
volution. 

Moreover,  political  organization,  to  some  ex- 
tent, must  be  had  in  the  very  smallest  communities. 
Even  in  the  government  of  a  small  country  town, 
the  actual  daily  work  of  administration  must  be 
done  by  men  specially  selected.  Even  in  the  small- 
est rural  communities,  if  we  give  to  the  individual 
citizen  the  fullest  possible  share  in  the  practical 
operation  of  the  government,  we  shall  still  find  that 
the  regular  daily  work  of  government  must  be  done 
by  a  few  men  specially  selected ;  in  the  time-honored 
phrase  of  New  England,  by  "selectmen."  Even 
in  the  little  country  town,  the  outside  practicable 
field  for  the  action  of  the  ordinary  citizen  is,  tliat 
he  shall  have  his  one  voice  in  the  selection  of  those 
few  "selectmen." 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  25 

Wlien,  however,  we  consider  the  government  of 
large  communities,  of  large  cities,  states,  or  of  a 
nation,  then  the  necessity  of  organization  becomes 
simply  overwhelming.  In  all  large  communities, 
government  by  the  entire  body  of  citizens  in  mass, 
or  government  by  perpetual  rotation,  becomes  a 
glaring  and  grotesque  impossibihty.  In  small  com- 
munities, public  work,  being  on  a  smaller  scale, 
and  less  intricate,  requires  a  less  degree  of  spe- 
cial training.  Country  roads  do  not  require  the 
same  solidity  and  finish  with  the  public  highways 
in  the  cities;  for  they  do  not  carry  as  heavy  traffic. 
Country  schools  deal  with  pupils  in  smaller  num- 
bers ;  and  do  not  require,  in  general,  such  com- 
plex educational  appliances.  In  short,  all  the  public 
work  is  on  a  smaller  scale,  and  has  less  intricacy. 
The  result  is,  in  the  small  rural  communities,  that 
public  work  need  not  be  specialized  so  highly. 
Nevertheless,  it  must  be  specialized.  In  other 
words,  there  must  be  organization. 

These  considerations  clear  the  way  for  an  af- 
firmative statement  of  the  form  of  organized  de- 
mocracy. 

Its  form  must  be  decided  by  the  application  to 
public  affairs  of  the  methods,  and  the  system, 
which  human  experience  has  shown  to  be  best 
fitted  for  the  handling  of  large  private  affairs,  in  the 


26  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

hands  of  large  private  corporations.  A  city,  a  state, 
or  a  nation  is  a  "  body  politic,"  a  large  public  corpo- 
ration. In  handling  the  affairs  of  any  large  private 
corporation,  human  experience  has  demonstrated  it 
to  be  an  absolute  necessity,  that  administration 
must  be  single  headed;  but  that  the  single  adminis- 
trative head  must  be  supervised  —  and  controlled 
—  by  a  deliberative  body;  by  some  kind  of  execu- 
tive committee;  by  a  comparatively  small  body  of 
men,  specially  selected  by  the  individual  members 
of  the  corporation,  for  the  work  of  supreme  super- 
vision and  control. 

The  work  of  administration,  of  execution,  requires 
that  men  work  under  single  heads.  Even  at  the 
head  of  each  httle  "gang"  of  day  laborers  there 
must  be  a  single  foreman.  At  the  head  of  each 
administrative  office  and  department  there  must 
be  some  one  man,  who  will  be  the  head  of  that 
office  or  department,  responsible  for  its  operation. 
Over  all  the  different  departments,  combined,  there 
must  be  a  single  responsible  administrative  head, 
a  "superintendent,"  a  "president,"  a  chief  execu- 
tive, under  one  or  another  name.  Finally,  over 
this  single  administrative  head,  this  chief  executive, 
there  must  be  an  executive  committee,  a  board  of 
directors,  a  deliberative  body  of  some  kind,  specially 
charged  with  the  work  of  supervision  and  control. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  27 

This  form  of  organization  has  been  found  to  be 
absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  secure  administra- 
tive efficiency,  in  all  large  private  affairs.  It  has 
been  universally  adopted  in  the  administration  of 
the  affairs  of  all  large  private  corporations.  It  will 
be  quite  as  serviceable,  and  it  is  quite  as  necessary, 
in  the  administration  of  the  public  affairs,  —  of 
every  large  municipal  corporation. 

There  is,  however,  one  essential  difference  be- 
tween the  two  situations. 

In  the  private  business  corporation  the  busi- 
ness is  of  a  single  kind,  of  a  comparatively  simple 
character,  involving  the  interests  of  a  compara- 
tively small  number  of  persons.  Moreover,  the 
directors,  or  members  of  the  executive  commit- 
tee, are  usually  large  owners  in  the  property  or 
business  to  be  managed.  For  that  reason  it  does 
no  great  harm,  if  those  directors  are  —  as  matter 
of  form  —  selected  at  an  annual  election  by  the 
shareholders.  Moreover,  the  shareholders  are  gen- 
erally able  to  tell  with  comparative  ease,  by  an 
examination  of  the  annual  accounts,  and  by  the 
size  of  the  dividends,  whether  or  not  their  property 
has  been  well  managed.  They  are,  therefore,  in 
general,  well  able  to  form  an  intelligent  judgment  as 
to  whether  or  not  they  need  a  change  of  directors. 

In  a  large  modern  political  community,   how- 


28  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ever,  the  number  of  persons  interested,  and  the 
interests  involved,  are  extremely  large  and  com- 
plex. Their  magnitude,  and  diversity,  far  tran- 
scend those  concerned  in  any  private  business.  The 
wise  and  efiicient  handling  of  those  large  public 
interests  requires  our  ablest  men;  and  those  men 
must  have  the  training  that  comes  from  large  ex- 
perience; an  experience  far  beyond  any  that  can  be 
acquired  in  any  short  term  of  years. 

These  facts  make  it  an  impossibility,  in  large 
communities,  that  the  individual  citizens,  who  cor- 
respond to  the  shareholders  in  the  private  corpora- 
tion, should  be  able  to  pass  an  intelhgent  judg- 
ment on  the  conduct  of  their  public  affairs.  The 
citizens  have  neither  the  time,  nor  the  opportunity, 
to  get  the  necessary  knowledge.  Under  a  proper 
form  of  election  machinery,  the  citizens  constitute, 
in  my  belief,  the  best  available  agency  for  the  work 
of  original  selection  —  of  the  directors,  who  are  to 
supervise  each  people's  public  affairs.  But  private 
citizens  cannot  have  the  time,  or  the  knowledge,  to 
enable  them  to  form  an  intelligent  judgment  on 
the  quality  of  the  work  of  those  directors,  after 
those  directors  have  once  been  selected.  Conse- 
quently, the  system  of  annual  elections,  or  elec- 
tions for  short  terms  of  years,  which  serves  well 
enough  in  private  business  corporations,  is  quite 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  29 

out  of  place,  and  will  certainly  fail  to  give  good 
results,  in  the  government  of  large  communities. 
Moreover,  we  have  already  seen,  that  the  inevit- 
able result  of  any  system  of  annual  elections,  when 
applied  to  the  selection  of  the  public  officials  of 
our  large  communities,  is  the  election  machine. 

But  here  we  face  the  most  difficult  feature  in  our 
problem.  Under  a  democratic  government,  we  must 
in  some  way  secure  due  responsibility  to  "  the 
people."  In  some  way,  too,  we  must  secure  the 
selection  of  able  and  upright  men  for  the  work 
of  our  different  governmental  organizations,  local, 
state,  and  national.  Above  all  things,  it  is  essen- 
tial that  we  should  have  the  right  men  at  the 
head.  The  selection  of  the  men  below,  of  the  rank 
and  file,  is  comparatively  unimportant.  It  is  the 
men  at  the  head,  on  whom  we  must  depend  for 
results,  in  all  our  governmental  organizations.  It  is 
at  the  government's  head,  that  we  must  have  men 
of  exceptional  capacity,  with  the  thorough  training 
for  their  official  work  which  can  come  only  from 
experience.  Any  government,  which  is  to  do  its 
work  rightly,  in  any  large  community,  must  be  a 
thing  very  different  from  government  by  ordinary 
average  untrained  citizens,  under  any  conceivable 
system  of  rotation  in  office.  Tliis  large  and  intri- 
cate work,  of  managing  large  public  affairs,  demands 


30  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  ablest  men  that  the  community  can  furnish; 
and  those  men,  when  once  chosen,  must  not  be 
continually  changing,  but  must  keep  their  places  so 
long  as  they  are  able  to  do  their  work  efficiently. 
Only  when  they  become  inefficient,  should  new  men 
be  put  in  their  places.  Nothing  can  be  devised, 
which  is  so  certain  to  destroy  the  efficiency  of  any 
large  working  organization,  as  frequent  changes  in 
its  members.  Especially,  any  high  degree  of  effi- 
ciency is  an  impossibility,  under  any  system  of  fre- 
quent periodic  changes  in  the  men  at  the  head. 
Such  a  system  is  one  of  periodic  decapitation. 

But  how  is  it  to  be  accompUshed,  as  an  actual 
practical  fact,  that  we  shall  have  public  work  done 
by  a  body  of  men  selected  by  reason  of  their  fit- 
ness for  their  work,  men  of  special  training,  and 
large  experience.''  In  short,  how  are  we  to  get  a 
sound  system  of  democratic  organization  ? 

In  seeking  the  answer  to  this  question,  we  shall 
find  that  our  own  experience  in  the  development 
of  democratic  institutions  has  now  established  cer- 
tain political  laws;  and  if  we  wish  to  make  demo- 
cratic institutions  a  practical  success,  we  must  fol- 
low those  laws. 

Moreover,  if  anything  has  been  made  clear  by 
our  study  up  to  this  point,  it  is  that  any  substan- 
tial improvement  in  our  existing  political  institu- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  31 

tions  must  provide  for  a  large  reduction  of  the 
volume,  and  intricacy,  of  our  election  work;  that 
it  must  put  an  end  to  the  periodic  permanence  of 
that  work;  and  that  it  must  at  the  same  time  pro- 
vide some  simple,  inexpensive,  workable  process  of 
popular  election,  whereby  each  separate  political 
community  can  make  its  own  free  choice,  of  the 
men  who  are  to  have  the  supreme  control  of  its 
public  affairs. 

Bearing  these  things  in  mind,  let  us  now  consider 
some  of  the  political  laws,  as  to  the  development 
of  democratic  institutions,  which  have  been  ascer- 
tained by  our  experience  of  the  last  hundred  years. 

The  first  of  these  laws  is  this:  — 


I.   ADMINISTRATION  MUST  BE  SINGLE  HEADED, 

It  need  hardly  be  said,  that  every  chief  execu- 
tive, every  head  of  the  administrative  forces  of  a 
community,  must  himself  be  under  constant  super- 
vision, and  complete  control.  Moreover,  under  any 
form  of  government  that  can  be  termed  democratic, 
the  entire  administrative  force  of  the  community, 
through  its  single  head,  must  be,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, under  the  control  of  "  the  people."  As  has 
already  been  seen,  the  chief  practical  defect  of  our 
present  political  system  is,  that  the  supreme  con- 


32  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

trol  of  public  officials  and  public  affairs  is  not  now 
in  the  hands  of  the  people,  but  is  in  the  hands  of 
the  macliine  poUticians.  Indeed,  the  prime  essen- 
tial of  organized  democracy  is,  the  securing,  in  a 
simple  practical  effective  form,  the  control  of  pub- 
lic affairs  by  the  people  —  by  the  whole  people  — 
acting  as  a  unit,  as  a  single  political  organism. 

Subject  to  such  control  by  the  people,  however, 
the  first  law  of  organized  democracy  is,  that  ad- 
ministration must  be  single  headed. 

That  means,  that  every  administrative  office, 
or  department,  must  have  a  single  head;  that  it 
must  be  under  the  full  control  of  some  single  man, 
who  shall  individually  be  held  responsible  for  the 
efficiency  of  that  office,  or  department. 

In  order  to  accomplish  that  result,  he  must  have 
the  selection,  and  the  control,  of  his  subordinates. 
Control  —  of  his  subordinates  —  can  be  secured 
only  by  vesting  in  him  the  power  of  removal  —  of 
those  subordinates.  Then,  too,  in  order  to  secure 
his  own  efficiency,  he  must,  in  his  turn,  be  subject 
to  removal,  at  any  time,  by  his  immediate  official 
superior,  for  any  cause  which  prevents  his  effective 
discharge  of  his  official  duty. 

It  also  means,  that  the  chief  executive,  in  every 
government,  in  the  government  of  every  city,  state, 
and  the  nation,  shall  be  held  individually  respon- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  33 

sible  for  the  efficiency  of  all  the  administrative  de- 
partments and  offices  under  him;  that,  in  order  to 
secure  such  efficiency,  he  must  have  the  appoint- 
ment —  and  removal  —  of  all  his  heads  of  depart- 
ments; that,  in  order  to  secure  liis  own  efficiency, 
to  enforce  his  responsibility,  he  shall  himself  be 
subject  to  removal,  at  any  time,  by  the  best  avail- 
able superior  power;  not  merely  for  a  crime,  or  a 
distinct  violation  of  law;  but  for  any  cause,  which 
makes  _him  at  the  time  unable  to  properly  dis- 
charge his  official  duty;  for  physical  or  mental  dis- 
ability; for  fatal  defects  in  administrative  tempera- 
ment; for  obstinacy;  in  short  —  for  any  reason 
which  makes  his  removal  at  any  time  necessary  for 
the  complete  protection  of  pubhc  interests. 

It  is  easily  seen,  that  single-headed  administra- 
tion, in  this  form,  giving  to  each  head  of  an  office 
or  department  the  selection  of  his  subordinates, 
and  to  the  chief  executive  the  selection  of  all  his 
heads  of  departments,  will  at  once  remove  one  of 
the  chief  causes  of  the  existence  of  the  election 
machine.  It  will  at  once  sweep  away  a  large  part 
of  its  work.  It  will  remove  the  greater  part  of 
the  prizes,  which  are  now  to  be  won  by  success  in 
carrying  our  annual  elections.  The  chief  fact,  to- 
day, which  makes  the  volume  of  our  election  work 
so  vast,  is,  that  we  use  the  process  of  popular  elec- 


34  ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY 

tion  for  so  large  a  number  of  subordinate  admin- 
istrative offices,  in  our  state  and  local  governments; 
and,  in  addition,  we  use  the  process  at  short  fixed 
periods.  In  the  national  government,  indeed,  we 
use  the  process  of  election  only  for  the  President 
and  the  members  of  our  national  legislature.  That 
is  reasonable.  The  use  of  the  process  to  that  ex- 
tent rests  on  a  basis  of  sound  sense.  But  in  our 
state  and  local  governments,  besides  using  the  pro- 
cess for  the  selection  of  our  chief  executives,  and 
the  members  of  our  different  legislative  bodies,  we 
also  use  it  for  the  selection  of  a  large  number  of 
administrative  subordinates.  That  is  one  of  the 
chief  causes  of  the  present  large  volume  of  our  elec- 
tion work.  That,  too,  is  the  cause  of  the  large 
number  of  periodic  vacancies,  which  constitute  the 
prizes,  to  be  won  at  each  of  these  annual  election 
campaigns. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  adoption  of  single- 
headed  administration,  if  it  had  no  other  effect, 
would  at  once  eradicate  one  of  the  chief  evils  in  our 
present  political  system.  It  would  have  the  imme- 
diate effect,  of  cutting  down  the  number  of  elective 
offices;  consequently  of  cutting  down  the  volume 
of  election  work.  To  that  extent,  it  would  take 
away  the  inducements,  and  the  occupation,  of  the 
professional  politicians. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  35 

But  single-headed  administration  will  be  found 
to  justify  itself  on  every  reasonable  ground. 

Every  man,  who  has  had  any  considerable  ex- 
perience in  active  practical  affairs,  is  well  aware, 
that  the  only  administrative  responsibility,  which 
has  any  practical  value,  is  the  responsibility  of  sin- 
gle men.  The  responsibility  of  more  men  than 
one,  even  with  small  numbers,  is  worth  httle.  The 
responsibility  of  men  in  large  numbers  is  worth 
nothing. 

When,  then,  we  talk  of  the  administrative  re- 
sponsibility of  one  of  our  large  political  "parties," 
with  its  large  numbers,  and  shifting  personalities, 
we  talk  of  responsibility  which  has  no  practical 
value;  which  has,  indeed,  no  practical  existence. 
We  might  almost  as  well  talk  of  the  responsibility 
of  a  swarm  of  bees. 

We  may  lay  it  down  as  a  universal  political  law, 
that  the  division  of  power  means  the  division  of 
responsibility;  and  the  division  of  responsibility 
means  its  destruction. 

Conversely,  we  may  lay  it  down  as  the  same 
political  law,  in  another  form,  that  the  conserva- 
tion of  responsibility  requires  its  concentration; 
and  the  concentration  of  responsibility  means  the 
concentration  of  power. 

Furthermore,  there  is  only  one  way  possible,  by 


36  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

which  to  enforce  administrative  responsibility;  and 
that  is,  by  giving  to  every  administrative  head  the 
selection,  and  the  removal,  of  his  subordinates. 

The  theory  of  our  present  form  of  "government 
by  the  people"  is,  that  administrative  responsi- 
bility is  to  be  enforced  by  "the  people,"  through 
the  use  of  the  process  of  popular  election,  at  short 
fixed  terms,  by  the  entire  body  of  citizens  in  mass, 
as  to  large  numbers  of  officials  in  mass.  It  is  an 
attempt  to  enforce  responsibility  —  of  public  oflB- 
cials  in  mass,  to  the  citizens  in  mass.  It  is  tlie  very 
quintessence  of  the  attempt  at  mass  rule. 

Such  an  attempt  inevitably  results  in  the  utter 
destruction  —  of  administrative  responsibility,  and 
administrative  efiiciency.  It  is  fundamentally  and 
fatally  vicious.  Every  system  of  government,  that 
has  ever  been  framed  on  that  principle,  has  had 
the  same  result.    No  other  is  possible. 

In  ancient  times,  the  old  Romans  carried  the 
system  of  divided  responsibility  to  an  absurd  ex- 
treme, when  they  gave  the  command  of  their 
armies  to  one  consul  on  one  day,  to  the  other 
consul  on  the  next. 

In  modern  times,  "parliamentary  government," 
as  it  is  termed,  has  developed  ofiicial  responsibil- 
ity in  a  still  more  remarkable,  and  grotesque  form; 
that  of  responsibility  of  the  heads  of  administrative 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  37 

departments,  termed  a  "ministry,"  for  legislation. 
Under  what  is  termed  "parliamentary  govern- 
ment," the  practice  is,  that  the  heads  of  admin- 
istrative departments,  collectively,  lose  their  ad- 
ministrative positions,  not  for  failures  in  adminis- 
tration, but  for  a  failure  on  the  part  of  themselves 
and  their  followers  to  carry  some  measure  of  legis- 
lation. At  times,  the  resignation  of  some  single 
minister,  or  even  of  the  whole  of  a  ministry,  may 
be  enforced  for  reasons  which  concern  adminis- 
tration. But  the  regular  practice  is,  that  an  entire 
ministry  resigns  from  their  offices  of  administra- 
tion, by  reason  of  a  failure  to  carry  some  measure 
of  legislation.  We  need  go  no  further,  to  find  the 
cause  of  the  universally  conceded  administrative  in- 
efficiency of  the  British  government.  Administra- 
tive responsibility,  in  any  correct  sense  of  the  term, 
has  no  existence.  The  heads  of  administrative  de- 
partments are  compelled  —  to  give  their  time  and 
best  efforts  to  work  in  the  House  of  Commons;  to 
keeping  a  majority  in  the  House,  not  to  the  affairs  of 
the  Army,  the  Navy,  or  the  administrative  offices 
of  which  they  purport  to  be  the  heads.  Either 
work  alone,  the  work  of  legislation  or  administra- 
tion, will  tax  to  the  utmost  the  powers  of  any  one 
man.  The  result  is,  that  neither  work  is  done  well. 
No  single  minister  is  responsible  for  any  one  thing. 


38  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

No  single  minister  gives  his  time,  and  energies,  to 
one  thing.  No  single  minister  is  judged  separately, 
for  his  individual  performance,  of  any  one  class  of 
work.  The  result  is,  that  the  absence  of  individual 
responsibility  works  the  destruction  of  administra- 
tive efficiency. 

Administrative  efficiency  can  be  secured  in  only 
one  way;  that  is,  through  a  system  of  individual 
responsibility,  for  individual  performance,  in  the 
work  of  administration  alone;  by  having  all  admin- 
istrative officials  selected  and  removed  separately, 
by  reason  of  their  success  or  failure  in  giving  good 
administrative  results. 

Thereupon  it  follows,  that  the  selection,  and  the 
removal,  of  all  administrative  officials  must  be  made 
by  some  man,  or  body  of  men,  who  will  have  full 
and  accurate  knowledge  of  the  quality  of  their 
official  work. 

That  being  so,  the  selection  and  removal  of  all 
administrative  officials  must  be  made  by  their  im- 
mediate official  superior.  He  is  the  only  person, 
who  can  have  the  needed  knowledge.  Moreover, 
he  will  be  led  by  his  own  personal  interests  to  use 
his  power  of  selection  and  removal,  with  a  view  to 
serving  the  interests  of  the  public.  For  it  is  on  the 
fitness  and  efficiency  of  his  own  subordinates,  that 
he  must  depend  for  his  own  administrative  success. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  39 

No  doubt,  there  will  always  be  the  possibility,  that 
the  power  in  his  hands  may  be  used  unwisely.  But 
a  wise  use  of  that  power  in  any  other  hands  will  be 
an  impossibility. 

Nor  is  there  the  possibility,  that  any  man  should 
get  the  most  earnest  and  efficient  work  from  his 
subordinates,  unless  they  know  that  he  has  the 
power  to  discharge  them  at  any  time,  for  miscon- 
duct or  inefficiency.  Wliat  would  become  of  the 
business  of  any  one  of  our  large  private  corpo- 
rations, if  employees  were  independent  of  their 
employers;  if  they  could  keep  their  situations  for 
four  years,  or  for  one  year,  whether  they  did  their 
work  well  or  ill .'  Human  nature  is  the  same,  in  both 
public  and  private  affairs.  The  term  system,  which 
practically  allows  our  public  servants  to  keep  their 
official  positions  for  a  fixed  term  of  years,  with 
practically  no  regard  to  the  quality  of  their  work, 
or  their  fitness  for  their  places,  is  flatly  in  defiance 
of  all  the  principles  of  sound  administration,  and 
the  dictates  of  common  sense.  Such  a  system  — 
to  an  absolute  certainty  —  destroys  all  possibility 
of  high  administrative  efficiency.  It  would  very 
quickly  ruin  any  private  business.  Its  effects  on 
our  public  business  are  quite  as  bad,  as  they  would 
be  on  the  business  of  any  private  individual.  The 
reason  why  the  system  does   not  work  the  ruin  of 


40  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

our  public  business  is,  that  the  resources  of  the 
entire  people  are  so  vast.  The  mere  fact,  however, 
that,  v/ith  our  vast  wealth,  and  our  peculiar  condi- 
tions, we  have  been  able  thus  far  to  endure  the  sys- 
tem, does  not  alter  its  nature.  Nor  does  it  throw 
doubt  on  the  soundness  of  the  conclusion,  that 
the  only  way  to  secure  administrative  eflBciency,  in 
either  pubhc  or  private  affairs,  is  to  put  every  ad- 
ministrative official  under  the  control  of  some  sin- 
gle superior;  and  give  to  that  superior  the  power 
of  selecting  men  whom  he  judges  fit  for  the  work 
they  are  to  do,  and  discharging  those  men  when 
they  show  themselves  to  be  unfit  for  that  work. 

These  points  are  so  elementary,  and  any  other 
doctrine  so  flatly  contradicts  the  teachings  of  simple 
common  sense,  that  it  would  seem  almost  impos- 
sible that  a  system  of  fixed  official  terms  for  admin- 
istrative officials  should  ever  have  been  adopted. 

The  reason  for  its  adoption  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fact,  that  democratic  governments  have  thus 
far  been  regarded,  rather  as  protections  against 
tyranny,  than  as  organizations  for  the  efficient 
transaction  of  public  work.  The  fundamental  fact 
has  been  ignored,  that  every  kind  of  work,  public 
as  well  as  private,  requires  special  qualities  and 
special  training;  especially  the  training  that  comes 
only  from  experience.   All  these  considerations  have 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  41 

been  practically  ignored,  in  the  framing  of  our  pre- 
sent system  of  government;  and,  for  that  matter, 
in  the  framing  of  nearly  every  government  that  has 
ever  yet  existed,  democratic  or  hereditary. 

But  another  fact,  even  more  important,  has  been 
disregarded  in  framing  our  present  political  sys- 
tem. It  is  this.  In  order  to  ensure  efficient  work, 
work  of  the  highest  order,  the  workman  must  have 
before  him  the  possibility  of  a  career  for  Ufe, 
in  which  he  can  make  for  himself  a  reputation; 
with  the  possibility  of  rising  to  the  top  of  his  pro- 
fession, if  he  shows  himself  sufficiently  deserving. 
He  must  be  sure  of  permanent  employment,  sub- 
ject, of  course,  to  the  condition  of  honesty  and  effi- 
ciency. He  must  be  paid  reasonably  in  money,  but 
largely  and  liberally  in  the  possibility  of  an  honor- 
able reputation.  Work  of  the  highest  order  is  paid 
for,  in  general,  not  excessively  in  money,  but  largely 
in  reputation.  In  this  respect,  our  public  service, 
rightly  organized,  can  have  an  immeasurable  ad- 
vantage over  any  private  employment.  We  can,  if 
we  will,  make  it  pay  sufficiently  well  in  money; 
but  in  reputation  —  far  better  than  any  private 
calling.  In  other  words,  we  have  it  in  our  power, 
to  a  degree  impossible  for  any  private  employer, 
so  to  deal  with  our  public  servants,  as  to  make  it 
for  their  own  seffish  individual  interest  to  give  us 


42  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  highest  kind  of  work.  But  that  can  be  done 
only  in  one  way,  only  by  one  method;  and  that  is, 
by  aboUshing  the  term  system;  by  giving  our  pub- 
lic service  permanence;  by  making  the  rewards  of 
the  service  depend  on  fidelity  and  efficiency;  by  judg- 
ing each  man  separately ;  by  making  his  continuance 
in  the  service,  and  his  advancement  in  the  service, 
depend  on  the  quality  of  his  individual  work;  by 
removing  from  the  service  the  faithless  and  ineffi- 
cient; by  weeding  them  out  singly,  whenever  their 
inefficiency  is  discovered;  by  then  putting  new  men 
in  their  places,  and  testing  those  new  men  at  their 
work;  in  short,  by  selecting  men,  removing  them, 
and  promoting  them,  separately,  according  to  the 
quality  of  their  individual  performance. 

Above  all,  their  tenure  of  their  offices  must  not 
depend  on  success  in  carrying  popular  elections. 

In  other  words,  we  must  abolish  the  system  of 
tenure  by  election,  and  substitute  in  its  place  the 
system  of  tenure  during  good  behavior. 

There  is,  moreover,  another  consideration,  which 
bears  on  this  same  point. 

If  any  chief  executive  is  to  be  held  responsible 
for  the  efficiency  of  the  entire  body  of  the  adminis- 
trative force  under  him,  justice  to  him,  and  a  due 
regard  for  the  possibility  of  his  giving  the  people 
efficient  service,  absolutely  re(]uire,  that  the  selection. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  43 

and  control,  of  his  heads  of  departments  should  be 
in  his  individual  hands.  Those  department  heads 
must  not  only  be  able  and  competent  men;  but 
they  must  be  men  who  can  work  with,  and  under, 
him.  We  have  no  right  to  hold  a  man  responsible 
for  results,  unless  we  give  him  a  free  hand  in  the 
selection  of  his  tools,  his  subordinates.  Moreover, 
he  must  have  the  control  of  those  subordinates  after 
they  are  selected;  and  they  must  know  that  he  has 
it.  It  is  not  intended,  that,  in  the  use  of  that  con- 
trol, he  must  be  absolutely  free  from  all  regulation 
and  restriction.  But  his  control  of  his  subordinates 
must  be  full  and  complete.  If  he  is  held  to  a  strict 
accountability,  his  own  personal  interests  will  com- 
pel him  to  use  that  control  as  wisely  as  he  can.  For, 
if  he  selects  and  removes  his  subordinates  for  rea- 
sons other  than  their  efficiency  or  inefficiency,  he 
will  thereby  prevent  his  own  official  success.  There- 
by, in  time,  he  will  compel  his  own  removal. 

In  short,  from  whatever  point  of  view  we  con- 
sider the  question,  we  shall  find,  that  concentra- 
tion of  power  is  the  essential  condition,  of  both 
administrative  efficiency,  and  administrative  re- 
sponsibility. 

The  framers  of  democratic  governments  have 
generally  been  distrustful  of  the  concentration  of 
power  in  single  hands.    Their  fear  has  been,  that 


44  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  concentration  of  power  would  increase  the 
danger  of  its  abuse. 

Directly  the  reverse  is  the  fact.  Our  main  de- 
pendence for  enforcing  efficiency  and  responsi- 
bility, with  every  administrative  official,  must  al- 
ways be  the  supervision  and  control  of  his  imme- 
diate superior. 

But  with  the  few  administrative  chiefs,  the  few 
men  at  the  head,  there  will  be  the  operation  of 
another  force,  that  of  public  opinion.  That  force  it 
is  important  to  utilize  —  witliin  its  proper  limits  — 
though  we  can  depend  on  it  only  as  an  occasional 
auxiliary,  not  as  the  power  of  permanent  control. 

Public  opinion,  in  order  to  have  substantial  ef- 
fect, must  have  concentration.  It  must  be  concen- 
trated on  single  men.  If  any  public  official  wishes 
to  make  a  wrong  use  of  his  power,  he  is  much  less 
likely  to  do  so,  if  he  knows  that  he  must  face  pub- 
lic opinion  alone;  if  he  knows  that  the  disapproval 
or  wrath  of  the  public  is  to  be  poured,  the  whole  of 
it,  on  his  single  solitary  head.  Here,  again,  we  touch 
the  essential  weakness  of  any  attempt  to  enforce 
the  responsibility  of  a  "  party,"  or  of  any  group  of 
professional  politicians.  In  any  such  attempt,  the 
force  of  public  opinion  scatters.  It  wastes  itself  by 
diffusion.  It  strikes  so  many,  that  it  hurts  none. 
More  than  that,  the  men  who  are  really  the  efficient 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  45 

causes  of  corrupt  official  action,  keep  in  the  back- 
ground. They  are  the  "  power  behind  the  throne," 
the  uncrowned  kings;  the  poHtical  leaders,  beliind 
the  scenes,  who  pull  the  wires  and  move  the  pup- 
pets. If,  however,  there  is  some  single  department 
head,  or  some  single  chief  executive,  who  has  am- 
ple power  —  to  prevent,  or  remedy,  abuses,  who 
can  at  once  discipline,  or  remove,  corrupt  or  in- 
ejfficient  subordinates,  on  whom  the  community  can 
at  once  put  its  finger,  on  whom  responsibility  rests 
with  reason,  who,  in  his  turn,  can  be  immediately 
removed  by  his  own  single  superior,  then  public 
opinion  becomes  a  force  that  can  have  some  prac- 
tical effect;  that  can  have  some  real  power  in  pro- 
ducing practical  results.  But  in  order  to  give  to 
the  lightning  of  public  opinion  any  real  power,  it 
must  be  able  to  strike  some  single  head. 

Here,  again,  we  encounter  the  fundamental  law, 
that  the  conservation  of  responsibility  requires  its 
concentration;  and  the  concentration  of  respon- 
sibility requires  the  concentration  of  power. 

At  every  turn,  whenever  we  carefully  study  the 
practical  operation  of  administrative  forces  and 
administrative  bodies,  we  shall  find  ourselves  con- 
fronted with  the  absolute  necessity,  that  every  ad- 
ministrative body  must  be  single-headed. 

But  when  we  come  to  the  case  of  the  chief  executive. 


46  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

what  are  we  to  do  then  ?    What  security  are  we  to 
have  for  official  efficiency  and  integrity,  on  his  part  ? 

Here,  too,  we  shall  find,  that  the  only  practical 
way  of  enforcing  responsibiUty  on  the  part  of  a 
chief  executive,  a  mayor,  a  governor,  or  a  president, 
is  to  aboHsh  the  term  tenure;  to  limit  his  official 
duty  to  the  work  of  administration;  to  hold  him 
individually  responsible  for  the  efficiency  of  the  en- 
tire administrative  force  under  him;  to  that  end, 
to  give  him  full  control  of  all  the  administra- 
tive departments,  through  their  official  heads;  and 
then,  to  have  him  removable,  by  a  representa- 
tive popular  assembly;  not  at  the  end  of  a  term  of 
years,  but  at  any  time;  not  merely  for  crimes  and 
misdemeanors,  but  for  failure  to  give  good  admin- 
istrative results;  whether  by  reason  of  a  direct 
violation  of  law,  for  physical  or  mental  incapacity, 
or  for  mere  inefficiency;  in  short,  for  any  reason, 
which  causes  his  removal  to  be  at  any  time  de- 
manded by  public  interests. 

In  other  words,  the  term  system  must  be  abol- 
ished, as  to  executive  heads,  as  well  as  subordinates; 
and  single-headed  administration  must  be  adopted 
throughout  the  entire  administrative  body,  from  tlie 
bottom  to  the  top. 

Here,  no  doubt,  we  find  ourselves  opposed  by 
a  prevailing  popular  belief,  that  governmental  con- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  47 

trol  by  the  people  must  be  in  the  form  of  control 
by  the  entire  mass  of  citizens,  through  the  process 
of  periodic  popular  election  by  the  entire  mass  of 
citizens;  in  short,  through  some  form  of  mass  rule. 

Mass  responsibility,  responsibility  of  officials  in 
mass,  to  the  citizens  in  mass,  for  conduct  in  mass, 
enforced  by  periodic  popular  elections,  so  called, 
once  in  one  year,  in  two  years,  in  four  years,  or  in 
any  number  of  years,  is  a  delusion.  It  has  been  the 
cause  of  failure,  in  every  attempt  yet  made  at  the 
formation  of  democratic  institutions.  It  has  been 
the  primal  cause  of  the  primal  curse,  in  all  pre- 
vious efforts  to  establish  democracy. 

Control  by  the  people,  supremacy  of  the  people, 
in  a  practical  effective  form,  is  the  essence  of  de- 
mocratic government.  The  administrative  forces,  in 
a  democracy,  must  be  made  responsible  to  the  peo- 
ple, in  some  simple  effective  method.  Such  respon- 
sibility we  do  not  now  have.  As  we  have  already 
seen,  the  destruction  of  real  responsibility  to  the  peo- 
ple is  the  chief  defect  of  our  present  political  system. 

Democratic  organization  will  have  for  its  chief 
end,  the  providing  some  really  efficient  means  for 
enforcing  such  administrative  responsibility. 

What  shall  that  means  be  ? 

That  brings  us  to  the  statement  of  our  second 
political  law. 


48  ORGANIZED    DEMOCRACY 


n.  THE  ORGAN  OF  SUPREME  CONTROL  IN  THE 
BODY  POLITIC  MUST  BE  THE  POPULAR 
ASSEMBLY. 

Democracy  has  generally  been  assumed  to  be  a 
form  of  government,  whereby  is  secured  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  people's  will. 

But  with  a  people,  as  with  an  individual,  the  will 
should  be  under  the  control  of  the  thinking  faculty 
—  of  the  reason,  the  judgment.  Consequently,  de- 
mocracy, if  it  is  to  be  a  really  wise  form  of  govern- 
ment, should  do  something  more  than  secure  the  su- 
premacy of  the  people's  will.  It  should  secure  the 
control  of  the  people's  will  by  the  people's  judgment. 

This  supremacy  of  the  people's  judgment,  as  the 
power  of  final  supreme  control,  will  be  found  to 
be  a  result  quite  practicable,  quite  attainable  by 
human  institutions ;  a  thing  quite  possible  of  actual 
accomplishment;  and  that,  too,  by  the  use  of  po- 
litical machinery  already  well  proved  by  the  tests 
of  actual  experiment. 

The  practical  importance  of  this  point  will  be 
more  apparent,  when  we  bear  in  mind  the  con- 
clusion already  reached,  that  public  administra- 
tion, like  private,  must  be  single-headed.  The  chief 
executive  of  a  large  community  will  wield  great 
power.    Consequently,  if  government  is  to  be  really 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  49 

democratic,  if  we  are  to  have  a  genuine  "govern- 
ment by  the  people,"  this  one  man  at  the  head 
of  a  community's  entire  administrative  force,  this 
chief  executive,  must  be  placed  in  some  way  under 
continuous  effective  control;  under  control  by  the 
whole  people,  thinking,  judging,  and  acting,  as  one 
organism;  in  such  a  way  as  to  insure,  and  enforce, 
thorough  complete  responsibihty  to  the  people. 

How  is  that  to  be  accomplished?  How  is  it  to 
be  made  an  actual  practical  result,  in  the  regular 
every-day  working  of  a  government  ? 

Evidently,  as  has  now  been  demonstrated  by 
the  experience  of  every  people  which  has  thus  far 
made  attempts  at  the  development  of  democratic 
institutions,  it  cannot  be  accomplished  by  any  term 
system,  by  any  system  of  periodic  elections  by  the 
citizens  in  mass. 

We  must,  then,  make  some  other  experiment, 
on  some  other  foundation. 

Government,  in  large  communities,  in  all  its 
branches,  must  be  "representative;"  that  is,  it 
must  be  by  men  in  some  way  specially  selected, 
who  will  act  for  the  entire  community.  In  small 
communities,  in  country  towns  and  villages,  the 
selection  of  their  chief  public  servants,  together 
with  their  general  supervision  and  control,  should 
be  in  the  hands  of  the  citizens  themselves,  meet- 


50  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ing  and  acting  as  one  body  in  their  own  persons. 
In  large  communities,   however,  all   public  func- 
tions must  be  in  the  hands  of  "representatives;" 
of  men  who  will  "represent"  the  people  in  action; 
who  will  be  their  agents.    In  the  act  of  original  se- 
lection, through  some  simple  practical  process  of 
popular  election,  each  citizen  should  have  his  sin- 
gle voice.    The  form  and  operation  of  that  process 
will  be  the  subject  of  our  later  study.    But  in  any 
large  community,  it  is  a  mere  impossibility  —  for 
the  individual  citizen  to  take  part  in  the  work  of 
supervision  and  control;    an  impossibility  as  com- 
plete, as  it  is  for  him   to  take  part  in  the  daily 
routine  work  of  administration.    Having  taken  his 
part  in  the  work  of  original  selection,  of  the  men  at 
the  government's  head,  there  the  functions  of  the 
citizen  must  end.  He  cannot  possibly  have  the  time, 
or  the  knowledge,  to  take  part  in  the  work  of  su- 
preme supervision  and  control. 

This  position  does,  no  doubt,  involve  a  recon- 
struction of  current  theories  as  to  democratic  govern- 
ment. It  will,  however,  be  seen  to  be  fundamental, 
and  essential.  Its  soundness  will  be  found  to  be 
fully  established,  if  we  give  the  subject  a  careful 
consideration,  in  the  light  of  the  lessons  to  be  learned 
from  our  own  large  experience  in  the  last  century. 

Let  us  now  give  it  that  consideration.     And  at 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  61 

each  turn  of  this  study,  in  view  of  its  large  impor- 
tance, and  its  many-sided  practical  relations,  the 
forbearance  of  the  reader  must  be  asked,  if  there 
seem  to  be  somewhat  of  needless  repetition. 

Each  body  politic,  each  political  community, 
each  village,  town,  city,  state,  and  the  nation,  is 
a  distinct  human  organism.  Taken  together,  in 
combination,  they  constitute  a  single,  more  com- 
plex, organism.  But  each  one  of  them  is,  at  the 
same  time,  a  distinct  organism  in  itself.  Each  must 
have  its  own  distinct  organic  life. 

Especially,  every  body  politic  must  have  for  its 
power  of  supreme  control  its  own  brain;  its  own 
separate  organ,  whereby  it  can  form,  and  utter,  its 
own  unified  common  judgment,  and  its  own  unified 
common  will.  The  body  politic  is  not  to  be  gov- 
erned by  its  different  cells,  organs,  and  members, 
taken  collectively;  acting,  or  attempting  to  act,  in 
mass.  In  the  small  rural  community,  the  little 
country  town,  we  have  something  analogous  to  the 
plant  or  animal  of  a  single  cell;  a  single  organism, 
which  serves  continuously  and  cotemporaneously,  for 
the  performance  of  all  the  different  bodily  func- 
tions; those  of  absorption,  digestion,  locomotion, 
at  one  and  the  same  time.  But  in  the  larger  and 
more  complex  political  bodies,  we  must  have  the 
differentiation  of  functions,  with  a  corresponding 


52  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

differentiation  of  organs.  The  larger  the  commu- 
nity, the  more  varied  and  complex  must  be  that 
differentiation.    That  is  the  order  of  nature. 

Especially,  in  the  case  of  large  communities,  is 
it  all  the  more  essential,  that  we  should  have  a 
separate  organ  for  the  work  of  supreme  control; 
an  organ  for  the  people's  deUberations ;  an  organ 
for  forming  and  uttering  the  people's  thought;  a 
body  of  men  of  superior  capacity,  carefully  se- 
lected; men  of  large  knowledge,  and  large  expe- 
rience in  pubUc  affairs;  who  shall  constitute  the 
community's  brain;  which  will  supervise  and 
control  all  the  other  organs  and  members  of  the 
body  poUtic.  As  already  stated,  the  attempt  to  vest 
the  general  control  of  public  affairs  in  the  citizens 
in  their  own  persons,  is  quite  practicable,  in  the 
case  of  small  communities,  in  small  towns  and  vil- 
lages. Wlien,  however,  we  are  confronted  with  the 
different  conditions,  which  exist  in  our  large  modern 
communities,  in  our  large  cities  and  states,  such 
control  becomes  an  impossibility.  Public  ques- 
tions then  become  larger,  and  more  complex.  Their 
decision  demands  larger  knowledge,  wider  expe- 
rience, more  thorough  and  continuous  thought. 
We  laymen,  however  intelligent  or  well  educated 
we  may  be,  cannot  have  the  knowledge,  or  the  time, 
to  master  the  facts  —  of  important  pubUc  ques- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  53 

tions.  In  our  large  modern  communities,  it  is  this 
work  of  final  supervision  and  control,  far  more 
than  the  work  of  administration,  which  demands 
men  of  exceptional  capacity,  and  exceptional  ex- 
perience. It  is  this  work  of  supreme  control,  above 
all  others,  which  is  quite  beyond  the  capacities  of 
the  collective  mass  of  citizens;  which  must  be  in 
the  hands  of  men  carefully  selected,  who  will  con- 
stitute a  distinct  separate  organ  in  the  body  politic, 
the  people's  brain. 

This  conclusion  will  be  found  all  the  more  neces- 
sary, and  unavoidable,  when  we  consider  another 
point  to  which  we  have  already  made  allusion. 

The  essential  idea,  which  lies  at  the  foundation 
of  the  current  notions  of  democracy,  it  is  said,  is 
that  of  the  supremacy  of  the  people's  will.  It  is 
the  people's  will,  it  is  said,  which  must  be  the  su- 
preme power  in  the  state. 

So  it  should. 

But  we  must  also  bear  in  mind  the  vital  neces- 
sity, as  has  been  already  stated,  that  the  people's 
will  should  be  guided  —  and  governed  —  by  the 
people's  judgment.  It  will  not  answer  for  a  people, 
any  more  than  for  an  individual,  to  be  the  victim 
of  its  whims  and  caprices;  or  even  of  its  hasty 
ill-considered  impressions  and  opinions;  formed 
without  knowledge,  or  with  insufficient  knowledge; 


54  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

without  deliberation,  or  with  insufficient  dehbera- 
tion.  The  interests  of  the  entire  people  are  larger, 
and  more  complex,  than  those  of  any  individual. 
They  involve  the  consideration  of  larger  and  more 
complex  collections  of  facts.  All  the  more  vital 
and  essential  is  it,  that  all  large  questions  of  public 
policy  should  be  decided  after  the  most  mature  de- 
liberation, by  the  people's  best  thought,  by  its  best 
judgment.  It  is  not  enough,  that  the  action  of  the 
body  poUtic  should  be  the  expression  of  mere  hasty 
ill-considered  volition,  even  on  the  part  of  the  en- 
tire mass  of  the  individual  citizens. 

Nor  will  it  serve  our  needs,  to  have  public  af- 
fairs regulated  by  the  judgment  of  ordinary,  aver- 
age men.  These  large  public  questions  must  be 
handled  by  men  of  exceptional  ability,  and  excep- 
tional experience.  Consequently,  the  chief  point 
to  be  kept  in  view,  in  working  out  the  problem  of 
democratic  organization,  is  to  devise  some  organ, 
some  organ  that  is  practicable,  and  available,  which 
shall  be  the  body  politic's  brain;  the  organ  for 
forming  and  uttering  the  people's  wisest  judgment. 

Here  is  the  point  of  fundamental  importance  in 
our  study.  Here  we  touch  the  inherent  weakness 
of  any  and  every  system  of  hereditary  govern- 
ment; government  by  hereditary  kings,  or  hered- 
itary classes.    Hereditary  government,  under  what- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  55 

ever  form  it  may  exist,  is  not,  and  never  can  be, 
government  by  the  people's  brain.  Under  any  and 
every  system  of  hereditary  government,  the  men 
at  the  head  of  the  state  are  selected  by  birth,  and 
not  worth;  by  reason  of  the  fact,  that  they  are  the 
descendants,  actual  or  putative,  of  their  ancestors. 
They  hold  the  high  places  in  the  state,  as  property, 
by  inheritance,  instead  of  being  selected  for  those 
places,  by  the  people,  on  their  own  merits,  to  be 
tlie  people's  servants. 

Democracy,  on  the  contrary,  in  its  fully  devel- 
oped form,  implies  as  its  chief  essential,  that  the 
men  at  the  head  of  the  state,  the  men  on  whom 
the  community  must  depend  for  the  wise  hand- 
ling of  large  and  complex  public  questions,  shall 
be  a  body  of  exceptional  men;  selected  by  reason 
of  their  ability  in  affairs;  who  will  constitute  the 
organ  for  forming  and  uttering  the  people's  best 
thought,  the  people's  wisest  judgment;  being  se- 
lected —  by  the  people  —  for  that  very  work.  The 
people's  thought,  in  large  communities,  must  be  by 
the  people's  brain.  The  people's  brain  must  be  a 
separate  organ,  a  separate  body  of  men,  composed 
of  the  people's  best  fibre,  specially  selected  —  by 
a  rational  process  of  popular  election. 

What  light  do  we  get  from  the  previous  history  of 
democratic  institutions,  as  to  this  point  —  the  pro- 


56  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

viding  this  special  organ  —  for  forming  and  utter- 
ing a  people's  judgment,  and  a  people's  will? 

The  historic  tendency,  in  the  development  of 
democratic  institutions,  has  been,  thus  far,  steadily 
in  the  direction  of  the  supremacy  of  the  popular 
assembly,  of  either  one  or  two  chambers;  as  it 
seems  to  me,  of  one  chamber,  as  the  power  of  su- 
preme control  in  the  state. 

The  principal  reason,  for  the  existence,  and  use, 
of  the  popular  assembly,  in  democratic  institutions, 
has  hitherto  generally  been  assumed  to  be  its  neces- 
sity, as  a  bulwark  for  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the 
citizen,  and  the  people,  against  the  people's  rulers. 

This  necessity  was,  in  former  times,  a  real  ne- 
cessity. It  was,  no  doubt,  the  chief  reason,  and  a 
sufficient  reason,  for  the  existence  of  the  popular 
assembly,  in  times  past,  under  the  rule  of  heredi- 
tary kings. 

But  that  reason  ceases  to  have  any  considerable 
importance,  when  a  people  has  once  finally  achieved 
its  liberty;  when  it  has  finally  overthrown  the  sys- 
tem of  inheritance  in  matters  of  state  control ;  when 
it  has  finally  conquered,  as  every  civilized  people 
must,  and  will,  the  right  to  frame  its  own  politi- 
cal institutions,  on  its  own  free  judgment.  Then  it 
can  consider  the  popular  assembly  from  a  different 
standpoint;    as  the  means  of  accomplishing  a  dif- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  57 

ferent  political  purpose;  as  the  organ  for  forming 
and  uttering  the  people's  wisest  thought,  on  pub- 
lic questions  of  large  importance;  as  the  organ  for 
concentrating  on  single  questions  the  united  thought 
of  the  entire  people;  giving  to  that  thought  unity; 
and  supporting  it  by  the  concentrated  forces  of  the 
entire  community. 

The  question  here  to  be  considered  is :  whether  it 
is  not  possible  —  and  practicable  —  for  the  popular 
assembly  to  accomplish  tliis  result  just  stated,  in 
the  regular  daily  working  of  a  democratic  govern- 
ment ?  Has  not  the  popular  assembly  here  its  real 
function,  in  a  system  of  genuine  democracy  ? 

In  order  to  answer  that  question,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  consider  the  actual  operative  processes  of 
the  popular  assembly,  in  what  may  be  termed  its 
natural  normal  form. 

Here  we  are  not  remitted  to  conjecture,  or  theory, 
or  to  any  kind  of  doubt,  or  uncertainty,  by  reason 
of  the  absence  of  known  facts.  The  popular  as- 
sembly, in  one  or  another  form,  with  its  members 
selected  in  one  or  another  way,  is  not  a  thing  new, 
or  untried.  Its  existence  began  in  times  of  remote 
antiquity.  It  has  been  used,  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent,  in  many  forms,  by  many  peoples.  It  has 
always  been  used,  though  roughly  and  crudely,  for 
the  purpose  now  under  consideration,  the  forming 


58  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

and  uttering  of  a  people's  joint  common  thought; 
although  that  purpose  may  not  at  the  time  have 
been  publicly  proclaimed,  or  fully  appreciated.  Its 
practical  processes,  and  its  practical  results,  are  well 
ascertained. 

What  are  they? 

They  are  three:  Conference,  deliberation,  and 
agreement.  They  are  not,  or  should  not  be,  pro- 
cesses of  antagonism,  and  contest. 

In  any  private  or  public  assembly,  composed  of 
a  reasonable  number  of  reasonable  men,  having 
united  common  interests,  met  for  joint  action  on 
those  interests,  those  men  begin  their  action  with 
conference;  with  a  bringing  together  of  the  differ- 
ent individual  views,  of  the  different  individual 
men,  as  to  the  common  course  of  action,  on  which 
they  must  in  the  end  agree,  —  and  unite.  Next,  they 
discuss  —  shake  out,  and  weigh  —  those  different  in- 
dividual views.  In  other  words,  they  deliberate.  In 
the  last  stage  of  their  action,  they  come  to  an  agree- 
ment, as  to  the  common  course  of  action,  which  they 
deem  the  best  suited  to  accomplish  the  common  pur- 
pose, and  protect  the  common  interests.  Through- 
out the  entire  operation,  from  the  beginning  to  the 
end,  the  process  should  be,  and  easily  can  be,  one  of 
cooperation;  of  men  working  together;  not  a  pro- 
cess of  antagonism,  of  contest.    Different  individ- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  59 

iials  will  have  different  individual  views.  They 
will  express  those  views.  Often  it  will  happen, 
that  the  expression  of  those  views  will  be  accom- 
panied with  more  or  less  warmth  of  feehng.  But 
in  the  end,  reasonable  men,  who  have  common 
interests,  will  almost  invariably  come  to  an  agree- 
ment, as  to  a  united  common  course  of  action,  not- 
withstanding their  original  differences  of  opinion. 
Oftentimes,  they  will  retain  to  the  end  their  dif- 
ferences of  opinion,  yet  will  nevertheless  agree  on 
their  common  course  of  action.  Oftentimes,  too, 
they  will  change  their  opinions.  Sensible  men  well 
understand,  that,  in  the  end,  in  order  to  accom- 
plish any  practical  result,  they  must  come  to  an 
agreement.  Agreement  must  be  their  aim  and  pur- 
pose, from  the  beginning.  Discussion,  with  sen- 
sible men,  is  a  process  of  agreement.  It  involves, 
no  doubt,  a  contest  between  ideas.  But  it  should 
not,  and  need  not,  be  a  contest  between  men.  The 
men  —  whatever  they  may  think,  are,  or  should  be, 
working  in  harmony.  They  know,  that  that  is 
the  only  way  to  work  with  efficiency.  Indeed,  it  is 
the  only  way  in  wliich  they  can  work  at  all;  that 
is,  it  is  the  only  way  in  which  they  can  accom- 
plish results.  Free  democratic  government  should 
not  consist  in  continuous  periodic  contests  between 
men  —  for  places  and  votes.    If  a  contest  at  all,  it 


60  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

should  be  a  contest  between  ideas;  a  search  after 
the  truth;  after  the  measures  which  will  best  pro- 
tect the  interests  of  the  largest  number.  So  far  as 
concerns  men,  it  should  always  be  a  process  of  co- 
operation. 

"  Party  government "  has  been  generally  assumed 
to  be  a  contest  between  policies;  a  struggle  for  the 
victory  of  one  policy  over  another,  in  the  persons 
of  the  men  who  have  been  believers  in  those  poli- 
cies.   That  has  been  the  theory. 

In  fact,  however,  and  in  practice,  "party  gov- 
ernment" has  almost  always  been — in  the  main  — 
a  perpetual  periodic  contest  for  place;  between 
organizations  of  professional  politicians,  many  of 
whom  may  have  sincerely  believed  in  the  policies, 
or  principles,  which  they  have  professed,  but  whose 
immediate  moving  purpose  has,  after  all,  been  the 
acquisition  of  the  control  of  government,  largely  for 
the  promotion  of  their  own  personal  interests. 

Now,  even  if  we  assume,  contrary  to  the  fact, 
that  an  entire  community  can  possibly  be  divided 
into  two  or  more  adverse  bodies  of  men,  who  really 
hold  distinctly  diverse  political  beliefs,  on  all,  or  on 
many,  important  public  questions,  nevertheless,  a 
wise  regard  for  public  interests  requires,  that  the 
citizens  who  compose  those  organizations  should 
unite,  should  agree  —  on  the  wisest  course  of  com- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  61 

mon  action,  notwithstanding  their  differences  of 
belief.  PubUc  interests  are  very  imperfectly  pro- 
moted, indeed,  they  are  almost  invariably  injured, 
by  these  perpetual  periodic  contests  for  the  offices, 
even  if  the  contestants  have  sincere  differences  of 
opinion.  Notwithstanding  those  differences,  public 
interests  require,  that  the  parties  so  differing  should 
always  come  to  an  agreement,  as  to  the  common 
course  of  action.  A  people  should  think,  and  act, 
as  a  unit,  as  a  single  body,  as  a  single  organism, 
notwithstanding  any  differences  of  opinion,  between 
different  individuals,  or  groups  of  individuals,  as  to 
policies,  or  principles.  And  it  is  an  easy  possi- 
bility, if  we  abolish  these  perpetual  periodic  con- 
tests for  place,  that  a  people  should  so  unite,  on 
such  course  of  combined  common  action,  by  the  use 
of  nature's  regular  poUtical  processes  —  conference, 
discussion,  and  agreement. 

The  advocates  of  "  party  government "  so  called, 
have  generally  assumed,  that  differences  of  opinion, 
between  different  individuals,  or  different  groups  of 
individuals,  necessitate  disagreement  as  to  a  course 
of  action.  Quite  the  reverse  is  the  fact,  with  reason- 
able men.  It  is  only  the  small  minority  of  unrea- 
sonable irreconcilables,  who  always  insist  on  having 
either  their  own  way  or  none.  Sensible  men  are 
well  aware,  that  their  own  opinions  are  not  invari- 


62  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ably  certiiin  to  be  right.  They  are  well  aware,  that 
their  own  opinions,  even  if  right,  must  often  yield  to 
the  opinions  of  other  men ;  who,  on  their  part,  have 
the  same  right  to  hold  their  opinions.  Practical  men, 
men  of  affairs,  are  well  aware,  that  concession,  con- 
cession on  all  sides,  is  not  only  a  necessity  in  order 
to  get  action,  but  that  it  is,  in  the  large  majority  of 
cases,  the  surest  way  of  deciding  what  is  really  right, 
and  wise,  in  the  way  of  policy. 

Light  will  l)e  thrown  on  the  point  now  under 
consideration,  if  we  revert  for  a  moment  to  the  con- 
ditions under  which  the  popular  assembly  has  gen- 
erally come  into  existence,  in  the  previous  develop- 
ment of  democratic  institutions. 

In  the  rough  rudimentary  stages  of  ci\'ilization, 
when  public  questions  are  settled  by  brute  force, 
when  there  is  an  absence  of  the  rule  of  law,  most 
people  take  temporary  refuge  in  the  one  man 
power,  in  monarchy.  Large  public  questions  are 
then  comparatively  few  in  number.  Society  is  crude, 
and  undeveloped.  It  lives  in  a  condition  of  turmoil 
and  strife.  Public  questions  are  settled  by  an  ap- 
peal to  arms;  by  armies.  Armies  must  be  under 
single  heads.  Popular  assemblies  are  not  fitted  to 
direct  the  operations  of  war.  The  practical  result, 
then,  is  that  in  the  ages  of  lawlessness  and  war, 
men  take  refuge  in  monarchy,  as  the  only  form  of 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  63 

government  which  is  practicable,  under  then  exist- 
ing conditions. 

But  as  conditions  become  more  settled,  as  pro- 
perty increases,  as  social  relations  become  more 
complex,  and  the  need  becomes  imperative  for  the 
rule  of  law,  it  becomes  more  and  more  impossible, 
that  any  single  mind  should  be  equal  to  the  su- 
preme control  of  the  pubUc  affairs  of  any  large  com- 
munity. According  to  the  ordinary  idea,  the  most 
serious  objection  to  monarchy  is,  that  monarchy 
is  a  tyranny;  that  the  monarch  has  a  tendency  to 
use  his  power  as  the  head  of  the  state,  to  serve  his 
personal  interests,  rather  than  the  interests  of  the 
whole  people.  And  as  matter  of  fact,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  hereditary  kings  in  the  past  have,  fre- 
quently, if  not  generally,  used  their  power  with 
little  or  no  regard  for  the  best  interests  of  the  peo- 
ples. That  fact,  however,  constitutes  by  no  means 
the  most  serious  practical  objection  to  the  institu- 
tion of  hereditary  monarchy,  or  to  monarchy  of  any 
kind,  as  a  form  of  practical  political  organization, 
at  the  present  day.  The  \ntal,  fatal,  objection  to 
monarchy  of  any  kind,  as  a  form  of  political  organi- 
zation at  the  present  day,  is  to  be  found  in  its  utter 
mental  inadequacy  to  the  work  of  supreme  super- 
vision and  control,  in  any  large  modem  community. 
The  work  is  too  much  for  the  brain  of  any  one  man, 


64  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

even  if  he  be  a  Napoleon.  "War  lords"  are  now 
an  anachronism,  by  reason  of  their  lack  of  brain 
power.    They  have  become  a  pohtical  excrescence. 

The  same  reason  is  conclusive,  against  vesting  the 
supreme  control  of  the  pubUc  afiFairs  of  any  large 
modem  community  in  any  hereditary  oligarchy.  An 
hereditary  oUgarchy  will  not  give  us  adequate  brain 
power. 

We  are  led,  from  sheer  necessity,  to  the  use  of 
the  representative  popular  assembly,  as  the  organ 
of  supreme  control  in  any  large  modem  community, 
if  for  no  other  reason,  in  order  to  secure  adequate 
brain  power.  Such  a  body  of  men  may  do  the  work 
imperfectly,  inasmuch  as  they  will  be  human.  Es- 
pecially, when  first  selected,  the  individual  mem- 
bers of  such  an  assembly  will  show  the  defects  which 
invariably  come  from  the  lack  of  training  and  ex- 
perience. If,  however,  the  individual  members  are 
carefully  and  wisely  selected,  by  reason  of  their 
capacity  for  affairs,  and  are  then  given  time  —  to 
gain  knowledge  and  experience,  if,  thereafter  they 
are  not  compelled  to  curry  favor  with  the  popu- 
lace, and  are  free  to  devote  their  combined  energies 
to  the  thorough  study  of  public  questions  and  pulj- 
lic  interests  —  they  will  do  the  work  of  supervision 
and  control  far  better  than  it  can  be  done  by  any 
other  available  human  agency. 


ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY  65 

The  higher  the  stage  of  civihzation  reached  by 
any  community,  the  more  clearly  pronounced  has 
been  the  tendency  to  government  by  representa- 
tive popular  assembly.  The  reason  for  that  ten- 
dency is  to  be  found  in  the  growing  general  con- 
viction, as  yet  somewhat  vague  and  unformed,  of 
the  inadequacy  of  any  other  public  organ  to  the 
large  needs  of  our  large  modem  communities.  Gov- 
ernment by  popular  assembly  has  not  yet  reached 
its  highest  stage  of  development.  But  towards  that 
form  of  government  the  tendencies  are  clear.  By 
no  other  means,  by  no  other  political  organism,  is 
it  now  a  possibility  to  concentrate  in  a  single  head 
the  political  forces  of  any  civiUzed  people. 

Still  another  point  is  here  to  be  considered. 

However  imperfect  an  organ  the  popular  assem- 
bly may  be  in  its  present  stage  of  development,  it 
is,  even  now,  the  only  power,  which  can  ever  com- 
mand the  confidence  of  any  free  modern  commun- 
ity. The  great  mass  of  citizens,  in  any  free  com- 
munity, may  be  persuaded  with  comparative  ease 
to  have  a  reasonable  degree  of  confidence  in  a  body 
of  men,  who  are  the  men  of  their  own  free  choice. 
They  will  have  complete  confidence  in  no  other 
public  authority.  Its  supremacy,  in  the  large 
modern  community,  is  therefore  inevitable. 

But  there  is,  no  doubt,  in  the  minds  of  many 


66  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

men  a  deeply  seated  conviction,  that  the  supreme 
power  in  the  state  should  not  be  vested  in  any  single 
authority;  that  no  large  power  in  the  state  should 
be  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man,  or 
body  of  men;  that  every  power  in  the  state  should 
be  divided,  among  different  men,  or  bodies  of  men; 
and  that  democratic  government,  especially,  should 
be  government  under  a  system  of  checks  and  bal- 
ances. 

Let  us  examine  this  idea. 

So  far  as  concerns  administration,  this  idea  is 
now  well  proved  to  be  erroneous.  Thoughtful  men, 
generally,  have  come  to  a  realizing  sense,  that,  so 
far  as  concerns  administration,  we  must  have  the 
concentration  of  power  in  single  hands. 

But  many  men,  whose  minds  have  gone  as  far 
as  that,  still  shrink  from  taking  the  next  step,  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  power  of  final  supreme 
control  should  be  vested  in  any  one  body  of  men, 
even  in  an  elective  representfitive  popular  assem- 
bly. In  the  minds  of  such  men,  such  vesting  of 
the  supreme  control  in  any  one  body  of  men 
would  mean  the  establishment  of  a  new  kind  of 
tyranny. 

We  must,  however,  bring  ourselves  to  compre- 
hend, and  realize,  that  under  any  and  every  con- 
ceivable form  of  government  that  can  be  devised. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  67 

the  ultimate  practical  security  for  able  and  upright 
public  administration  must  always  be  found  in  men ; 
in  the  calibre,  and  character,  of  the  men  at  the  gov- 
ernment's head.  The  only  adequate  security  against 
the  abuse  of  official  power  is  to  be  found  in  the 
quahty  of  the  men  to  whom  we  intrust  the  power 
of  final  supreme  control.  The  system  of  checks 
and  balances  has  been  fully  tried,  and  has  been 
found  wanting.  We  must  use  in  our  public  affairs 
the  same  methods  which  we  use  in  private  affairs. 
In  private  affairs,  we  place  our  dependence  on 
men.  We  find  no  great  difficulty  in  getting  men 
who  deserve  our  confidence.  At  times,  that  confi- 
dence is  misplaced.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a  well- re- 
cognized principle,  that  the  men  at  the  head  of 
every  large  private  enterprise,  the  men  who  are  re- 
sponsible for  results,  must  have  a  free  hand.  They 
must  be  trusted.  In  large  private  affairs,  the  wisest 
administrators  do  not  resort  to  the  method  of  the 
distribution  of  one  power  among  different  men,  or 
different  bodies  of  men.  Such  a  system  results  only 
in  the  destruction  of  responsibility,  and  efficiency. 

Here  we  need  not  rest  on  theory.  We  have  the 
teacliings  of  experience  in  the  history  of  the  British 
House  of  Commons. 

That  House,  in  domestic  affairs,  is  practically 
omnipotent.    Its  powers  are  restricted  by  no  con- 


68  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

stitution,  written  or  unwritten.     No  considerable 
practical  evil,  or  inconvenience,  has  ever  resulted 
from  the  absence  of   limitations  and  restrictions 
on  its  power.    Its  supremacy  has  not  resulted  in 
tyranny,  or  abuse.    Its  supremacy  has  worked  no 
considerable    evil    result.     No   authority    in   the 
state  has  ever  yet  been  found  so  worthy  of  entire 
public  confidence  as  a  deliberative  assembly,  com- 
posed of  reputable   representative  men.     Such  a 
body  of  men  can  be  trusted,  without  restriction 
or  reserve,  to  take  wise  action  on  all  large  ques- 
tions of  public  interest,  if  they  are  only  free  and 
independent,  if  they  are  really  supreme.    Under 
any  form  of  government,  our  dependence  for  the 
wise  control  of   public   affairs  must  be  on  some 
human  agency.    No  human  agency  can  be  trusted 
with   that  control    with    so  great  security,  with 
such  freedom  from  danger,  as  a  representative 
popular  assembly,  the  members  of  which  are  the 
free  choice  of  the  people.    As  a  last  resort,  under 
any  possible  form  of  government,  we  must  de- 
pend on  men  —  on  the  capacity,  the  judgment, 
and  the  honesty  —  of  men.      Constitutional  re- 
strictions, statutes,  rules,  and  regulations,  may 
be  multipUed  without  number.     With  them,  or 
without  them,  our  final  dependence  must  always 
be  the  wisdom,  and  integrity  of  men  —  of  those 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  69 

men,  in  whose  hands  we  vest  the  power  of  su- 
preme control. 

We  must  recognize  that  fact,  fully  and  finally. 
We  must  comprehend,  fully  and  finally,  that 
our  security  for  a  wise  and  upright  administra- 
tion of  public  affairs  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the 
restriction  of  power,  but  in  its  enlargement;  not 
in  distrust,  but  in  confidence. 

In  short,  democratic  government  means  free- 
dom, independence  —  combined  with  genuine 
responsibility  to  the  people  —  throughout  the 
entire  body  politic;  for  pubUc  servants,  as  well 
as  for  their  employers;  for  public  officials,  as 
well  as  the  mass  of  citizens.  Every  pubhc  ser- 
vant must  be  carefully  selected.  He  must  be 
held  to  constant  thorough  responsibility,  in  some 
way  which  will  be  really  effective.  But  he  must 
have  freedom;  the  same  freedom  that  wise  ad- 
ministrators give  to  their  employees  in  private 
employments.  In  private  employments,  we 
trust  men.  We  give  them  our  confidence.  We 
find  that  to  be  the  surest  way  of  making  them 
deserve  our  confidence.  There  is  no  atmos- 
phere so  certain  to  make  men  dishonest  and 
inefficient,  as  the  atmosphere  of  doubt  and  dis- 
trust. 

Especially,  wc  must  abandon  the  attempt  to 


70  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

keep  the  chief  executive  under  the  direct  control 
of  the  citizens  in  mass,  by  means  of  the  term 
system.  If  the  term  system  really  did  keep  that 
control  in  the  hands  of  the  citizens,  the  case  would 
be  different.  If  we,  the  mass  of  citizens,  were 
capable  of  exercising  that  control  wisely,  the  case 
would  be  different.  If  we  were  able  even  to 
know  the  time,  when  it  was  necessary  to  exer- 
cise that  control  at  all,  the  case  would  be  dif- 
ferent. In  practice,  no  one  of  these  things  is 
possible.  We,  the  mass  of  citizens,  cannot,  by 
any  possibility,  have  that  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
which  is  absolutely  necessary,  in  order  merely  to 
know  the  time  when  it  will  be  wise,  and  safe, 
to  make  a  change  in  the  person  of  the  chief  ex- 
ecutive, who  must  be  the  head  of  the  entire  ad- 
ministrative force.  No  body  of  men  can  possibly 
have  that  knowledge,  except  a  body  of  men  who 
are  continually  in  close  touch  with  the  daily  ad- 
ministration of  public  affairs. 

In  the  end,  the  final  security  of  the  individual 
citizen,  and  of  the  state,  must  always  depend 
on  the  power  of  free  thought,  and  free  speech; 
the  power  which  constitutes  the  foundation  of 
free  democratic  institutions.  That  is  the  power, 
which  will  be  the  power  of  supreme  control  in 
our  popular  assemblies,  if  we  only  give  to  those 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  71 

assemblies  freedom  and  time.  We  have  been 
placing  our  dependence  on  checks  and  balances, 
on  statutes  and  constitutions.  Constitutions 
and  statutes  are  good,  in  their  proper  places, 
for  their  proper  purposes.  But  our  final  depend- 
ence, for  honest  and  efficient  administration,  for 
a  wise  ordering  of  our  public  affairs,  must  al- 
ways be  in  men;  in  the  men  at  the  head.  Chains 
and  checks  will  not  meet  our  needs.  If  we  tie 
men's  hands  to  prevent  them  from  doing  wrong, 
we  at  the  same  time  destroy  their  power  to  do 
right.  Even  if  we  change  the  men  at  the  head 
periodically,  we  are  still  compelled  to  trust  the 
men  who  are  in  high  office  during  their  terms. 
During  that  period,  even  those  men,  never  the 
men  of  our  own  free  choice,  have  to  be  trusted. 
Under  any  and  every  political  system,  our  de- 
pendence for  wise  and  upright  administration 
must  always  be  the  men  at  the  government's 
head. 

Hitherto  —  for  the  time  —  we  have  been  dis- 
trusting the  power  of  freedom,  of  free  thought, 
and  free  action,  which  is,  and  always  must  be, 
the  power  of  propulsion,  and  of  control,  in  every 
free  democratic  government. 

There  is  no  piece  of  political  machinery,  so 
destructive  of  political  freedom,  of  political  free 


72  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

thought,  political  free  speech,  and  political  free 
action,  as  this  term  system.  Under  it,  every- 
thing is  subordinated  to  the  necessity  of  carr}'- 
ing  the  next  election.  Every  citizen  must  join, 
and  act  with,  one  or  another  "  party."  The 
machine  politicians,  generally  controlled  by  the 
power  of  money,  virtually  decide  and  control 
all  questions  of  public  policy.  Often,  if  not  gen- 
erally, those  questions  are  decided  by  the  con- 
certed action  of  the  politicians  in  both  great 
"parties,"  acting  in  combination.  Public  mea- 
sures, to  use  the  phrase  of  the  day,  are  "  jammed 
through."  The  phrase  is  not  attractive.  But, 
like  all  phrases  which  work  their  way  into  the 
language  of  the  time,  it  stands  for  a  fact.  It  is 
to-day  the  fact,  that  the  most  important  public 
measures,  which  are  —  in  form — adopted  by  our  so- 
called  popular  assembUes,  are  "  jammed  through," 
by  the  commands  of  the  machine  politicians, 
who,  in  their  turn,  are  controlled  by  money. 
Free  thought,  and  free  speech,  as  regular  pro- 
cesses in  the  daily  transaction  of  our  public  busi- 
ness, by  our  public  servants,  so  called,  have  — 
for  the  time  —  almost  fallen  into  disuse.  The 
reason  for  that  state  of  things  is,  in  the  main, 
to  be  found  in  the  term  system,  this  system  of 
perpetual  periodic  "  popular  election,"  falsely  so 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  73 

called.  It  is  this  system  of  tenure  by  election, 
which  is  responsible  for  the  present  suppression 
of  free  thought  and  free  speech,  which  ought 
to  be  the  forces  of  supreme  control  in  our  daily 
political  life. 

We  must  abandon  it.  We  must  abandon  the 
attempt,  in  any  form,  to  vest  the  supreme  con- 
trol of  the  body  politic  in  the  entire  body  of  citi- 
zens in  mass.  The  supreme  power  in  the  body 
politic  must  be  the  popular  assembly. 

But  then  we  strike  another  point. 

If  the  popular  assembly  is  to  be  a  body  of  men 
capable  of  exercising  this  power  of  supreme  con- 
trol wisely,  it  must  be  composed  of  men  who  are 
able  and  upright;  of  the  community's  best  men; 
men  who  command  the  confidence  of  their  fel- 
low citizens ;  men  who  are  selected  by  their  fellow 
men  by  reason  of  their  superior  abilities  and 
character. 

How  are  we  to  get  men  of  that  kind  ? 

Only  by  the  machinery  of  popular  election. 
But  that  machinery  must  be  so  framed  that  the 
process  of  popular  election  will  be  really  free;  so 
as  to  make  it  practicable  for  the  citizens  to  make 
their  own  free  choice  of  their  representatives  on 
their  own  best  judgment. 

How  can  that  result  be  accomplished  in  prac- 


74  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

tice?  How  can  the  members  of  the  popular  as- 
sembly be  selected  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
them  really  the  people's  free  choice  ?  What  form 
of  the  process  of  popular  election  can  we  devise, 
which  will  insure  that  the  selection  of  the  men 
at  the  head  of  the  body  politic  shall  be  really  an 
act  of  the  people's  own  deliberate  judgment  ? 

That  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  our  next 
political  law,  the  law  which  decides  the  form  of  the 
process  of  popular  election. 

It  is  this :  — 

III.  THE  POPULAR  ASSEMBLY  MUST  BE  THE 
ORGAN  FOR  FORMING  AND  UTTERING  THE 
PEOPLE'S  JUDGMENT  IN  THE  SELECTION  OF 
MEN. 

Popular  election,  in  some  form,  as  the  process 
for  the  selection  of  the  men  at  the  head  of  the 
state,  would  seem  to  be  almost  a  logical  neces- 
sity, in  any  state  termed  democratic.  No  other 
method  would  be  deemed  possible. 

The  commonly  accepted  reason,  thus  far,  for 
the  use  of  the  process  of  popular  election  in  the 
selection  of  the  highest  public  officials,  has  been 
its  supposed  necessity  as  a  security  for  the  peo- 
ple's rights  and  liberties.  Many  men  might  con- 
cede, that  the  process  of  popular  election  is  not 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  75 

the  one  best  fitted  to  secure  the  selection  of  the 
men  most  fit  for  the  pubHc  service;  that  it  does 
not  give  any  high  degree  of  certainty  for  getting 
the  right  man  in  the  right  place;  which  must 
always  be  the  first  essential  to  efiiciency  of  admin- 
istration, and  to  good  government  in  general. 

My  contention,  however,  is,  that  the  process 
of  popular  election,  used  in  the  right  form,  and 
within  right  limitations,  is  the  best  available 
practical  process,  for  the  selection  of  the  few 
men  who  are  to  be  the  head  of  every  body  poli- 
tic. If  the  process  can  be  made  to  take  such  a 
form,  that  it  shall  be  a  real  act  of  judgment,  by 
the  people,  on  the  fitness  of  single  men  for  sin- 
gle places;  if  the  process  can  be  made  to  take 
such  form  as  to  give  us  the  people's  calm  delib- 
erate judgment,  as  to  the  character  and  capa- 
city of  the  men  for  whom  they  vote,  then,  no 
other  process  can  be  devised,  which  is  so  cer- 
tain in  my  belief  to  secure  a  wise  selection  of  the 
men  who  are  to  fill  the  highest  places  in  the 
government.  Especially,  no  other  process  can  be 
devised,  which  will  insure  the  selection  of  men 
who  will  be  so  sure  to  command  the  people's  con- 
fidence.   And  that  is  a  thing  of  vital  importance. 

Of  course,  we  must  have  some  form  of  the 
process,  which  shall  give  us  something  more  than 


76  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

an  aggregation  of  individual  assents,  to  some 
"  party  ticket,"  in  the  making  of  which  the  citi- 
zens have  virtually  no  voice.  Of  course,  we  must 
have  some  form  of  the  process,  which  will  make 
the  act  of  popular  election  an  act  of  deliberation, 
an  act  of  judgment,  on  the  part  of  the  entire  peo- 
ple. If,  however,  we  can  get  such  a  form  of  the 
process  —  then  we  shall  have  the  best  means  yet 
devised,  for  the  selection  of  our  chief  executives, 
and  of  the  men  who  are  to  hold  the  position  of 
final  supreme  control,  the  men  who  are  to  be 
the  state's  brain;  the  men  who  are  to  control  its 
chief  executive,  and  through  him  handle  the  entire 
forces  of  government. 

Not  only  should  the  act  of  popular  election 
be  an  act  of  judgment;  but  that  judgment,  if  it 
is  to  have  any  substantial  value  for  the  practical 
purposes  of  government,  should  be  a  judgment 
on  the  fitness  of  separate  individuals,  for  the 
special  work  of  their  separate  places.  One  man 
will  be  useful  in  a  deliberative  body,  for  advice 
and  counsel;  for  the  discussion  and  decision  of 
large  broad  questions  of  public  policy.  But  he 
may  be  most  unfit,  to  be  chief  executive.  He 
may  be  a  man  of  weak  will;  a  man  devoid  of 
executive  force;  a  man  without  discretion,  with- 
out nerve;  of  unsound  judgment;    a  man  with- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  77 

out  practical  experience  in  administration.  For 
any  one  of  many  reasons,  he  may  be  extremely 
ill  fitted  to  be  a  chief  executive.  Consequently, 
the  process  of  popular  election  must  have  such 
form,  as  will  make  it  possible  to  pass  judgment 
on  single  men  separately,  on  a  due  consideration 
of  their  individual  fitness,  for  the  work  of  special 
offices. 

It  is  quite  evident,  that  no  such  result  as  that 
is  possible  from  our  present  combination  of  the 
separate  ballot  and  the  term  system.  Hardly 
any  one  would  contend,  that  these  frequent  pe- 
riodic elections,  so  called,  give  us  anything  that 
can  be  accurately  termed  a  judgment  of  the  peo- 
ple, on  the  fitness  of  individual  men  for  special 
work;  or,  in  general,  on  the  fitness  of  any  man 
for  any  work.  At  best,  they  give  us  men  who 
chance  at  the  time  to  be  "popular."  But  such 
men  may  be  most  dangerous  and  pernicious,  if 
put  in  control  of  the  forces  of  the  state. 

We  must  then  devise  some  other  form  of  the 
process.  We  must  devise  a  form  that  will  be 
simple,  easy  of  operation,  and  inexpensive;  one 
which  will  make  only  reasonable  demands  on 
the  time  and  energies  of  the  individual  citizen; 
demands  which  he  can  meet  with  ease,  with  no 
undue  sacrifice  of  his  own  individual  interests. 


78  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

But,  above  all  things,  our  efforts  will  be  fruit- 
less, unless  we  can  devise  some  form  of  the  pro- 
cess of  popular  election,  which  will  enable  a 
people  to  think,  and  deliberate,  as  a  people;  to 
form  its  united  common  judgment,  as  a  people, 
at  the  time,  and  in  the  act,  of  voting,  on  the 
fitness  of  single  men,  for  work  of  a  single 
kind. 

Can  we  devise  a  form  of  the  process,  which  will 
meet  these  requirements? 

My  answer  to  this  question  is,  that  we  can  at 
once  find  such  a  form,  by  simply  reverting  to  the 
old-fashioned  natural  procedure,  which  was  in 
use  in  this  country  successfully,  for  many  years, 
until  the  experiment  was  made  quite  early  in 
our  pohtical  history  in  the  use  of  the  separate 
secret  ballot. 

The  process  in  use  in  this  country  before  the 
separate  secret  ballot  was  that  of  viva  voce  vot- 
ing in  the  public  meeting.  The  use  of  the  pro- 
cess of  popular  election  was  then  mainly  limited 
to  the  election  of  single  men,  to  be  the  repre- 
sentatives of  single  towns,  in  the  early  colonial 
and  state  legislatures.  The  individual  citizens 
came  together  in  the  town  meeting.  In  addi- 
tion to  their  regular  town  business,  they  would 
elect  their  representative  to  the  colonial  or  state 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  79 

legislature,  the  "general  court,"  the  body  which 
acted  on  behalf  of  the  whole  people,  upon  all 
questions  of  general  public  interest.  The  pro- 
cess of  election  was  simple,  and  easy.  Nomina- 
tions were  made  by  any  one  who  wished.  They 
could  be  made  up  to  the  last  moment,  even 
after  the  voting  began,  or  after  it  had  continued 
for  a  long  time.  The  process  of  nomination  had 
complete  freedom.  There  was  complete  free- 
dom of  discussion,  at  the  time,  and  in  the  act, 
of  voting.  Discussion  was  had  on  the  merits  of 
candidates,  on  their  fitness  for  the  special  work 
which  they  were  to  do.  The  discussion  could 
concern  all  points,  which  would  bear  on  the  fit- 
ness of  the  men  for  their  particular  work;  their 
ability,  their  character,  their  opinions  on  public 
questions,  if  those  opinions  had  at  the  time  any 
practical  importance.  Each  individual  citizen 
had  something  more  than  his  individual  vote. 
He  had  also  his  individual  weight,  in  guiding 
and  influencing  the  votes  of  other  men.  In  reach- 
ing the  final  result,  citizens  were  not  merely 
counted.  They  were  weighed.  Their  opinions 
were  weighed.  As  nearly  as  such  a  result  is  prac- 
ticable by  finite  human  agencies,  the  opinions  of 
different  individual  citizens  got  the  full  weight 
that  they  deserved.     The   practical  result  was. 


80  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

in  the  large  majority  of  cases,  that  the  repre- 
sentatives so  chosen  by  the  old  town  meetings, 
were  the  community's  ablest  men,  the  men  of 
character,  the  successful  men;  the  men  who 
had  achieved  success  by  steady  hard  work,  and 
honesty.  They  were  not  the  community's  unem- 
ployed.    They  were  not  the  community's  refuse. 

So  much  for  the  working  of  that  process  in 
the  case  of  a  single  town,  or  of  any  small  com- 
munity, the  numbers  of  which  would  allow  all 
its  citizens  to  meet,  and  act,  in  a  single  deliber- 
ative body. 

Let  us  next  see  how  the  process  could  be 
adapted  to  the  case  of  a  community  of  larger 
numbers. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  that  if  it  were  the  case  of 
electing  a  representative  of  the  colony  or  a  state 
to  a  higher  popular  assembly,  which  should  act 
for  many  colonies,  or  many  states,  the  "general 
court"  already  chosen  as  stated  could  at  once 
elect  such  new  representative  by  the  same  sim- 
ple process.  It  is  easily  seen,  that  the  machinery 
of  representation  can  be  adapted  without  limit, 
in  a  succession  of  electoral  colleges,  as  the  ma- 
chinery of  the  process  of  popular  election.  By 
changes  in  figures,  it  can  be  adapted  to  voting 
constituencies  of  any  numbers. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  81 

By  way  of  illustration,  let  us  take  a  constit- 
uency, let  us  say,  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand voters;  which  would  ordinarily  correspond 
to  a  total  population  of  about  one  million  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  persons.  A  com- 
munity of  that  size  would  comprise  five  hun- 
dred primary  districts,  each  having  five  hundred 
voting  citizens.  If,  then,  the  voters  in  each  pri- 
mary district  met  in  one  body,  and  elected  one 
representative;  and  the  five  hundred  represen- 
tatives so  chosen  afterwards  met  in  an  electoral 
college,  to  elect  one  or  more  public  officials,  we 
should  then  have  this  result.  At  each  of  these 
two  stages,  the  meeting  of  citizens  in  the  pri- 
mary district,  and  the  subsequent  meeting  of  the 
representatives  in  an  electoral  college,  each  pro- 
cess, that  of  nomination,  of  public  discussion, 
and  voting,  would  have  complete  freedom.  In 
the  primary  election  district,  the  citizens  would 
have  complete  freedom  —  of  nomination,  of  dis- 
cussion, and  voting  —  in  the  choice  of  their  repre- 
sentative. In  the  resulting  electoral  college  of 
those  representatives,  those  representatives  would 
in  their  turn  have  complete  freedom  —  of  nom- 
ination, of  discussion,  and  voting  —  in  the  choice 
of  public  officials. 

The  entire  process,  from  the  beginning  to  the 


82  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

end,  is  simple  in  the  extreme.  It  is  the  process 
of  nature.   It  has  the  simpHcity  of  nature. 

This  was  the  process,  by  the  use  of  which 
were  selected  the  members  of  our  colonial  legis- 
latures, our  early  constitutional  conventions,  the 
conventions  which  uttered  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  the  members  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  the  members  of  the  Convention  which 
drafted  our  National  Constitution,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  different  state  conventions  which 
adopted  it,  the  members  of  the  conventions 
which  drafted  our  early  state  constitutions,  and 
the  members  of  our  early  state  legislatures.  By 
this  process,  with  unimportant  variations,  were 
selected  practically  all  the  men,  who  did  such 
remarkable  statesmen's  work  in  our  early  polit- 
ical history.  The  men  so  selected  were  inva- 
riably the  community's  ablest  and  most  upright 
men. 

It  is  the  process  best  fitted,  in  all  ordinary 
cases,  to  insure  the  best  practical  results  in  the 
selection  of  men,  for  the  highest  places  in  the 
body  politic. 

I^et  us  consider  the  reason  of  the  thing. 

With  men  who  have  reached  such  a  degree 
of  civilization  that  they  demand  free  democratic 
institutions,  it  is  simply  human  nature,  that  they 


ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY  83 

will  vote  as  to  the  fitness  of  candidates  for  high 
public  office  on  their  best  judgment.  Every  man, 
of  ordinary  intelligence,  of  ordinary  common 
sense,  when  he  casts  his  vote  for  the  men  who 
are  to  act  for  him,  in  making  and  enforcing 
laws,  in  providing  for  the  protection  and  well- 
being  of  himself,  his  family,  and  his  fellows, 
will,  almost  as  matter  of  instinct,  vote  for  men 
of  ability  and  character,  if  he  has  the  full  and 
free  opportunity  so  to  do.  He  will  not  willingly 
vote  for  the  unemployed;  for  men  who  are 
unknown;  for  men  whose  services  are  so  value- 
less, that  no  one  employs  them.  Every  ordinary 
man,  of  ordinary  common  sense,  at  least  in- 
tends, and  attempts,  to  get  the  best  servants, 
and  the  best  service,  that  he  can;  in  pubHc 
affairs,  as  well  as  private. 

It  may  be  said,  that  conditions  with  us  to-day 
are  different  from  what  they  were  a  hundred 
years  ago;  that  we  have  since  that  time  had  in 
our  large  cities  a  large  influx  of  ignorant  foreign 
immigrants;  and  that  the  same  governmental 
methods  cannot  be  used  by  our  present  hetero- 
geneous urban  populations,  that  could  be  used 
by  our  native  population  in  the  early  part  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Especially,  it  will  be 
said,  that  in  our  large  cities,  the  ignorant  are 


84  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

in  a  majority,  and  that  they  will  outweigh,  and 
outvote,  the  educated  minority. 

But  the  practical  question  is,  how  are  we  to 
get  the  best  process  of  popular  election,  for  our 
existing  population,  such  as  it  is.  Even  igno- 
rant and  uneducated  men  will  act  more  wisely, 
with  freedom  of  nomination,  discussion,  and 
voting,  than  without  it.  Even  ignorant  and  un- 
educated men  will  do  better  work  in  the  pro- 
cess of  election  when  free,  than  in  the  chains  of 
the  election  machine.  Even  men  who  are  igno- 
rant and  uneducated  wish  to  get  the  best  ser- 
vants, and  the  best  service,  which  they  know 
how  to  get. 

But  this  idea  as  to  the  ignorance  and  inca- 
pacity of  the  voters  in  our  large  cities  does  great 
injustice,  in  my  opinion,  to  the  population  of 
our  large  communities  at  the  present  day. 

Both  the  voters  and  the  machine  poUticians, 
in  our  large  cities,  are  of  the  same  character, 
and  the  same  quahty,  as  in  the  country.  The 
only  difference  is,  that  pubUc  affairs  in  the 
cities  are  on  a  larger  scale  than  in  the  country; 
and,  consequently,  the  practical  results  are  on 
a  larger  scale.  Abuses  and  evils  in  the  cities 
are  more  visible  to  the  eye.  They  exist,  in  both 
places,  in  about  the  same  proportions.     There  is 


ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY  85 

as  much  political  corruption,  and  political  mis- 
conduct, in  the  one  as  in  the  other.  The  differ- 
ence is  in  magnitude,  not  proportion. 

Furthermore,  as  to  the  distinction  between 
our  population  of  a  century  ago  and  our  popu- 
lation of  to-day,  with  its  increased  urban  ma- 
jorities, the  advantage,  in  both  mental  alert- 
ness and  political  intelligence,  is  in  my  opinion 
largely  on  the  side  of  the  population  of  to-day. 
Its  stores  of  political  knowledge,  that  is,  of  prac- 
tical political  knowledge,  are  larger  than  ever 
before.  The  public  press  is  larger,  abler,  better 
equipped  for  public  service,  than  ever  before. 
Whatever  may  be  the  differences  between  the 
American  people  of  to-day  and  the  American 
people  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, there  has  undoubtedly  been  a  great  in- 
crease in  the  volume  of  our  political  knowledge. 
It  may  be  conceded,  and  it  is  my  contention, 
that,  for  the  time,  we  have  allowed  the  process 
of  united  common  thought,  of  united  public  de- 
liberation, as  a  regular  process  in  our  daily  po- 
litical life,  to  fall  into  disuse.  But  the  process  is 
not  lost.  Rational  public  discussion  of  public 
questions  is  not  one  of  the  "lost  arts."  It  will 
revive.  It  will  revive  soon.  This  American 
people  is  becoming  restless  —  is  getting  weary. 


86  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

of  having  important  public  measures  crowded 
through  by  mere  brute  force,  under  the  dicta- 
tion of  the  machine  politicians.  It  is  beginning 
to  yearn  again  for  the  atmosphere  of  free  po- 
Utical  thought,  and  free  political  action,  by  the 
process  of  free  public  discussion;  the  only  pro- 
cess which  is  suited  to  the  needs,  or  the  genius, 
of  free  democratic  government.  We  need  be 
under  no  fear,  as  to  the  permanence  of  the 
power  of  free  thought,  and  free  speech;  or  as  to 
the  absolute  certainty,  that  they  will  again  be- 
come the  forces  of  supreme  control,  in  practical 
politics.    They  will  do  so  soon. 

But  this  consideration  of  possible  differences 
between  our  population  to-day  and  a  century 
ago,  either  in  city  or  country,  or  in  both,  is  after 
all  quite  aside  from  the  practical  point  at  issue. 
Whether  our  population  to-day  be  a  little  more 
or  a  little  less  intelligent  and  moral,  than  it  was 
a  hundred  years  ago,  matters  very  little,  in  the 
consideration  of  the  practical  operation  of  the 
process  of  popular  election.  The  point  of  prac- 
tical importance  is  this:  that  the  old  process 
of  viva  voce  voting,  in  the  public  meeting,  by 
both  citizens  and  their  duly  elected  representa- 
tives, is  the  only  process  whereby  either  citizens 
or  the  community  can  secure  genuine  freedom. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  87 

of  either  thought  or  action;  and  that  both  the 
citizens  and  the  community  can  accomplish 
better  practical  results,  with  such  freedom  of 
thought  and  action,  than  without  it.  In  short, 
they  can  accomplish  better  working  results, 
with  a  free  head,  and  a  free  hand,  than  they  can 
in  the  fetters  of  the  election  machine. 

Let  us  next  consider  some  others  of  the  prac- 
tical features  of  this  simple  natural  machinery 
of  the  public  meeting,  used  at  each  stage  of  the 
process  of  popular  election. 

In  the  first  place,  we  must  note  its  extreme 
simpHcity.  Nothing  can  be  more  simple.  Citi- 
zens who  can  operate  the  process  of  popular 
election  in  any  form,  can  operate  it  in  this  form. 
It  involves  no  outside  machinery  of  caucuses, 
and  conventions,  to  be  manipulated  beforehand. 
Any  one  can  comprehend  the  process.  Any  one 
can  take  his  part  in  it.  If  a  citizen  wishes  to 
make  a  nomination,  all  that  he  has  to  do  is,  to 
"stand  up  in  meeting,"  and  make  his  nomina- 
tion. After  the  nominations  are  made,  the  pro- 
cess of  voting  is  as  simple  as  that  of  nomination. 
The  voting  can  be  an  ordinary  standing  vote, 
if  that  is  all  that  is  desired.  If  it  is  desired  to 
have  something  more,  and  generally  that  should 
be  desired,  then  there  may  be  the  roll  call  of  the 


88  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

citizens;  and  each  man  can  vote  when  his  name 
is  called,  for  the  candidate  of  his  own  choice. 
No  machinery  can  be  more  simple.  It  is  the 
simplicity  of  nature. 

In  the  next  place,  the  process  is  inexpensive. 
It  requires  no  printing  of  ballots,  or  "tickets," 
general  or  special.  There  need  be  no  inspec- 
tors of  election,  or  other  oflScials,  either  for  the 
receiving  nominations,  or  the  counting  of  votes. 
Every  citizen  will  be  an  inspector  of  election. 
Every  citizen  can  keep  his  own  count  of  the 
votes.  Money  expenditure  is  reduced  to  the 
minimum;  almost  to  a  single  item,  that  of  the 
hire  of  a  hall  for  each  public  meeting;  first,  of 
the  citizens  in  the  primary  election  districts; 
and  afterwards,  of  conventions  of  delegates. 

Next,  the  securities  against  fraud  are  simple  in 
the  extreme;  and  at  the  same  time  as  complete 
as  it  is  possible  to  make  them.  False  persona- 
tion, fraudulent  registration,  fraudulent  voting, 
arc  all  made  so  difficult  of  execution,  and  cer- 
tain of  detection,  as  to  make  their  abolition 
nearly  certain.  The  citizens  who  live  in  any  one 
neighborhood  will  meet  together.  Thereby  they 
will  have  the  strongest  practicable  security  against 
fraud  of  any  kind,  either  in  registration,  persona- 
tion, voting,  or  counting  of  votes. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  89 

But  the  chief  point  is,  that  this  process  is 
the  only  one,  which  gives  us  the  possibiHty  — 
of  complete  freedom  of  action,  of  both  citizen 
and  the  people;  which  gives  so  much  as  the 
possibility  —  of  getting  the  best  judgment  of 
both.  Free,  open,  public  discussion  —  at  the 
time,  and  in  the  act  —  of  nominating  —  and  vot- 
ing —  at  each  stage  of  the  process,  both  in  the 
choice  of  delegates  and  in  the  final  choice  of 
public  officials,  that  is  the  possibility — which  we 
have  with  the  simple,  old-fashioned,  well-proved 
process  of  the  public  meeting.  It  is  a  possibiUty, 
which  we  can  get  in  no  other  way. 

Therein  we  have  the  essential  distinction  be- 
tween the  practical  operation  of  the  process 
of  the  separate  secret  ballot,  and  the  process  of 
the  public  meeting.  The  one  makes  freedom  of 
action  —  either  for  the  citizen,  or  the  commu- 
nity —  an  impossibility.  The  other  makes  that 
freedom  complete.  The  distinction  is  essential, 
vital,  and  fundamental.  The  one  process  is  that 
of  free  democratic  government;  the  only  one, 
whereby  either  the  citizen  or  the  people  can 
secure  freedom  —  in  its  selection  of  its  public 
servants.  The  other  insures  —  absolutely  — 
and  certainly  —  the  supremacy  of  the  election 
machine. 


90  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

Have  we  lost  sight  —  forever  —  of  the  essen- 
tial vital  necessity,  of  free  public  conference, 
of  free  public  discussion,  as  the  only  practicable 
means  of  influencing  men  by  reasonable  argu- 
ment, in  their  action  on  public  as  well  as  pri- 
vate questions;  and  especially,  in  their  action  in 
the  choice  of  public  officials? 

As  to  the  answer  to  this  question,  my  own 
mind  is  free  from  doubt.  The  process  of  free 
public  deliberation  has,  no  doubt,  for  the  time, 
gone  into  eclipse.  It  has,  for  the  time,  almost 
disappeared  from  our  daily  governmental  pro- 
cesses. But  men  have  not  ceased  to  be  intel- 
ligent, thinking,  reasoning,  and  reasonable  be- 
ings. Sound  thought  has  not  lost  its  power,  as 
a  force  in  practical  politics.  Even  now,  our  en- 
tire machinery  of  popular  election  goes  on  the 
assumption,  an  assumption  rightly  made,  that  the 
mass  of  individual  citizens  can  be  influenced, 
in  casting  their  votes,  by  reasonable  argument. 

But  the  chief  practical  difficulty,  under  which 
we  have  been  laboring  in  late  years  in  the  oper- 
ation of  our  election  machinery  has  been  the 
overwhelming  strength  of  "  party "  feeling,  and 
"  party  "  obligations.  The  most  powerful  foe  to 
free  thought,  with  us  to-day,  is  to  be  found  in 
the  ties  and   obligations  of  "party."    No  doubt 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  91 

men  are  gradually  coming  to  greater  independ- 
ence of  action  in  voting;  are  gradually  coming 
to  greater  independence  of  party  influence.  But 
the  power  of  that  influence  has  in  late  years  been 
so  great,  as  to  almost  destroy  the  practical  value 
of  the  ballot.  The  chief  purpose,  in  giving  the 
citizen  the  ballot  at  all,  is  that  he  should  vote  on 
the  fitness  of  candidates  on  his  individual  judg- 
ment. In  practice,  however,  the  vast  majority 
of  the  citizens  virtually  disregard  their  own 
individual  judgments.  In  the  vast  majority  of 
cases,  we  vote,  bhndly,  and  regularly,  for  our 
regular  "party"  candidates.  We  find  any  other 
course  impracticable,  with  our  present  political 
machinery.  Thereby,  we  virtually  disfranchise 
ourselves,  and  defeat  the  fundamental  purpose 
for  which  the  ballot  has  its  existence. 

This  condition  in  affairs  is  due,  almost  en- 
tirely, to  the  use  of  the  separate  secret  ballot. 
The  use  of  the  separate  ballot  has  made  confer- 
ence and  public  discussion  a  practical  impossi- 
bility, in  the  process  of  popular  election. 

No  way  can  be  devised,  so  far  as  my  lights 
go,  whereby  the  citizen  can  be  emancipated 
from  his  slavery  to  the  great  "party"  organi- 
zations, from  his  slavery  to  the  election  machine, 
except  to  return  to  the  use  of  the  public  meet- 


92  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ing,  as  the  organ  to  be  used  in  the  process  of 
popular  election. 

But  it  will  be  said,  any  system  of  viva  voce 
voting  will  destroy  secrecy,  and  subject  the  voter 
to  corrupt  influences. 

This  view  has  had,  now  for  many  years,  the 
almost  unanimous  support  of  writers  on  politi- 
cal subjects. 

It  is,  in  my  opinion,  radically  erroneous. 

Let  us  look  at  the  reason  of  the  thing. 

In  the  first  place,  open  public  discussion, 
with  open  public  voting,  affords  the  best  prac- 
ticable opportunity,  to  enable  the  wise  and  up- 
right, the  honest  and  respectable  men  in  the 
community,  to  influence  the  votes  of  their  fel- 
low citizens,  by  the  legitimate  methods  of  reason- 
able argument,  by  the  force  of  their  own  presence, 
and  their  own  example.  Then,  too,  it  is  only 
the  disreputable  candidates,  who  will  lose  by  the 
process  of  viva  voce  voting.  No  man  is  ever 
deterred  by  publicity,  from  voting  for  men  who 
are  reputable  and  respectable.  Secrecy  in  voting 
is  needed  only  by  men  who  are  ashamed  of  the 
quality  of  their  action.  Secrecy  is  a  protection, 
only  for  action  which  should  not  be  protected. 
It  is  wholly  opposed  to  the  genius  of  free  demo- 
cratic institutions. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  93 

But  we  have  here  another  point.  Every  citi- 
zen, in  deciding  his  own  action  in  voting  for 
public  officials,  is  entitled,  of  right,  to  the  ad- 
vice, and  example,  of  his  fellows;  especially  of 
those  who  are  abler  and  wiser  than  himself. 
Moreover,  his  fellows  are  entitled,  of  right,  to 
that  opportunity  to  advise  and  influence  him. 
If  it  be  said,  that  the  voter,  when  compelled 
to  vote  openly,  will  be  subjected  to  influence, 
the  answer  is,  that  he  ought  to  be  subjected  to 
the  influence  of  the  wise  and  upright.  No  man 
has  the  right,  in  a  free  democratic  government, 
to  conceal  his  action.  Publicity  is  the  strongest 
possible  security  for  purity.  Publicity  is  politi- 
cal sunlight.  No  man  wishes  secrecy,  who  in- 
tends to  vote  on  his  convictions  of  the  right.  It 
is  only  those  men  who  plan  mischief  to  the  state, 
who  desire  secrecy.  Those  men  should  not  have 
that  protection.  They  should  be  dragged  into 
the  open.  They  should  be  compelled  to  vote 
in  the  face  of  their  fellow  men.  Responsibility 
to  the  people,  under  a  democratic  government, 
should  begin  with  the  responsibihty  of  the  indi- 
vidual citizen,  for  his  individual  action  in  cast- 
ing his  vote.  That  responsibility  can  be  enforced 
in  only  one  way  —  by  publicity;  by  having  the 
action  of  the  individual  citizen  open  and  above 


94  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

board,  in  the  presence  of  his  fellows.  The  "in- 
fluence "  to  which  the  citizen  will  be  subjected, 
in  the  process  of  viva  voce  voting,  will  be  an 
influence  only  for  good. 

Moreover,  free  public  discussion,  at  the  time, 
and  in  the  act,  of  voting,  is  the  only  means, 
whereby  it  is  possible  in  the  process  of  popular 
election  to  secure  to  each  citizen  his  due  weight 
—  in  the  choice  of  our  highest  public  servants. 
Our  present  machinery  is  a  machinery  for  count- 
ing noses.  The  public  meeting  is  a  machinery 
for  weighing  brains ;  for  weighing  ideas ;  for  giv- 
ing to  each  man  his  due  weight,  in  producing 
the  final  result;  for  securing  to  each  citizen  his 
legitimate  influence  over  the  action  of  his  fellows. 
Thereby  he  has  his  legitimate  opportunity  for 
moving  other  men,  by  his  advice,  and  his  exam- 
ple. Of  that  opportunity  he  is  almost  wholly 
deprived  by  the  separate  secret  ballot.  By  the 
secret  ballot,  we  tend  to  put  all  men  on  a  dead 
level.  We  make  every  individual  count  only  for 
one.  But  men  of  weight  and  influence  ought  to 
count  in  proportion  to  their  weight  and  influence. 
No  political  process  can  make  it  an  absolute  cer- 
tainty—  that  they  will  so  count.  But  the  process 
of  the  public  meeting  gives  a  much  greater  possi- 
bility of  that  result,  than  the  separate  secret  ballot. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  95 

And   it  gives  us  the   greatest  certainty  that  is 
practicable,  under  any  process. 

It  may  be  said,  too,  that  the  viva  voce  process 
makes  it  possible  to  buy  voters,  and  make  sure 
of  their  votes. 

There  is  no  doubt,  that  the  viva  voce  process 
would  give  the  opportunity  of  knowing  how 
each  individual  citizen  voted;  and  would,  in 
that  way,  and  to  that  extent,  make  possible  the 
purchase  of  votes. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  viva  voce 
process  in  the  public  meeting  will  give  to  the 
honest  citizen  the  possibility  of  knowing  what 
voters  are  purchased;  and  of  bringing  to  bear 
on  those  voters  the  full  weight  of  public  opinion, 
and  public  indignation. 

But  this  buying  of  votes  under  our  present 
machinery  is  much  misunderstood.  With  the 
present  methods  of  the  machine  politicians,  the 
payment  for  votes  is  generally  made  contingent 
on  results;  and  consists  mainly  in  the  favorable 
use  of  political  power  after  election,  not  in  the 
use  of  money  before  election. 

There  can  be  no  security  so  complete,  against 
the  purchase  of  votes,  as  the  process  of  voting 
in  public.  With  open  public  voting,  the  buyers 
and  sellers  of  votes  will  be  known.     It  will  sel- 


96  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

dom  be  difficult  to  detect  them.  In  the  end,  the 
security  against  buying  and  selling  votes  must 
always  finally  rest  in  the  community's  common 
conscience.  That  conscience  will  have  the  best 
field  for  its  operation,  with  publicity  in  the  act 
of  voting. 

But  this  danger  of  buying  and  selling  votes,  such 
as  it  is,  will  always  exist,  under  any  form  of  the 
process  of  voting.  The  method  now  is,  to  buy 
votes  at  wholesale,  by  buying  the  magnates  of  the 
election  machine.  The  operation  is  made  all  the 
more  easy,  for  the  reason  that  we,  the  voters,  who 
are  bought  and  sold,  are  not  aware  of  the  fact. 
Under  the  supremacy  of  the  election  machine,  the 
votes  of  all  of  us,  in  each  of  the  "grand  old  par- 
ties," are  bought  and  sold,  by  the  thousand,  and 
the  million.  We,  the  voting  citizens,  are  bought 
and  sold,  in  herds,  like  so  many  sheep,  following 
year  after  year  our  old  political  bell-wethers.  Why 
make  such  a  pother  about  buying  a  few  votes 
at  retail,  when  our  present  political  masters  are 
continually  selling  our  votes  at  wholesale  ?  The 
purchase  of  votes  will  be  decreased,  by  giving  to 
the  voters  the  fullest  knowledge  of  the  facts,  so 
that  the  public  conscience,  and  public  opinion, 
can  have  their  full  legitimate  eflFcct  upon  each  indi- 
vidual voter. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  97 

Let  us  sum  up  this  branch  of  our  study. 

The  act  of  prime  importance  in  any  system  of 
democratic  government,  or  in  government  of  any 
kind,  is  the  selection  of  the  men  who  are  to  be  the 
state's  head;  the  power  of  supreme  control  in  the 
daily  conduct  of  public  affairs.  All  other  functions 
in  the  state  are  of  comparatively  slight  importance 
in  comparison  with  this,  the  selection  of  the  peo- 
ple's highest  public  servants,  their  elected  rulers. 
On  those  men  we  must  always  depend,  for  the 
wisdom  and  efficiency  of  our  public  administra- 
tion. 

Consequently,  it  is  of  vital  importance,  that 
our  organization  for  the  selection  of  those  men 
should  be  as  perfect  as  we  can  make  it.  At  best, 
it  will  be  imperfect.  But  we  must  make  it  as 
perfect  as  we  can. 

In  order  to  make  it  as  perfect  as  we  can,  we 
must  use  the  well-tried  process  of  combination, 
of  conference,  of  joint  deliberation,  of  united  com- 
mon thought,  by  the  entire  community,  thinking 
and  acting  as  one  body,  in  the  act  of  selecting  those 
men.  The  selection  of  those  men,  above  all  things, 
must  be  the  act  of  the  people's  combined  concen- 
trated judgment,  the  product  of  its  best  thought. 
That  product,  in  the  act  of  popular  election,  can 
be  obtained  by  no  possible  process,  by  the  use  of 


98  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

no  possible  organ,  other  than  the  popular  assem- 
bly; the  assembly  of  the  entire  community,  meet- 
ing and  acting  in  one  body,  in  the  persons  of  all 
its  voting  citizens,  when  their  numbers  will  per- 
mit; in  the  persons  of  their  elected  representa- 
tives, when  the  numbers  of  the  citizens  are  too 
large  to  permit  them  to  meet  and  act  as  a  single 
deliberative  body. 

It  is  to  be  noted  at  this  point,  that  some  such 
organization  as  is  here  considered,  an  electoral 
college  of  elected  representatives,  for  the  choice  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  was  evidently 
in  the  contemplation  of  the  framers  of  our  national 
constitution,  when  they  provided  for  the  choice 
of  presidential  electors.  There  was,  however,  this 
singular  fundamental  omission;  the  omission  of 
any  provision  whereby  these  electors  could  meet, 
as  one  body,  for  joint  action  in  the  act  of  election. 
This  omission  was  fatal.  It  effectually  prevented 
the  possibility  of  independent  deliberative  action 
on  the  part  of  those  electors.  If  there  had  been 
such  a  provision,  permitting  independent  original 
action  by  those  presidential  electors,  as  one  body, 
we  should  doubtless  have  seen  a  very  different 
course  of  events  in  the  choice  of  our  Presidents, 
It  might  then  have  been,  that  the  choice  of  those 
Presidents  would  have  been  made  a  real  act  of 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  99 

judgment,  instead  of  a  mere  counting  of  the  num- 
bers of  the  men  who  could  be  induced  to  "rally" 
around  one  or  another  "party  standard."  We 
might  not  have  had  such  a  predominance  of  drum 
and  trumpet  politics,  of  politics  of  the  brass  band. 

However  that  may  be,  it  is  evident,  that  in  the 
future,  in  the  selection  of  the  mayors  of  our  large 
cities,  the  governors  of  our  states,  the  Presidents 
of  the  nation,  and  the  members  of  our  popular 
assemblies,  we  must  have  something  better  than 
the  mere  possibility  of  a  choice  between  two  or 
more  "party  tickets,"  constructed  by  machine 
politicians,  in  the  making  of  which  the  citizens, 
and  the  people,  have  —  virtually  —  no  voice.  We 
must  have  a  process  of  popular  election,  which 
will  insure  free  popular  action;  which  will  ena- 
ble us  to  get  a  real  judgment  of  the  people,  think- 
ing, and  acting,  as  one  organism,  on  the  fitness  of 
single  men,  for  single  places. 

Such  thought,  and  action,  are  possible  —  only 
by  the  use  of  the  popular  assembly,  as  the  organ 
for  forming  and  uttering  the  people's  judgment, 
on  questions  of  men  as  well  as  measures. 

The  results,  then,  of  this  branch  of  our  study 
as  to  the  form  of  organized  democracy,  are  the 
following  three  conclusions :  — 

I.  Administration  must  be  single-headed. 


100  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

II.  The  organ  of  supreme  control  in  the  body 
poUtic  must  be  the  popular  assembly. 

III.  The  popular  assembly  must  be  the  organ 
for  forming  and  uttering  the  people's 
judgment,  in  the  selection  of  men. 

These  conclusions  involve  the  adoption  of 
nothing  new  or  untried  in  political  machinery. 
Single-headed  administration  is  as  old  as  monar- 
chy.  Indeed,  it  is  in  single-headed  administration, 
that  monarchy  has  its  one  desirable  feature.  It  is 
in  single-headed  administration,  that  monarchy 
has  in  all  ages  shown  such  superiority  as  it  pos- 
sesses —  as  a  practical  political  institution.  All 
human  experience  shows  that  the  organization 
under  single  heads  is  the  only  form  of  administra- 
tive organization,  which  will  enforce  responsibility, 
and  insure  efficiency. 

The  popular  assembly,  too,  is  the  only  organ 
which  has  ever  been  devised,  or  used,  whereby  any 
people  can  form  and  utter  its  own  free  judgment, 
or  its  own  free  will,  whether  as  to  measures  or 
men.  The  separate  individual  ballot  may  enable 
the  mass  of  separate  individual  citizens  to  express 
their  individual  preferences  between  two  or  more 
"tickets."  But  it  will  not  enable  the  ordinary 
individual  citizen  to  have  any  freedom  of  action, 
or  his  rightful  weight  and  influence,  in  the  selection 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  101 

of  public  oflBcials.  It  will  not  enable  a  people  to 
go  through  the  process  of  joint  deliberation,  as  a 
people;  to  form  its  own  judgment,  as  a  people. 
The  only  organ,  by  which  it  is  possible,  either  for 
the  citizen  to  have  a  free  active  part  in  the  process 
of  popular  election,  or  for  a  people  to  form  its  own 
free  judgment  in  the'clibit'c  of  its  .-ulers,  is  the 
popular  assembly 

These  three  laws;  ft  is  ^bmittelJ,*s't"ate'the  essen- 
tials of  organized  democracy.  They  are  deduced 
from  experience;  mainly  from  our  own  experi- 
ence, the  largest  in  all  history  in  the  operation 
of  democratic  institutions. 

Summed  up  in  a  single  phrase,  the  entire  scheme 
here  submitted  may  be  stated  to  be  —  the  estab- 
lishment of  government  by  the  people,  acting  as 
a  unit  in  its  representative  popular  assembly.  In 
matters  of  administration,  the  popular  assembly 
would  act  through  a  single  chief  executive,  elected 
by  the  people,  directly  and  continuously  respon- 
sible to  the  people  in  its  popular  assembly.  The 
popular  assembly  would  be  used  as  the  organ  for 
forming  and  uttering  the  people's  judgment,  and 
the  people's  will,  as  to  both  measures  and 

The  forces  of  administration  would  be  concen- 
trated, and  controlled,  under  a  chief  executive; 
who  would  be  directly  and  continuously  under 


102  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  immediate  supervision  and  control  of  the  popu- 
lar assembly.  Administrative  responsibility  would 
be  single  and  complete  throughout;  culminating  in 
the  responsibility  of  the  single  chief  executive  to  a 
body  of  men  of  exceptional  ability,  of  full  and  accu- 
rate knowledge,  who  would  be  at  all  times  closely 
in  touch  with  the  entire  range  of  public  affairs. 

The  changes  here  suggested  strike  at  the  very 
roots  of  -the  caii^es  of  the  existence  of  the  election 
machine. 

The  process  of  popular  election,  it  is  seen,  would 
have  its  work  reduced  to  a  minimum.  It  would 
cease  to  be  annual  and  continuous.  It  would  be 
simple  in  form,  easy  of  operation,  free  from  the 
necessity  of  large  money  expenditure.  It  would 
be  used  only  for  electing  the  few  men  at  each 
government's  head  ;  the  chief  executives,  and 
the  members  of  the  different  popular  assemblies, 
national,  state,  and  local.  The  form  of  the  process 
used  would  be  that  of  open  viva  voce  action,  in 
the  act  of  nomination,  discussion,  and  voting,  in 
the  successive  popular  assemblies ;  those  assemblies, 
in  the  primary  election  districts,  being  composed  of 
the  voting  citizens ;  in  the  higher  assemblies,  of  their 
duly  elected  representatives. 

There  is  the  sum  and  substance  of  the  entire 
scheme,  so  far  as  concerns  its  form. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  103 

The  fundamental  idea,  on  which  the  scheme 
rests,  is  the  supremacy,  in  each  body  politic,  in 
each  town,  city,  state,  and  the  nation,  of  the  will, 
and  judgment,  of  the  entire  community ;  conferring, 
dehberating,  forming  its  common  judgment,  and 
its  common  will,  in  one  body,  as  a  unit,  upon  all 
public  questions,  whether  of  measures  or  men. 

The  scheme  here  suggested  meets  at  once,  di- 
rectly and  effectively,  the  chief  practical  obstacle, 
which  now  stands  in  the  way  of  giving  to  the 
people  the  free  choice  of  its  own  chief  rulers,  by 
reducing  to  reasonable  proportions  our  present 
immense  mass  of  election  work,  and  simplifying 
its  machinery. 

We  have  seen,  that  the  fundamental  fact, 
which  destroys  the  possibility  of  a  free  choice  of 
their  rulers  by  the  people  under  our  present  sys- 
tem, lies  in  the  volume,  and  the  intricacy,  of  this 
permanent  periodic  mass  of  election  work,  which 
is  forced  upon  us  by  the  term  system,  in  connec- 
tion with  the  direct  secret  ballot.  The  votes  of 
our  large  modern  constituencies  cannot  be  handled 
under  our  present  system,  without  these  corre- 
spondingly large  election  organizations,  which  we 
term  "parties."  That  difficulty  is  met  directly. 
It  is  completely  obliterated  from  the  operation  of 
our  governmental  machinery.    We  reduce  to  the 


104  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

lowest  point,  both  the  number  of  elective  offices, 
and  the  frequency  of  elections.  We  destroy  the 
periodic  permanence  of  this  election  work.  We 
simplify  the  election  machinery.  We  make  that 
machinery  workable,  with  the  expenditure  by  the 
citizens  of  a  reasonable  amount  of  time. 

This  form  of  electoral  machinery  makes  it  prac- 
ticable for  the  citizen  to  take  an  active  part  in  each 
separate  stage  of  the  process  of  popular  election; 
nomination,  discussion,  and  voting.  The  secret  bal- 
lot effectually  bars  the  citizen  from  taking  part  in 
the  acts  of  nomination  and  common  discussion. 
It  sterilizes  him.  It  virtually  reduces  him  to  the 
position,  and  function,  of  a  vermiform  appendix. 

The  scheme  would  make  an  immense  reduction 
of  money  expenditure  in  our  process  of  popular 
election.  Consider  the  expenditure,  in  time,  and 
money,  involved  in  this  never  ending  cycle  of 
revolutions,  which  we  term  "popular  elections." 
Any  one  of  our  annual  elections,  in  only  a  single 
large  city,  now  costs  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
dollars.  Any  one  of  our  quadrennial  presidential 
elections  costs  many  millions. 

Nearly  all  that  money  outlay  would  be  avoided. 
We  should  take  away  the  need,  and  to  a  great  ex- 
tent, the  use,  of  money,  in  the  regular  manipula- 
tion of  our  election  machinery.    Instead  of  having 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  105 

these  costly  annual  contests  between  bodies  of 
professional  politicians  for  the  control  of  our  dif- 
ferent governments,  we  should  have  simple  inex- 
pensive elections  of  their  public  servants  by  the 
citizens,  when  required  to  jBll  vacancies.  The  money 
cost  of  the  process  of  popular  election,  when  used, 
would  be  reduced  to  its  lowest  figure.  In  a  voting 
constituency  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand, 
which  would  be  the  approximate  number  of  voters 
in  a  population  of  one  million,  the  entire  cost  of 
an  election  would  consist  of  the  rent  of  a  hall  in 
each  primary  election  district  of  about  five  hundred 
voters,  for  the  choice  of  a  delegate  by  the  voting 
citizens  in  that  district;  with  the  rent  of  another 
hall,  for  the  meeting  of  the  assembly  of  the  dele- 
gates so  chosen,  for  the  election  of  the  representa- 
tives, or  chief  executive,  to  be  chosen  by  that  con- 
stituency. All  expenditure  for  printing  ballots,  and 
for  election  officials,  would  be  avoided.  So,  too,  all 
the  cost  of  campaign  meetings,  and  general  cam- 
paign operations,  would  be  made  unnecessary;  in- 
asmuch as  the  only  discussion  which  would  have 
any  practical  bearing  on  the  result  would  be  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  citizens  themselves  in  the  primary 
meetings,  and  of  their  representatives  in  the  repre- 
sentative electoral  colleges.  The  saving  in  mere 
money  expenditure  would  be  beyond  calculation. 


106  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

The  larger  the  constituency,  the  larger  will  be 
the  saving  of  money.  A  single  additional  series 
of  representative  electoral  assemblies  would  adapt 
the  machinery  to  a  constituency  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  million  voters;  which  would  re- 
present approximately  an  entire  population  of  over 
six  hundred  million  persons.  Slight  changes  in 
the  numbers,  of  the  citizens  voting  in  the  primary 
districts,  and  of  the  delegates  in  the  different 
electoral  assemblies,  would  adapt  the  machinery 
to  constituencies  of  any  size.  In  all  constituencies, 
large  and  small,  the  money  expenditure  of  operat- 
ing the  machinery  is  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

In  the  next  place,  this  plan  of  reorganization 
would  secure  the  outside  possible  degree  of  po- 
litical freedom  —  for  the  individual  citizen,  and 
the  entire  people. 

Under  any  possible  political  system,  the  outside 
possibilities  of  the  active  part,  which  the  individual 
citizen  can  take  in  the  actual  operation  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  any  large  community,  must  be  limited 
to  his  action  in  the  selection  of  the  men  at  the  gov- 
ernment's head.  More  than  that  he  cannot  secure, 
in  the  way  of  political  activity,  under  any  form  of 
political  machinery  that  the  wit  of  man  has  yet 
devised. 

In   that   process   of   popular  election,  we   have 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  107 

already  seen  the  practical  result,  which  is  always 
certain  to  come  from  the  attempt  to  have  the  citi- 
zen do  too  much.  Such  an  attempt  takes  the  pro- 
cess of  election  altogether  out  of  his  hands,  so  far 
as  concerns  any  brain  work,  any  substantial  de- 
gree of  political  power,  or  any  free  political  action. 
It  limits  his  action  to  the  mere  deposit  of  a  ballot. 
He  loses  his  part  in  the  more  important  acts,  of 
nomination,  and  public  discussion  of  the  quahfi- 
cations  of  candidates.  His  action  becomes  almost 
purely  mechanical.  He  loses  his  political  freedom. 
The  scheme  here  under  consideration,  however, 
will  give  to  the  citizen,  and  to  the  people,  the 
most  complete  measure  of  freedom,  that  is  pos- 
sible under  any  political  system.  In  the  process  of 
popular  election  here  submitted,  each  individual 
citizen,  in  each  primary  assembly,  will  have  com- 
plete freedom,  —  of  combination,  of  nomination, 
of  public  discussion,  and  of  voting.  Machine  poli- 
ticians may  make  as  many  "  tickets  "  as  they  see 
fit.  Thereafter,  when  the  citizens  come  together 
in  their  primary  meetings,  they  will  be  able  to 
oppose  combinations  made  beforehand  by  the  poli- 
ticians, with  comV)inations  made  on  the  spot  by 
themselves.  They  will  be  able  to  make  new  nom- 
inations without  limit ;  and  support  those  new 
nominations    in    open     public    debate  ;    with    the 


108  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

fullest  possibility  of  allowing  every  citizen  to  act  on 
his  own  free  judgment.  Greater  freedom  of  action 
than  that,  it  is  impossible  to  secure  by  any  pro- 
cess conceivable.  In  comparison  with  the  slavery 
under  which  we  now  exist,  the  difference  between 
the  plan  here  proposed  and  the  system  we  now  use, 
is  the  difference  between  daylight  and  darkness. 

In  addition  to  this  point,  however,  we  have  the 
further  one,  that  the  abolition  of  the  term  sys- 
tem will  destroy  this  permanent  supply  of  political 
prizes,  and  the  permanence  of  occupation,  which 
constitute  the  reason  of  the  existence  of  the  ma- 
chine politician.  It  is  this  annual  mass  of  vacant 
offices,  this  annual  collection  of  election  prizes, 
which  furnishes  the  means  of  payment  from  our 
public  treasuries,  of  our  great  standing  armies 
of  machine  politicians.  Take  away  this  periodic 
mass  of  vacant  oflSces,  and  the  machine  politicians 
will  be  compelled  to  betake  themselves  to  other 
employments. 

The  disappearance  of  these  standing  armies 
of  professionals,  which  must  take  place  when  we 
abolish  their  occupation,  and  their  field  of  plunder, 
will  make  it  possible  for  each  body  politic  to  make 
its  own  free  choice  of  its  public  officials,  upon  its 
own  best  judgment  of  the  individual  fitness  of  those 
men  for  the  special  work  of  their  special  oflSces. 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  109 

That  result  is  an  impossibility  —  unless  the  people 
has  full  freedom  of  action  in  the  process  of  pop- 
ular election.  That  process  is  the  fundamental 
process  in  democratic  government. 

The  next  point  is,  that  this  scheme  of  reorgani- 
zation will  greatly  enlarge  the  citizen's  field  of 
political  activity,  and  the  citizen's  political  power. 

Can  anything  be  more  dismally  unsatisfactory, 
as  the  aggregate  of  the  citizen's  political  activities, 
than  this  present  ridiculous  practice,  of  putting  "  his 
mark  "  against  a  single  name,  or  against  a  "  ticket," 
placed  before  the  voter  by  different  factions  of 
machine  politicians  ?  Can  there  be  a  more  com- 
plete surrender  of  the  elective  franchise,  in  practice, 
than  is  involved  in  the  actual  operation  of  our 
present  election  machinery,  under  which  the  vast 
majority  of  the  citizens  become  mere  puppets,  to 
be  manipulated  by  professional  poHticians  ? 

If,  however,  we  so  reduce  the  volume  of  our 
election  work,  and  so  simplify  its  machinery,  as 
to  bring  its  operation  within  the  possibilities  of 
busy  workingmen,  then  every  citizen,  when  he 
comes  to  act  in  the  process  of  popular  election, 
can  have  his  full  opportunity  of  taking  part  in 
the  entire  process:  that  of  nomination,  of  public 
discussion,  and  the  final  vote.  He  will  be  able  to 
perform  the  entire  process  at  once.    He  can  have 


110  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

that  degree  of  practical  influence  in  the  process, 
which  is  due  to  his  capacity  and  character.  He 
can  do  something  more  than  count  as  one  unit. 
He  will  have  his  legitimate  individual  weight,  at 
the  time,  and  in  the  act,  of  voting. 

In  the  next  place,  such  a  reorganization  will 
secure  the  wisest  practicable  administration  of 
public  affairs. 

Every  large  body  of  men  must  always  depend  for 
its  working  capacity  on  the  men  at  its  head;  on 
their  cahbre,  their  character,  and  their  training. 
For  the  selection  of  those  men  at  the  head,  in  each 
and  every  body  politic,  no  process  is  so  certain  to 
give  the  best  practical  results,  in  the  large  majority 
of  cases,  as  the  process  of  popular  election,  used 
in  its  proper  form,  and  within  its  proper  limits. 
Citizens  who  act  in  their  public  meeting,  when 
their  action  is  free,  will  not  choose  men  who  are 
unknown;  men  who  have  no  reputations  at  all. 
Neither  will  they  choose  men  whose  reputations 
are  bad.  No  doubt,  where  the  entire  mass  of  citi- 
zens vote  in  chains,  where  the  only  choice  allowed 
them  is  one  between  the  "tickets"  of  machine 
politicians,  then  we  must  expect  that  the  process 
of  "popular  election,"  if  we  dignify  it  with  that 
name,  will  give  very  unsatisfactory  results.  It 
will  often  give  us  men,  who  have  cither  no  rcpu- 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  111 

tations  or  bad  ones.  But  whenever  the  action  of 
any  people  is  free,  whenever  a  community  is  free  to 
make  its  own  choice  of  men  on  its  own  judgment, 
then  it  is  as  near  to  a  certainty  as  we  can  get  in 
human  affairs,  that  that  people's  choice  will  be  of 
men  well  known,  of  men  who  have  acquired  rep- 
utations; consequently,  of  men  of  high  calibre  and 
character. 

Here  we  have  the  essential  fundamental  basis 
of  democratic  institutions.  It  consists  in  the  fact, 
that  the  instincts  of  "the  people,"  the  judgment 
of  "the  people,"  the  sound  common  sense  of  "the 
people,"  when  that  people  has  genuine  freedom  — 
of  thought,  public  discussion,  and  action  —  fur- 
nishes the  best  available  agency,  for  the  selection 
of  the  men  who  are  to  be  the  head  of  the  state. 

In  the  next  place,  this  scheme  of  reorganization 
will  promote  public  purity,  will  raise  the  people's 
moral  standards,  in  both  pohtics  and  private  life. 
It  will  so  organize  the  body  politic,  as  to  make 
honesty  and  fidelity  pay;  make  them  bring  large  re- 
wards; as  they  do  in  private  callings.  It  will  make 
public  officials'  personal  interests  coincide  with  their 
public  duties.  Success  in  public  Hfe,  as  in  private 
life,  must  be  made  to  depend  on  faithful  service,  on 
good  conduct.  In  order  that  our  public  servants  may 
act  up  to  their  own  highest  standards,  they  must  be 


112  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

free.  At  the  same  time,  they  must  have  security  for 
permanence  of  employment.  That  security  must 
depend  solely  on  the  quality  of  their  work.  But  the 
man  who  is  always  under  the  necessity  of  carrying 
the  next  election,  as  a  condition  of  continuing  his 
political  hfe,  is  not  a  free  man.  He  is  the  slave 
of  the  election  machine.  He  depends  for  his  tenure 
of  his  place,  not  on  the  quality  of  his  work,  but 
on  his  value  to  the  election  machine.  Every  public 
official,  who  holds  an  elective  office  under  our 
present  term  system,  is  well  aware  that  his  politi- 
cal existence,  and  his  political  advancement,  de- 
pend on  the  grace  of  the  politicians.  It  is  seldom 
that  any  man  who  has  political  aspirations  will 
venture  to  offend  them.  By  one  means  or  ftAother, 
he  will  find  a  way  to  do  their  bidding.  Every 
public  official,  who  shows  genuine  political  inde- 
pendence, is  certain,  sooner  or  later,  to  be  barred 
from  public  Ufe.  It  is  to-day,  in  this  country,  prac- 
tically an  impossibility  —  for  a  man  in  public  hfe 
to  keep  his  independence,  and  "stay  in  politics." 
Protestations  of  devotion  to  public  interest  we  have 
in  abundance.  They  are  often,  if  not  generally, 
made  with  sincerity.  But  the  makers  promise  more 
than  they  can  perform.  When  it  comes  to  the 
moment  of  final  pressure,  almost  invariably  they 
succeed  in  finding  some  means  of  working  the  will 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  113 

of  their  masters,  while  saving  outside  appearances. 
The  power  of  the  machine  poHticians  is  well-nigh 
absolute.  They  rule  their  servants  with  a  rod 
of  iron. 

The  community's  workers,  the  men  who  have 
achieved  success  by  legitimate  methods,  by  hon- 
est hard  work,  find  it  almost  impossible  at  present 
to  enter  our  public  service.  The  reason  for  that 
fact  is  found  in  our  term  system.  Those  men  will 
gladly,  eagerly,  enter  the  public  service,  provided 
they  can  do  so  on  conditions  that  will  not  involve 
the  sacrifice  of  their  self-respect,  and  will  give 
them  the  usual  securities,  for  a  reasonable  money 
income,  and  a  reputation  rightly  proportioned  to 
their  deserts.  Public  callings,  under  present  con- 
ditions, make  it  a  virtual  certainty  —  that  honest, 
faithful  service  to  public  interests  will  not  secure 
its  due  reward.  Nothing  can  so  demoralize  our 
public  service.  Nothing  can  make  it  so  certain, 
that  the  community's  best  men  will  keep  out  of 
that  service.  The  situation  is  the  natural  inevitable 
product  of  our  term  system,  which  causes  these 
perpetual  revolutions  in  the  men  at  the  govern- 
ment's head,  so  that  their  only  chance  of  con- 
tinuance in  the  service  depends  on  the  will  of 
the  machine  politicians.  The  result  is  due  to  the 
political  mechanics.   It  is  as  sure  as  sunrise. 


114  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

These  conditions  are  not  the  conditions  of  de- 
mocracy. They  do  not  secure  the  realization  of 
the  will  of  the  people,  or  of  the  dictates  of  the 
people's  judgment. 

The  abolition  of  the  term  system,  combined 
with  the  substitution  of  a  process  of  popular  elec- 
tion, whereby  citizens  can  have  genuine  freedom 
of  political  action,  will  make  two  things  possi- 
ble: first,  the  people  will  be  able  to  elect  to  the 
highest  public  offices,  to  the  places  of  supreme 
control,  the  men  of  its  own  free  choice;  second, 
those  men,  after  they  are  elected,  will  be  free  and 
independent;  and,  at  the  same  time,  they  will 
be  under  a  system  of  continuous  effective  responsi- 
bility to  the  people,  acting  in  its  popular  assembly. 
They  will  be  able  to  Uve  up  to  their  own  convic- 
tions. They  will  have  the  possibility  of  being 
statesmen.  And  the  people  will  have  the  possibiUty 

—  of  genuine  democratic  government. 

In  short,  with  such  reorganization  as  is  here 
proposed,  we  should  secure  at  least  the  possibility 

—  of  improvement.  We  should  secure  at  least  the 
possibility  —  of  getting  our  ablest  men  at  the  head 
of  our  different  governments,  local,  state,  and  na- 
tional; and  of  giving  them  a  free  hand  to  do  their 
best  work.  We  should  not  inaugurate  the  millen- 
nium.   We  should  not  secure  results  that  would  be 


ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY  115 

perfect.  But  we  should  secure  the  possibiUty  —  of 
decided  improvement.  We  should  secure  at  least 
the  possibility  —  of  getting  as  good  men,  and  as 
good  practical  results,  in  public  affairs,  as  in  pri- 
vate affairs.  In  my  belief,  we  should  get  better; 
for  the  rewards  would  be  larger  ;  not  it  may  be 
in  money,  but  in  reputation.  In  every  free  coun- 
try, the  ablest  men  have  always  been  eager  to 
enter  the  public  service.  And  the  people,  the  large 
majority  of  the  citizens,  really  wish  their  public 
affairs  to  be  managed  by  such  men.  But  under 
our  present  political  system,  the  citizens  are  pre- 
vented from  carrying  that  wish  into  effect  by 
"party"  machinery;  by  their  loyalty  to  "party" 
organizations;  and  by  the  impossibihty  of  electing 
men  approved  by  their  own  judgment,  which  is 
due  to  that  loyalty.  Loyalty  to  party  organiza- 
tions has  its  praiseworthy  features.  When,  how- 
ever, it  is  carried  to  the  extent  of  depriving  the 
citizen  of  freedom  of  action,  when  —  in  practice 
—  it  reduces  him  to  a  pohtical  puppet,  then  we 
are  confronted  with  a  condition  of  affairs  which 
strikes  at  the  foundation  of  free  democratic  gov- 
ernment. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   COST   OF  MACHINE   POLITICS 

We  have  now  reached  this  point  in  our  study. 
We  have  seen,  that  the  necessary  inevitable  result 
of  our  term  system,  our  system  of  periodic  revolu- 
tion, is  "machine  politics."  "Machine  pohtics"  is 
merely  another  name  for  "  government  by  party." 
"Government  by  party,"  whatever  it  may  have 
been  in  its  origin,  has  now  resolved  itself  into  an 
annual  contest  between  powerful  political  organ- 
izations, for  our  pubUc  offices,  and  the  control  of 
our  public  treasuries.  It  constitutes  a  most  subtle 
kind  of  a  tyranny,  the  tyranny  of  a  system;  a 
system  of  our  own  creation,  formed  for  the  pur- 
pose of  keeping  the  supreme  power  in  the  com- 
munity directly  in  the  hands  of  the  citizens.  It 
is  an  attempt  at  the  impossible.  Mass  rule,  for 
that  is  really  what  we  have  been  attempting,  can- 
not be  secured  by  any  known  device.  It  would  be 
undesirable,  even  if  it  were  practicable.  But  it 
is  not  practicable.  It  cannot  be  made  an  accom- 
pUshcd  fact.    The  attempt  to  realize  it,  by  any 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE   POLITICS    117 

system  of  periodic  popular  election,  will  always 
result  in  the  future,  as  it  has  already  resulted  in  the 
past,  in  "machine  politics." 

That  is  the  lesson  of  our  experience  in  the  last 
century. 

Furthermore,  we  have  seen,  that  it  is  at  least  pos- 
sible —  to  devise  a  scheme  of  genuine  democratic 
government;  a  scheme,  under  which  the  entire 
community  will  be  a  single  organism;  a  political 
unit,  with  its  combined  concentrated  forces  com- 
pacted under  a  single  control,  that  of  the  popular 
assembly. 

But  we  must  go  even  further,  if  we  expect  to 
convince  this  conservative  American  people  of 
the  necessity  of  a  radical  fundamental  change 
in  the  framework  of  its  political  institutions.  We 
must  show  —  not  merely  that  our  present  polit- 
ical system  produces  bad  results  —  but  we  must 
also  show,  that  these  results  are  so  large,  as  to 
call  for  immediate  action  on  our  part.  We  must 
show  the  magnitude  of  these  results.  And,  if  pos- 
sible, we  must  show  their  magnitude  in  figures; 
in  dollars  and  cents.  For  we  must  bear  in  mind 
that  this  American  people  is  intensely  practical; 
that  practical  men  always  distrust  theories  and 
theorists;  that  government  is  largely  a  matter  of 
ways  and  means,  of  money;  and  that  bad  political 


118  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

machinery   will    generally    make    its    evil   nature 
apparent  in  the  public  balance  sheet. 

Consequently,  we  must  at  least  make  the  at- 
tempt, to  show  the  cost  of  "  machine  politics "  in 
money. 

The  attempt  will  now  be  made. 

The  figures  here  given  will  mainly  concern  the 
operations  of  the  national  government;  and  will  be 
limited,  of  necessity,  to  the  operations  of  a  few  of 
its  departments.  From  the  figures  here  given,  how- 
ever, it  will  easily  be  possible  to  deduce  general 
conclusions,  as  to  the  money  cost  of  "machine 
politics"  in  our  different  state  and  local  govern- 
ments. 

"Machine  politics"  on  a  large  scale  began  with 
the  opening  of  the  Civil  War.  Prior  to  that  time, 
the  operations  of  all  our  governments,  national, 
state,  and  local,  involved  the  handUng  of  com- 
paratively small  amounts  of  money.  Then,  for  the 
first  time,  did  the  operations  of  the  national  gov- 
ernment furnish  a  field  for  fraud  and  corruption 
on  a  large  scale.  Then,  for  the  first  time,  under 
the  administration  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  we  have  the  evi- 
dence of  the  omnipotence  of  the  election  machine. 

In  connection  with  the  facts  now  to  be  related, 
we  must  continually  bear  in  mind,  that  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's purity  of  purpose  —  his  personal  integrity 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    119 

—  and  his  sincerity  and  earnestness  in  using  the 
powers  of  his  office  for  what  he  deemed  the  highest 
pubUc  interests,  are  universally  conceded.  Con- 
sequently, we  are  compelled  to  conclude,  that  if 
he  was  unable  to  resist  the  power  of  the  election 
machine,  that  power  is  practically  irresistible. 

Immediately  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  election  began 
the  inevitable  division  of  the  "  spoils,"  which  has 
been,  for  well  nigh  a  century,  the  invariable  sequel 
of  the  election  of  a  new  President. 

Mr.  Lincoln's  nomination,  as  is  well  known, 
was  procured  by  a  political  barter.  It  is  a  well- 
authenticated  fact,  that  a  bargain  had  been  made 
by  Mr.  Lincoln's  political  friends,  at  the  Chicago 
convention  which  nominated  him,  that  the  vote 
of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  in  that  conven- 
tion should  be  paid  for  —  by  the  appointment  of 
Simon  Cameron  to  a  seat  in  the  Cabinet.  Whether 
or  not  Mr.  Lincoln  knew  and  approved  the  bargain 
before  his  election,  has  been  questioned.  But  it  is 
the  historic  fact,  that  he  carried  out  the  bargain 
afterwards,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  by 
making  Mr.  Cameron  his  Secretary  of  War. 

Mr.  Lincoln  did  this  in  opposition  to  the  re- 
monstrances of  a  number  of  the  most  reputable 
men  in  his  own  party.  Those  men  represented 
to  Mr.  Lincoln,  that  the  character  and  reputation 


120  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

of  Mr.  Cameron  were  so  bad,  that  no  administra- 
tion could  endure  the  disgrace  of  such  an  appoint- 
ment. 

The  story  of  Mr.  Cameron's  appointment  to  be 
Secretary  of  War  is  thus  told  by  Mr.  Lincoln's 
biographer :  *  — 

"Cameron  had  many  and  formidable  enemies,  who 
alleged  that  he  was  a  man  notorious  for  his  evil  deeds, 
shameless  in  his  rapacity  and  corruption,  and  even  more 
shameless  in  his  mean  ambition  to  occupy  exalted  sta- 
tions, for  which  he  was  utterly  and  hopelessly  incom- 
petent; that  he  had  never  dared  to  offer  himself  as  a 
candidate  before  the  people  of  Pennsylvania,  but  had 
more  than  once  gotten  high  office  from  the  Legislature 
by  the  worst  means  ever  used  by  a  politician;  and  that 
it  would  be  a  disgrace,  a  shame,  a  standing  offence  to 
the  country,  if  Mr.  Lincoln  should  consent  to  put  him 
in  his  cabinet." 

As  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  action,  the  biographer  con- 
tinues the  story  from  the  statement  of  one  of  the 
actors  —  Colonel  M'Clure :  — 

"I  do  not  know  that  any  one  went  there  to  oppose 
the  appointment  but  myself.  .  .  .  Lincoln's  character 
for  honesty  was  considered  a  complete  guaranty  against 
such  a  suicidal  act.  No  efforts  had  therefore  been  made 
to  guard  against  it.  ...  I  hastily  got  letters  from  Gov- 
ernor Curtin,  Secretary  Slifen,  Mr.  Wilmot,  Mr.  Day- 
ton, Mr.  Stevens,  and  started.  I  took  no  affidavits  with 
me,  nor  were  any  specific  charges  made  against  him 
by  me,  or  by  any  of  the  letters  I  bore;  but  they  all  sus- 

'  Lamon's  Life  of  Lincoln,  p.  459. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    121 

tained  me  in  the  allegation  that  the  appointment  would 
disgrace  the  administration  and  the  country,  because  of 
the  notorious  incompetency  and  public  and  private  vil- 
lany  of  the  candidate.  I  spent  four  hours  with  Mr.  Lin- 
coln alone;  and  the  matter  was  discussed  fully  and 
frankly.  Although  he  had  previously  decided  to  ap- 
point Cameron,  he  closed  our  interview  by  a  reconsid- 
eration of  his  purpose,  and  the  assurance  that  within 
twenty-four  hours  he  would  write  me  definitely  on  the 
subject." 

Mr.  Lincoln's  own  opinion  of  Mr.  Cameron 
was  so  bad  as  to  make  him  think  that  the  mere 
appointment  of  Mr.  Cameron  by  him  to  a  cabi- 
net position  would  of  itself  destroy  his  own  great 
reputation  for  honesty.  According  to  his  biogra- 
pher, he  said:  — 

"All  that  I  am  in  the  world  —  the  Presidency  and 
all  else  —  I  owe  to  that  opinion  of  me  which  the  peo- 
ple express  when  they  call  me  Honest  Old  Abe.  Now 
what  will  they  think  of  their  honest  Abe  when  he 
appoints  Simon  Cameron  to  be  his  familiar  adviser  ?  " 

At  the  time  of  Mr.  Cameron's  appointment, 
we  were  at  the  opening  of  a  great  war,  on  which 
depended  the  nation's  existence.  The  War  Sec- 
retaryship was  the  most  important  office  in  the 
nation.  It  demanded  a  man  of  great  ability,  and 
of  unquestioned  integrity.  Success  in  the  war 
would  be  largely  a  matter  of  money.      Upright 


122  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

and  able  administration  of  the  War  Office  was 
certain  to  be  the  most  important  thing  in  the  entire 
administration.  Nevertheless,  Mr.  Lincoln  gave 
the  headship  of  the  War  Office  to  a  man  who  was 
notoriously  and  scandalously  corrupt.  Of  that 
fact  he  was  fully  advised  in  advance.  He  was  fully 
warned,  as  to  the  necessary  and  inevitable  conse- 
quences of  his  action.  Nevertheless,  he  made  the 
appointment.  It  may  be  conceded,  that  Mr.  Lin- 
coln had  good  intentions.  Yet  there  is  the  record 
of  his  action. 

Other  cabinet  appointments  were  made  in  like 
manner,  for  like  reasons.  It  cannot  be  said  with 
accuracy,  that  a  single  one  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  cab- 
inet appointments  was  made  by  reason  of  the 
fitness  of  the  appointee  for  his  official  work. 

As  already  said,  Mr.  Lincoln's  purity  of  pur- 
pose and  earnestness  of  endeavor  are  conceded,  on 
all  hands.  We  must  assume,  that  he  did  every- 
thing in  his  power  to  insure  an  honest  administra- 
tion of  our  national  affairs.  For  he,  and  every 
intelligent  man,  well  understood  that  success  in 
putting  down  the  rebellion  was  largely  a  ques- 
tion of  money;  and  that  it  was  of  vital  necessity 
that  the  strictest  economy  should  be  used  in  the 
management  of  our  Army  and  Navy,  and  of  the 
nation's  finances. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    123 

Bearing  all  that  in  mind,  let  us  see  what  were 
the  practical  results  of  his  so-called  "political" 
appointments. 

The  government  was  compelled  to  purchase 
large  quantities  of  material  of  all  kinds,  arms  and 
supplies  for  the  Army,  and  vessels  for  the  trans- 
port service  and  the  Navy.  To  the  ordinary  lay 
mind  it  would  seem  natural  and  reasonable,  that 
vessels  to  be  purchased  should  be  fitted  for  the 
use  to  which  they  were  to  be  put.  The  arms  to  be 
bought  should  have  been  such  as  could  be  of  ser- 
vice. It  was  very  clear  that  the  men,  of  all  others, 
who  would  be  the  best  judges  of  what  was  needed 
by  the  two  branches  of  the  service  in  the  way  of 
ships  and  arms,  would  be  the  officers  of  the  Navy 
and  Army.  And  the  officers  of  the  Navy,  in  the 
beginning,  had  little  else  on  which  they  could  well 
be  employed  except  these  very  purchases.  For 
we  had  no  vessels  for  them  to  command.  Never- 
theless, for  some  reason  best  known  to  the  men  who 
conducted  the  affairs  of  the  country  at  the  time, 
the  political  friends  of  congressmen  and  cabinet 
members  were  found,  of  all  men  in  the  United 
States,  to  be  the  only  ones  having  the  needed 
skill  and  knowledge  which  fitted  them  to  make 
purchases  for  the  government. 

The  purchasing  of  vessels  for  the  Navy  De- 


.124  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

partraent  at  the  port  of  New  York  was  taken  from 
the  commandant  of  the  navy-yard  there,  and  trans- 
ferred to  a  man  of  whom  a  House  of  Representa- 
tives Committee  ^  say,  that  he  had 

"never  had  the  slightest  experience  in  the  new  and 
responsible  duties  which  he  was  called  upon  to  dis- 
charge, either  in  the  naval  service,  the  building  or  buy- 
ing and  seUing  of  ships,  or  in  any  pursuit  calling  for 
a  knowledge  of  their  construction,  capacity,  or  value, 
never  having  spent  an  hour  in  either." 

The  Committee  further  say  that 

"The  evidence  was  abundant  before  the  committee, 
that  if  it  had  been  necessary  to  obtain  the  services  of 
any  gentlemen  outside  of  the  navy  itself,  those  gen- 
tlemen, combining  from  experience  and  education  the 
knowledge  most  calculated  to  fit  them  for  this  duty, 
independent  of  outside  aid,  could  have  been  secured 
without  the  slightest  difficulty  for  a  salary  not  exceeding 
$5000  for  the  year." 

The  other  points  of  the  affair  can  be  best  given 
in  an  extract  from  the  Committee's  report.  They 
say  of  this  purchasing  agent  that  he 

"received  as  compensation  during  the  period  of  seven 
weeks  previous  to  the  6th  day  of  September,  when  this 
testimony  was  taken,  the  enormous  sum  of  $51,584,  as 
admitted  by  himself  before  the  committee.    When  this 

'  House  of  Representatives,  Thirty-seventh  Congress,  Sec- 
ond Session,  Report  No.  2. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    125 

testimony  was  taken,  information  of  its  extraordinary 
character  and  import  was  communicated  to  the  depart- 
ment, in  the  hope  that  an  abuse  so  glaring,  when  pointed 
out,  might  be  corrected.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the  de- 
partment became  thus  possessed  of  the  information  that 
its  own  agent  was,  by  this  system  of  commissions,  amass- 
ing a  private  fortune,  the  committee  have  been  sur- 
prised to  learn,  from  a  recent  communication  from  the 
Navy  Department  furnishing  them  with  the  numbers 
and  prices  of  vessels  purchased  by  Mr.  Morgan  for  the 
Government  since  said  6th  day  of  September,  that  the 
cost  of  those  thus  purchased  by  him  amounts  in  the 
aggregate  to  the  sum  of  $1,736,992.  If  he  has  received 
the  same  rate  of  compensation  since  as  before  that  date, 
there  must  be  added  to  the  sum  of  $51,584  paid  him  be- 
fore that  date  the  further  compensation  of  $43,424  for 
services  rendered  since,  making  in  all  the  sum  of  $95,000 
paid  to  a  single  individual  for  his  services  as  agent  of 
the  Government  since  the  15th  day  of  July,  a  period 
of  four  and  one-half  months." 

And  the  Committee  add:  — 

"The  committee  do  not  find  in  the  transaction  the 
less  to  censure  in  the  fact  that  this  arrangement  be- 
tween the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  Mr.  Morgan  was 
one  between  brothers-in-law." 

Five  thousand  carbines  belonging  to  the  gov- 
ernment were  sold  to  a  private  individual  for  $3.50 
apiece,  and  were  immediately  repurchased  for 
the  government  for  $22  apiece,  making  a  differ- 
ence on  this  one  transaction  of  nearly  $90,000. 


126  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

One  lot  of  these  carbines  went  through  this  pro- 
cess of  sale  and  repurchase  twice.  They  were  first 
sold  by  the  government  at  a  price  merely  nom- 
inal, and  were  repurchased  at  $15  apiece.  They 
were  again  sold  by  the  government  at  the  price 
above  stated,  of  $3.50,  and  again  repurchased 
at  $22.  How  many  other  times  these  arms  did 
service  under  the  purchase  and  sale  treatment, 
or  whether  they  ever  did  service  in  the  field,  did 
not  appear. 

A  certain  contractor  testified  that  he  furnished 
supplies  to  the  government  to  the  amount  of 
$800,000,  on  which  he  made  a  profit  of  over  forty 
per  cent.  The  purchases  from  him  were  made 
in  direct  violation  of  law. 

Two  politicians  in  New  York,  one  of  them  an 
old  personal  and  political  friend  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  had  two  million  dollars  of  government  money 
placed  in  a  private  banking-house,  subject  to  their 
order  for  the  purchase  of  supplies,  in  direct  vio- 
lation of  law.  Two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
dollars  of  this  money  they  spent  without  ever 
accounting  for  any  of  it.  It  was  in  evidence,  that 
of  this  amount  ten  thousand  dollars  was  paid 
for  a  large  quantity  of  groceries  supplied  by  a 
dealer  in  hardware.  Another  sum  of  over  twenty 
thousand  dollars  was   paid   for  "straw  hats  and 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    127 

linen  trousers."  But  no  one  in  the  Army  saw  any 
of  our  troops  decked  in  this  fantastic  costume. 
Two  steamers  were  purchased  by  a  friend  of  high 
government  officials  for  about  one  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars,  and  were  immediately  sold  to  the 
government  for  two  hundred  thousand  dollars. 
One  steamer  was  chartered  to  the  government 
for  two  thousand  five  hundred  dollars  a  day; 
and  the  government  paid  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
five  thousand  dollars  for  a  period  during  which 
she  lay  at  a  wharf  before  she  was  ever  once  used. 
One  railroad  company  received  for  transporta- 
tion in  one  year  from  the  government  over  three 
million  five  hundred  thousand  dollars,  being  an 
excess  over  the  company's  entire  earnings  for  the 
previous  year  of  one  million  three  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  dollars,  or  about  forty  per  cent. 
And  the  rates  charged  for  this  transportation  were 
about  thirty-three  and  one-third  per  cent  in  ex- 
cess of  the  rates  paid  by  private  individuals.  The 
brother-in-law  of  the  president  of  this  railroad 
company  was  Mr.  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  War. 

These  are  merely  single  instances  of  the  way 
in  which  the  people's  money  was  wasted  by  the 
party  leaders  and  their  political  supporters. 

That  was  not  all.  In  every  war,  under  any 
form  of  government,  there  has  generally  been  more 


128  ORGANIZED    DEMOCRACY 

or  less  waste  of  the  public  money.  It  remained 
for  the  great  republic  of  modern  times,  to  give  to 
the  world  one  of  the  most  remarkable  exhibitions 
of  the  wholesale  squandering  of  public  funds  and 
public  property  recorded  in  history.  Not  only  did 
we  waste  our  own  men  and  money,  but  we  fed 
and  clothed  the  army  of  the  enemy  we  were  fight- 
ing. The  Confederate  forces  got  the  very  supplies 
which  kept  them  in  the  field,  by  trade  carried  on 
through  the  lines  under  written  permits  given  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States. 

The  report  of  a  Congressional  Committee  states :  * 

"The  testimony  before  the  committee  discloses  the 
shameless  and  treasonable  character  of  the  trade  which 
has  been  carried  on  within  the  rebel  lines  with  rebel  agents, 
and  for  the  use  of  rebel  armies.  The  amount  of  supplies 
necessary  for  the  support  of  rebel  armies,  which,  under 
the  cover  of  this  trade,  has  been  sent  through  the  rebel  lines 
at  New  Orleans,  Memphis,  Norfolk,  and  other  places, 
almost  surpasses  belief.  Negotiations  have  been  entered 
into  and  correspondence  carried  on  by  citizens  of  the 
United  States  with  rebel  agents  to  deliver  for  the  rebel 
government  provisions  and  other  necessary  articles  to 
sustain  the  rebel  armies  in  return  for  cotton." 

And  the  report  adds:  — 

"General  Canby  states  that  the  rebel  armies  east 
and  west  of  the  Mississippi  River  have  been  mainly 

'  Report  on  "Trade  with  Rebellious  States,"  Thirty-eifrhth 
Congress,  Second  Session,  House  of  Representatives,  Report 
No.  24. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     129 

supplied  for  tJie  last  twelve  months  by  the  unlawful  trade 
carried  on  on  that  river. "  ^ 

But  political  influence  went  further  than  con- 
trolling the  Treasury  and  the  War  and  Navy 
departments.  It  controlled  the  appointment  of 
our  generals.  Machine  poHticians  aspired  to  the 
glory  of  the  soldier,  for  political  purposes.  They 
were  men  without  either  education  or  experience. 
One  of  them  at  least  had  never  in  his  hfe  so  much 
as  handled  a  battalion  or  a  company  on  a  parade 
ground.    Men  of  this  kind  were  given  generals' 

'  Here  is  a  specimen  of  the  permits  under  which  this  trade 
was  carried  on :  — 

"An  authorized  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department  having, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  contracted 
for  the  cotton  above  mentioned,  and  the  parties  having  agreed 
to  sell  and  deliver  the  same  to  said  agent, 

"It  is  ordered  that  the  cotton,  moving  in  compliance  with 
and  for  fulfilment  of  said  contract,  and  being  transported  to 
said  agent  or  under  his  direction,  shall  be  free  from  seizure  or 
detention  by  any  officer  of  the  Government;  and  command- 
ants of  military  departments,  districts,  posts,  and  detachments, 
naval  stations,  gunboats,  flotillas,  and  fleets,  will  observe  this 
order,  and  give  the  said  .  .  .  their  agents,  transports,  and  means 
of  transportation,  free  and  unobstructed  passage,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  getting  said  cotton,  or  any  part  thereof,  through  the 
lines,  and  safe  conduct  within  our  lines,  while  the  same  is 
moving,  in  compliance  with  regulations  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  and  for  fulfilment  of  said  contract  with  the  agent  of 

the  Government. 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

Committee  Report  No.  24,  Second  Session,  Thirty-eighth 
Congress. 


130  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

commissions,  and  the  command  of  armies;  and 
through  their  ignorance  and  incapacity  thousands 
of  better  men  than  themselves  lost  their  lives. 

In  all  departments,  throughout  the  war,  the 
plunder  of  the  treasury  by  machine  politicians 
proceeded  on  true  machine  principles.  The  peo- 
ple's offices  were  used,  not  for  the  service  of  the 
people,  but  for  the  service  of  the  election  machine, 
to  reward  machine  men  for  machine  work. 

Let  us  see  what  was  the  cost,  in  part,  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States  of  these  methods. 

The  cost  in  life  of  our  Civil  War,  on  the  North- 
em  side  alone,  making  no  account  of  the  losses 
of  the  Confederates,  according  to  the  official  rec- 
ords, was  as  follows:  — 

Killed  in  battle 44,238 

Wounds  and  injuries 49,205 

Suicide,  etc 526 

Disease 186,216 

Unknown  causes 24,184 

Total 304,369 

The  number  of  men  withdrawn  from  their 
ordinary  pursuits,  on  the  rolls  of  the  Northern 
Army  alone,  again  not  taking  into  account  the 
Confederates,  was  as  follows: — 

July  1,  '61 186,751 

January  1,  '62 575,917 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    131 

March  31,  '62 637,126 

Jan.  1,  '63 918,191 

Jan.  1,  '64 860,757 

Jan.  1,  '65 959,460 

Mar.  31,  '65 880,086 

May  1,  '65 1,000,516 

The  money  expenditure  of  the  national  govern- 
ment alone,  occasioned  by  the  Civil  War,  for  the 
Army  and  Navy  alone,  as  it  partially  appears  from 
our  treasury  records,  was  as  follows :  — 

War  Department  ex- 
penditures, years 
1862-1870  inclu- 
sive, $3,351,352,829.15 

Deduct    former    nor- 
mal  yearly   expen- 
diture  for   those 
years,  144.000.000.00 

Gives  the  War  De- 
partment   expendi- 
tures due  to  the 
Civil  War,  $3,207,352,829.15 

Navy  expenditures, 
years  1862-1870 
inclusive,  $456,100,149.81 

Deduct  normal 
yearly  expendi- 
ture for  those  years,  99,000.000.00 

Navy   expenditures 

due  to  Civil  War,  357,100,149.81 

Pensions    paid    years 
1862-1899, inclu- 
sive, 2,436,989,461.35 

Interest  on  public 
debt,  years  1862- 

1899  inclusive,  2,741.571,609.71 

Total  $8,743,014,050.02 


132  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

Aside  from  these  expenditures  of  the  national  gov- 
ernment, immense  sums  of  money  were  paid  out 
by  the  States,  and  by  cities  and  towns  all  over  the 
country,  for  war  purposes. 

Three  hundred  thousand  lives  is  far  below  the 
fact,  as  the  mere  expenditure  of  life. 

Nine  thousand  millions  of  dollars  is  doubtless  far 
below  the  fact,  as  the  mere  expenditure  of  money, 
due  to  the  war,  by  the  general  government  alone. 

More  than  half  of  that  expenditure  of  life  and 
money  was  wholly  needless;  and  was  due  to  the 
ignorance  and  incapacity  of  the  machine  politi- 
cians, who  were  then  in  control  of  the  national 
government.  At  least  one  half  that  amount  of 
money,  four  thousand  five  hundred  millions  of 
dollars,  was  simply  thrown  away,  or  stolen,  through 
the  incompetence  and  dishonesty  of  our  national 
officials.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the 
war  the  waste  of  the  people's  money  continued 
unchecked.    It  was  a  carnival  of  corruption. 

General  Schofield,  as  high  authority  as  could  be 
cited,  has  written:  ^  — 

"It  is  capable  of  demonstration,  to  the  satisfaction 
of  any  average  military  mind,  that  our  late  war  might 
have  been  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion  in  two 
years  instead  of  jour,  and  at  half  the  cost  in  men  and 

'  Cited  in  "The  Army  of  the  United  States,"  by  President 
Garfield,  North  American  Rcviev),  Muy-June,  1878. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    133 

money,  if  any  one  soldier  of  fair  ability  had  been  given 
the  absolute  control  of  military  operations,  and  of  the 
necessary  military  resources  of  the  country." 

At  the  time  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  appointment  of 
Mr.  Cameron  there  was  one  man,  already  promi- 
nent, who,  more  than  any  other,  had  shown  his 
preeminent  fitness  for  the  position  of  Secretary 
of  War.  That  was  Edwin  M.  Stanton.  He  was 
a  man  of  great  ability  and  large  experience.  He 
had  already  given  evidence  of  unusual  adminis- 
trative capacity,  and  of  his  loyalty  to  the  Union 
cause.  Moreover,  he  had  even  then  made  himself 
a  national  reputation,  by  the  stand  he  had  taken 
in  President  Buchanan's  Cabinet  against  the  sur- 
render of  the  garrison  in  Charleston  harbor.  The 
fitness  of  the  man  for  the  place  was  so  well  known, 
and  so  universally  acknowledged,  that  not  long 
afterwards  Mr.  Lincoln  found  himself  under  a 
virtual  necessity  of  appointing  Mr.  Stanton  to  be 
the  head  of  the  War  Department. 

Instead  of  Mr.  Stanton,  we  had  Simon  Cameron. 

At  the  same  time,  a  large  number  of  appoint- 
ments were  made  to  high  positions  in  the  Army,  of 
men  who  had  no  military  experience,  and  no  fit- 
ness for  high  commands,  most  of  them  Republican 
politicians.  We  had  at  that  time  in  the  country 
a  large  number  of  West  Point  graduates ;   men 


134  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

who  were  preeminently  fit  to  handle  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  on  scientific  military  methods. 
Those  men  were  the  ones,  evidently,  who  should 
have  been  given  all  of  the  high  commands  in  the 
Army.  War  should  be  waged  by  soldiers,  not  by 
politicians;  by  men  who  have  the  knowledge  and 
training  of  soldiers.  We  had  such  men.  They 
were  the  men  who  should  have  had  the  control 
of  army  aflFairs.  Instead  of  putting  the  control  of 
army  affairs  in  the  hands  of  those  men,  it  was  put 
in  the  hands  of  corrupt  party  politicians;  of  men 
like  Simon  Cameron. 

The  manner  in  which  army  affairs  were  man- 
aged can  be  best  described  by  quoting  from  let- 
ters written  at  the  time  by  Secretary  Stanton. 
The  first  is  one  to  General  Dix:  — 

"This  will  be  handed  you  by  Mr.  Andrews,  with 
whom  you  are  acquainted.  He  will  inform  you  of  the  state 
of  affairs  here.  They  are  desperate  beyond  conception. 
If  there  be  any  remedy  —  any  shadow  of  hope  to  pre- 
serve this  government  from  utter  and  absolute  extinc- 
tion, it  must  come  from  New  York  without  delay."  ^ 

On  March  10,  he  wrote :  "  The  scramble  for 
office  is  terrific." 

On   March    15,  he  wrote  :  "  The   pressure  for 

office  continues  unabated ;  every  department  is  over- 

*  Gorham's  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton, 
p.  199. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    135 

run,  and  by  the  time  that  all  the  patronage  is  dis- 
tributed, the  Republican-party  will  be  dissolved." 

General  Sherman,  in  his  Memoirs,  gives  the 
following  account  of  a  call  he  made  on  President 
Lincoln  in  March,  1861,  when  his  brother.  Senator 
Sherman,  introduced  him  to  the  President.  The 
Senator  said,  "Mr.  President,  this  is  my  brother, 
Colonel  Sherman,  who  is  just  up  from  Louisiana, 
and  he  may  give  you  information  you  want." 

"'Ah,'  said  Mr.  Lincoln,  'how  are  they  getting  along 
down  there  ?'  I  said,  'They  think  they  are  getting  along 
swimmingly;  they  are  preparing  for  war.'  'Oh,  well,' 
said  he,  'I  guess  we  will  manage  to  keep  house.'  I  was 
silenced;  said  no  more  to  him,  and  we  soon  left.  I 
was  sadly  disappointed,  and  remember  that  I  broke 
out  on  John,  damning  the  politicians  generally;  saying, 
'You  have  got  things  in  a  hell  of  a  fix,  and  you  may  get 
them  out  as  well  as  you  can,'  adding  that  the  country 
was  sleeping  on  a  volcano  that  might  burst  forth  at  any 
moment. " 

A  letter  of  General  Dix  to  Mr.  Stanton,  dated 
May  28,  1861,  reads  as  follows:  — 

"Ever  since  I  wrote  you  last  I  have  been  busy  night 
and  day,  and  am  a  good  deal  worn  out  by  my  labors  on 
the  Union  Defense  Committee  and  by  superintending 
the  organization  and  equipment  of  nine  regiments,  six 
of  which  I  have  sent  to  the  field,  leaving  three  to  go  to 
the  field  to-morrow  and  the  day  afterward.  The  post 
of  Major-General  of  Volunteers  was  tendered  to  me 
by  Governor  Morgan,  and  I  could  not  decUne  without 


136  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

laying  myself  open  to  the  imputation  of  hauling  down 
my  flag,  —  a  thing  altogether  inadmissible.  So  I  am 
in  harness  for  the  war,  although  the  administration  takes 
it  easy,  for  I  have  not  yet  been  accepted,  and  there  are 
rumors  that  there  are  too  many  Democratic  epaulettes 
in  the  field.  There  seems  to  be  no  fear  at  Washington 
that  there  are  too  many  Democratic  knapsacks.  New 
York  has  about  15,000  men  at  the  seat  of  war,  under 
Sanford,  who  has  gone  on  temporarily.  How  is  it,  my 
dear  sir,  that  New  York  is  always  overlooked,  or  nearly 
always,  except  when  there  are  burdens  to  be  borne  ?  As 
to  this  generalship,  it  was  unsought,  and  I  am  indif- 
ferent about  it  entirely.  I  am  willing  to  give  my  strength 
and  life,  if  need  be,  to  uphold  the  government  against 
treason  and  rebellion;  but  if  the  administration  pre- 
fers some  one  else  to  command  New  York  troops,  no 
one  will  acquiesce  so  cheerfully  as  myself." 

Another  letter  of  Mr.  Stanton,  of  June  8,  1861, 

reads  as  follows:  — 

"Well,  every  patriotic  heart  has  rejoiced  at  the  en- 
thusiastic spirit  with  which  the  nation  has  aroused  to 
maintain  its  existence,  and  all  the  peculation  and  fraud 
that  immediately  sprang  up  to  prey  upon  the  volunteers 
and  grasp  the  public  money  as  plunder  and  spoil,  has  cre- 
ated a  strong  feeling  of  loathing  and  disgust,  and  no 
sooner  had  the  appearance  of  an  imminent  danger  passed 
away  and  the  administration  recovered  from  its  panic, 
than  a  determination  became  manifest  to  give  a  strict 
party  direction  to  the  great  national  movement.  After  a 
few  Democratic  appointments,  as  Butler  and  Dix,  every- 
thing has  been  devoted  to  back  Republican  interests.  This 
has  already  excited  strong  reactionary  feeling,  not  only  in 
New  York  but  also  in  the  Western  States. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    137 

"General  Dix  informs  me  that  he  has  been  so  badly 
treated  by  Cameron  that  he  intends  immediately  to 
resign.  This  will  be  followed  by  a  withdrawal  of  finan- 
cial confidence  and  support  to  a  very  great  extent. 
Indeed,  the  course  of  things  for  the  last  four  weeks  has 
been  such  as  to  excite  distrust  in  every  department  of 
the  government." 

Another  letter  of  Mr.  Stanton,  to  General  Dix, 
is  as  follows :  — 

"The  meeting  of  the  24th  of  April,  in  New  York, 
has  become  a  national  epoch,  for  it  was  a  manifestation 
of  patriotic  feeling  beyond  any  example  in  history.  To 
that  meeting,  the  courage  it  inspired  and  the  organized 
action  it  produced,  this  government  will  owe  its  salva- 
tion, if  saved  it  can  be.  To  the  general  gratification  of 
the  country  at  your  position  as  chairman  of  the  Union 
Committee,  there  were  added  to  my  breast  a  feeling  of 
security  and  succor  that  until  that  time  was  unknown. 
No  one  can  imagine  the  deplorable  condition  of  this 
city  and  the  hazard  of  the  government,  who  did  not 
witness  the  weakness  and  panic  of  the  administration 
and  the  painful  imbecility  of  Lincoln.  We  looked  to 
New  York  in  that  dark  hour  as  our  only  deliverance 
under  Providence,  and  thank  God  it  came.  The  up- 
rising of  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  their 
government  and  crush  rebellion  has  been  so  grand,  so 
mighty  in  every  element  that  I  feel  it  a  blessing  to  be 
alive  and  witness  it.  The  action  of  your  city  especially 
filled  me  with  admiration,  and  proves  the  right  of  New 
York  to  be  called  the  Empire  City.  But  the  picture  has 
a  dark  side  —  dark  and  terrible  from  the  corruption 
thai  surrounds  the  War  Department  and  seems  to  poison 


138  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

with  infamous  breath  the  very  atmosphere.  Millions  of 
New  York  capital,  the  time,  strength  and  perhaps  lives 
of  thousands  of  patriotic  citizens  will  be  wanted  to  crush 
a  ravenous  crew.  On  every  side  the  government  and 
soldiers  are  pillaged;  arms,  clothing,  transportation  and 
provisions  are  each  and  all  subject  of  peculation  and  spoil. 
On  one  side,  the  waves  of  treason  and  rebellion  are 
madly  dashing,  on  the  other  is  the  yawning  gulf  of  na- 
tional bankruptcy.  Our  cause  is  the  greatest  that  any 
generation  of  men  was  ever  called  upon  to  uphold.  It 
would  seem  to  be  God's  cause,  and  must  triumph.  But 
when  we  witness  venality  and  corruption  growing  in 
poiver  every  day,  and  controlling  the  millions  of  money 
that  should  be  a  patriotic  sacrifice  for  national  deliver- 
ance, and  treating  the  treasury  of  the  nation  as  a  booty 
to  be  divided  among  thieves,  hope  dies  away.  Deliver- 
ance from  this  danger  must  also  come  from  New  York. 
Those  who  are  unwilling  to  see  blood  shed,  lives  lost, 
treasure  wasted  in  vain,  must  take  speedy  measures  to 
reform  the  evil  before  it  is  too  late. 

"Of  military  affairs  I  can  form  no  judgment.  Every 
day  affords  fresh  proof  of  the  design  to  give  the  war  a 
party  direction.  The  army  appointments  appear,  with 
two  or  three  exceptions  only,  to  be  bestowed  on  persons 
whose  only  claim  is  their  Republicanism  —  broken-down 
politicians  without  experience,  ability  or  other  merit. 
Democrats  are  readily  repelled  or  scowled  upon  with 
jealous  and  ill-concealed  aversion.  The  western  demo- 
cracy have  already  become  disgusted,  and  between  the 
corruption  of  some  of  the  Republican  leaders  and  the 
selfish  ambition  of  others,  some  great  disaster  may  soon 
befall  the  nation.  How  long  will  the  democracy  of  New 
York  tolerate  these  things  ? 

"The  navy  is  in  a  state  of  hopeless  imbecility  and 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    139 

is  believed  to  be  far  from  being  purged  from  the  treach- 
ery that  has  already  occasioned  so  much  shame  and 
dishonor." 

So  much  for  the  administration  of  Army  and 
Navy  affairs. 

Let  us  turn  to  that  of  our  foreign  relations. 

From  the  outset,  it  was  apparent  to  all  men  of 
intelligence,  that  the  point  of  most  serious  danger 
was  England.  No  doubt,  for  many  years  we  had 
heard  the  expressions  of  English  horror  over  the 
evils  of  African  slavery.  Intelligent  men,  however, 
were  well  aware,  that  the  action  of  England  would 
be  determined  almost  entirely  by  considerations  of 
the  pound  sterling;  or,  in  the  words  of  Tennyson, 
by  the  "  jingling  of  the  guinea." 

All  that  was  required  in  order  to  enlist  the  moral 
sympathies  of  England  on  our  side,  was  for  us  to 
furnish  them  with  cotton;  keep  their  mills  busy 
manufacturing  arms  and  clothing  for  our  Army  and 
Navy;  employ  their  shipyards  in  the  construction  of 
ships  for  us,  instead  of  for  the  Confederacy ;  and  pay 
them  lavishly  in  our  government  bonds  bearing  a 
high  rate  of  interest.  With  our  immense  superior- 
ity in  men  and  money,  this  policy  was  one  of  com- 
parative simplicity  and  ease. 

Thereupon,  all  England  would  have  resounded 
with  pagans  in  praise  of  freedom.  Wilbcrforces  would 


140  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

have  arisen  in  every  constituency  declaiming  on  the 
iniquities  of  slavery,  and  the  duty  of  the  English 
people  to  support  the  cause  of  individual  and  na- 
tional hberty.  Professor  Freeman's  monumental 
work,  "  The  History  of  Federal  Governments  from 
the  Formation  of  the  Achaian  League  to  the  Dis- 
ruption of  the  United  States,"  would  have  been  en- 
titled "The  Evolution  of  Democracy."  Mr.  Glad- 
stone, instead  of  proclaiming  that  Jefferson  Davis 
"had  made  a  nation,"  would  have  exulted  over  the 
fact  that  President  Lincoln  had  saved  one,  and  had 
destroyed  slavery.*  The  hands  of  John  Bright 
would  have  been  strengthened,  and  he  would  have 
been  able  to  dominate  the  policy  of  England  in 
reference  to  our  struggle  to  enforce  the  supremacy 
of  the  Constitution  and  the  laws. 

Obviously,  therefore,  England  should  have  been 
the  objective  of  our  most  able  and  adroit  diplo- 
macy;   and  should    have    had   the    most   careful 

•  Mr.  Morley  in  his  life  leaves  this  episode  precisely  where 
it  was  before  Mr.  Gladstone,  in  July,  1896,  attempted  to  explain 
his  famous  utterance.  But  the  explanation  goes  only  so  far  as 
to  apologize  for  the  indiscretion  of  such  an  utterance  by  a  cab- 
inet minister.  It  leaves  Mr.  Gladstone  where  he  was  before  — 
in  the  matter  of  sympathy.  And  Mr.  Gladstone  adds,  with 
charming  naivete:  "It  illustrates  vividly  that  incapacity  which 
my  mind  so  long  retained,  and  perhaps  still  exhibits,  an  inca- 
pacity of  viewing  subjects  all  round,  in  their  extraneous  as  well 
as  in  their  internal  properties,  and  thereby  of  knowing  when  to 
he  silent  and  when  to  speaks 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    141 

thought  at  the  hands  of  the  Washington  authori- 
ties. 

Let  us  see  what  was  the  fact. 

Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  our  Minister  at  the 
Court  of  St.  James,  has  left  in  his  Diary  an  account 
of  his  interview  with  President  Lincoln  and  the 
Secretary  of  State,  when  he  went  to  Washington, 
to  receive  his  appointment,  and  his  instructions  for 
the  duties  of  his  mission.  His  son  gives  it  as  follows : 

"The  secretary  introduced  the  minister  to  the  Presi- 
dent, and  the  appointee  of  the  last  proceeded  to  make  the 
usual  conventional  remarks,  expressive  of  obligation, 
and  his  hope  that  the  confidence  implied  in  the  appoint- 
ment he  had  received  might  not  prove  to  have  been  mis- 
placed. They  had  all  by  this  time  taken  chairs;  and  tlie 
tall  man  listened  in  silent  abstraction.  When  Mr.  Adams 
had  finished,  —  and  he  did  not  take  long,  —  the  tall  man 
remarked  in  an  indifferent,  careless  way  that  the  appoint- 
ment in  question  had  not  been  his,  but  was  due  to  the 
secretary  of  state ;  and  that  it  was  to  '  Governor  Seward ' 
rather  than  to  himself  that  Mr.  Adams  should  express 
any  sense  of  obligation  he  might  feel;  then,  stretching 
out  his  legs  before  him,  he  said,  with  an  air  of  great  re- 
lief, as  he  swung  his  long  arms  to  his  head:  '  Well,  gov- 
ernor, I've  this  morning  decided  that  Chicago  post-of- 
fice appointment.'  Mr.  Adams  and  the  nation's  foreign 
policy  were  dismissed  together!  Not  another  reference 
was  made  to  them.  Mr.  Lincoln  seemed  to  think  that 
the  occasion  called  for  nothing  further;  as  to  Mr.  Adams, 
it  was  a  good  while  before  he  recovered  from  his  dis- 
may; he  never  recovered  from  his  astonishment,  nor  did 


142  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  impression  then  made  ever  wholly  fade  from  his 
mind.  Indeed,  it  was  distinctly  apparent  in  the  eulogy 
on  Seward  delivered  by  him  at  Albany  twelve  years 
afterwards." 

The  war  was  managed,  precisely  as  the  so-called 
"war"  with  Spain  was  managed,  by  party  poli- 
ticians, for  party  purposes.  It  is  not  intended,  that 
President  Lincoln  intentionally  betrayed  his  trust. 
Simply,  he  was  out  of  place.  He  was  a  great  ora- 
tor; a  man  with  the  large  views,  and  high  pur- 
poses, of  a  statesman.  But  he  had  no  appreciation 
of  the  men  and  methods  needed  for  the  conduct 
of  a  war.  The  government  then  needed  at  its  head 
a  man  with  the  gifts  and  training  of  an  executive. 
We  wanted  —  a  leader.    We  had  —  a  millstone. 

The  results  of  this  kind  of  administration  were 
only  what  were  to  be  expected.  The  success  of 
the  Union  arms  depended  upon  the  wise  and  eco- 
nomical handling  of  men,  material,  and  money. 
The  superiority  in  resources  of  the  North  over 
the  South  was  vast  and  overwhelming.  The  re- 
sult of  the  contest  never  ought  to  have  been  doubt- 
ful. It  never  would  have  been  doubtful,  with  an 
honest  and  efficient  administration  at  Washington. 
But  the  corrupt  and  needless  expenditure  of  life 
and  money,  that  continued  from  the  very  outset  of 
military  operations  through  the  very  last  campaign. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    143 

was  such  as  to  make  the  result  of  the  war  doubt- 
ful up  to  the  end. 

As  to  this  fact,  let  us  hear  General  Schofield. 
In  his  "  Forty-six  Years  in  the  Army,"  he  says :  — 

"  In  a  great  and  prolonged  war  it  is  not  possible  for  a 
people  to  contribute  all  the  means  required  at  the  time. 
The  amount  of  taxation  would  be  greater  than  any 
people  could  bear.  Hence  the  government  must  bor- 
row the  necessary  money.  This  cannot  be  done  with- 
out national  credit.  If  credit  decUnes,  rates  of  interest 
and  discount  on  securities  increase  until  the  national 
debt  reaches  its  limit  and  no  more  money  can  be  bor- 
rowed.   In  short,  the  nation  becomes  bankrupt. 

"This  was  the  condition  of  the  United  States  before 
the  close  of  the  late  Civil  War,  with  a  million  of  men  on 
the  muster  and  pay  rolls,  including  several  great  armies  of 
veteran  troops  in  the  field,  while  the  Confederate  armxj  was 
reduced  to  a  very  small  portion  of  that  number.  The  Union 
was  on  the  very  verge  of  failure,  because  Government 
could  no  longer  raise  money  to  pay  its  troops,  purchase  sup- 
plies or  make  any  further  use  of  its  magnificent  armies. 
This  astounding  fact  was  confided  to  the  Generals  of  the 
army  in  the  Winter  of  1864-1865,  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  who  then  said  the  Rebellion  must  be  suppressed 
in  the  coming  Spring  campaign  or  the  effort  abandoned 
because  the  resources  of  the  Treasury  were  exhausted." 

In  view  of  these  facts,  it  will  be  interesting  to 
read  General  Schofield's  further  comments  on  the 
financial  policy  of  the  administration.    He  says :  — 

"In  a  great  country  with  unlimited  resources  like 
the  United  States,  resort  to  loans  would  seem  to  be 


144  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

entirely  unnecessary.  However  this  may  be,  and  what- 
ever may  be  the  necessity  in  any  case,  a  forced  loan 
without  interest  is  simply  robbery  to  the  extent  of 
vmpaid  interest,  even  if  the  principal  is  paid.  And  a  rob- 
ber cannot  be  expected  to  have  much  credit  left  after 
his  robbery  becomes  known  to  the  world. 

"The  issue  of  legal  tender  notes  during  the  Civil  War 
was  of  this  character.  The  country  received  a  deadly 
blow  to  its  financial  credit  when  that  policy  was  adopted. 

"  It  is  now  perfectly  well  known  to  all  who  have  taken 
the  pains  to  study  the  subject  that  this  false  and  prac- 
tically dishonest  policy,  however  innocently  it  may  have 
been  conceived,  cost  the  United  States  many  hundreds 
of  millions  of  dollars  and  came  very  near  bringing  dis- 
aster upon  the  Union  cause.  One  of  the  most  astound- 
ing spectacles  ever  presented  in  the  history  of  the  world 
was  that  presented  by  this  country.  It  went  into  the 
war  practically  free  from  debt,  and  came  out  of  it  with 
a  debt  which  seemed  very  large  to  be  sure,  and  was  in 
fact  nearly  twice  as  large  as  it  ought  to  have  been, 
yet  so  small  in  comparison  with  the  country's  resources 
that  it  could  be  paid  off  in  a  few  years.  It  went  into 
the  war  practically  without  an  army,  and  came  out  of 
the  war  with  its  military  strength  not  even  yet  fully  de^oel- 
o-ped.  It  had  inore  than  a  million  of  men,  nearly  all  veter- 
ans, in  the  ranks  and  could  have  raised  a  million  more, 
if  necessary,  without  seriously  interfering  with  the  indus- 
tries of  the  country.  Yet,  in  four  short  years,  a  false 
financial  policy  destroyed  the  national  credit,  brought  its 
Treasury  to  bankruptcy,  and  thus  reduced  a  great  people 
to  a  condition  in  which  they  could  no  longer  make  any  use 
of  their  enormous  military  strength." 

The  end  of  the  war  came.  The  result  was  mili- 
tary success  for  the  government,  though  at  a  heavy 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    145 

cost  in  life  and  money,  largely  needless.  The 
armies  of  the  Confederacy  had  been  worn  out. 
Their  suppUes  had  been  exhausted.  The  strategy 
of  attrition,  for  it  was  nothing  else,  had  finally 
brought  the  conflict  to  a  close. 

With  the  end  of  the  war,  the  waste  of  the  na- 
tional resources  ought  to  have  come  to  an  end. 
Corruption  in  the  affairs  of  the  treasury  con- 
nected with  the  war  ought  then  to  have  ceased. 

There  was,  however,  a  still  further  field  for 
plunder,  yet  to  be  discovered  by  the  machine 
pohticians.    It  was  in  the  matter  of  pensions. 

The  expenditure  by  the  national  government 
for  pensions  in  the  year  1860  was  $1,100,802.32. 
Previous  to  that  year,  from  the  year  1845,  there 
were  only  two  years  in  which  the  expenditure  for 
pensions  exceeded  two  milUons  of  dollars.  Those 
two  years  were  1851  and  1852,  shortly  after  the 
war  with  Mexico. 

Thereafter,  the  annual  expenditure  for  pen- 
sions was  as  follows: — 

For  the  year  1861 $1,034,599.73 

For  the  year  18G2 852,170.47 

For  the  year  1863 1,078,513.36 

For  the  year  1864 4,985,473.90 

For  the  year  1865 16,347,621.34 

For  the  year  1866 15,605,549.88 

For  the  year  1867 20,936,551.71 


146  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

For  tlie  year  1868 $23,782,386.78 

For  the  year  1869 28,476,621.78 

For  the  year  1870 28,340,202.17 

For  the  year  1871 34,443,894.88 

For  the  year  1872 28,533,402.76 

For  the  year  1873 29,359,426.86 

For  the  year  1874 29,038,414.66 

For  the  year  1875 29,456,216.22 

For  the  year  1876 28,257,395.69 

For  the  year  1877 27,963,752.27 

In  other  words,  for  the  year  1877,  twelve  years 
after  the  end  of  the  Civil  War,  the  annual  expendi- 
ture for  pensions  was  only  slightly  over  $27,000,000. 

Beyond  any  reasonable  doubt,  at  that  time 
there  had  been  ascertained  the  full  number  of  all 
persons,  of  every  kind  and  description,  whether 
men  who  had  served  in  the  Army  or  Navy,  or  their 
widows,  or  their  children,  or  persons  dependent 
upon  them  for  support,  who  had  any  legal  or  moral 
claim  upon  the  nation,  by  reason  of  injuries  or 
diseases  suffered  in  our  Civil  War.  It  is  a  virtual 
certainty  —  that  the  expenditure  for  pensions  in  the 
year  1877,  already  stated  from  the  official  records 
at  a  little  over  twenty-seven  millions  of  dollars, 
was  high-water  mark,  for  any  rightful  payments  by 
our  national  government  to  any  and  all  persons, 
by  reason  of  disease  or  disability  of  any  kind,  in- 
curred in  the  military  or  naval  service. 

From  that  time,  however,  there  began  a  large 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    147 


increase  in  the  expenditures  for  pensions.  Most  of 
this  increase  was  undoubtedly  fraudulent,  created 
by  the  corrupt  action  of  our  national  officials  at 
Washington.  The  figures  for  the  period  subsequent 
to  the  one  already  given  are  as  follows :  — 


For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 
For  the  year 

The  magnitude  of  the  fraud  perpetrated  upon 


1878 $27,137,019.08 

1879 35,121,482.39 

1880 56,777,174.44 

1881 50,059,279.62 

1882 61,345,193.95 

1883 66,012,573.64 

1884 55,429,228.06 

1885 56,102,267.49 

1886 63,404,864.03 

1887 75,029,101.79 

1888 80,288,508.77 

1889 87,624,779.11 

1890 106,936,855.07 

1891 124,415,951.40 

1892 134,583,052.79 

1893 159,357,557.87 

1894 141,177,284.96 

1895 141,395,228.87 

1896 139,434,000.98 

1897 141,053,164.63 

1898 147,452,368.61 

1899 139,394,929.07 

1900 140,877,316.02 

1901 139,323,621.99 

1902 138,488,559.73 

1903 138,425,640.07 


148  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  United  States  Treasury,  in  this  matter  of  pen- 
sions, will  appear  more  clearly  from  the  following 
figures :  — 

In  the  twenty  years  from  1879  to 
1898  inclusive  the  total  amount  paid 
by  the  government  on  account  of 
the  pensions  was $1,928,352,000.00 

The  amount  paid  out  for  pensions 
in  the  year  1877  was,  as  already 
stated,  $27,963,752.27. 

Payments  for  the  twenty  years 
succeeding  1878  at  that  rate  would 
have  amounted  to 546,683,441.40 

The  difference  between  these  fig- 
ures, which  difference  will  give  us 
the  figures  of  the  fraud  perpetrated 
in  this  single  matter $1,381,668,558.60 

Practically  the  whole  of  this  large  amount  of 
money  has  been  stolen  from  the  United  States  Trea- 
sury, by  fraud  on  the  part  of  the  officials  of  our 
national  government,  who  were  charged  with  the 
protection  of  our  public  treasury. 

This  position  will  appear  more  clearly,  if  a 
short  statement  is  now  made  of  the  different 
stages  of  pension  legislation. 

Under  the  Act  of  July  14,  1862,  which  granted 
pensions  for  disabilities  contracted  in  the  War  of 
the  Rebellion,  the  persons  primarily  entitled  to  re- 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    149 

ceive  pensions  were  those  who  had  been  "disa- 
bled by  reason  of  any  wound  received  or  disease 
contracted  while  in  the  service  of  the  United  States 
and  in  the  line  of  duty."  Widows  during  widow- 
hood, and  children  under  sixteen  were  entitled 
to  the  same  pension,  in  case  of  death  resulting 
from  wounds  or  disease  received  or  contracted.  If 
there  were  no  widow  or  children,  any  depend- 
ent mother  was  entitled  to  a  pension.  If  there 
were  no  dependent  mother,  any  dependent  sisters 
were  entitled  to  a  pension.  This  last  right  was 
extended  to  dependent  brothers  by  an  act  passed 
June  6,  1866. 

High-water  mark,  under  a  just  and  reasona- 
ble pension  law,  had  been  reached  in  1874 ; 
nine  years  after  the  close  of  the  war.  After  that 
year,  the  figures  decreased  gradually,  until  in  1878 
they  amounted  to  only  $27,137,019.08.  According 
to  the  natural  course  of  events,  this  decrease  should 
have  continued  down  to  the  present  time,  when 
the  pension  list  would  have  been  comparatively 
slight. 

But  in  1879  the  tide  was  turned  in  the  other 
direction  by  new  legislation.  By  the  acts  of  Jan- 
uary 25,  1879,  and  March  3,  1879,  arrears  of 
pensions  were  awarded  so  as  to  cover  the  period 
intervening  between  the  date  of  the  disability  and 


160  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

the  time  when  the  application  was  granted.  Prior 
to  this  time,  the  pension,  reasonably  enough,  ran 
only  from  the  time  of  the  grant  (unless  applied 
for  within  the  first  five  years  after  the  disability 
occurred). 

The  result  was  that  the  pension  list  jumped 
from  $27,137,019.08  in  1878,  to  $35,121,482.39  in 
1879.  And  in  1880,  when  the  new  law  had  had 
time  to  produce  its  full  effect,  the  annual  expendi- 
tures for  pensions  amounted  to  $56,777,174.44. 

The  following  figures  show  the  effect  of  that 
change  in  the  law,  during  the  period  from  1880 
to  1890:  — 

Total  amount  paid  in  nine  years,  from 

1880  to  1889,  inclusive $657,101,000 

Yearly    average 65,710,000 

Yearly   average   for   preceding   period 

from  1865  to  1879,  inclusive 26,648,000 

But  the  greed  of  the  politicians  was  by  no  means 
satisfied  by  this  astounding  result. 

By  a  still  later  Act  of  June  27,  1890,  an  en- 
tirely new  class  of  pensioners  was  created.  The 
former  groundwork  of  the  pension  system  was 
swept  away.  Under  this  last  Act,  any  soldier  of 
ninety  days'  service,  who  became  disabled  from 
manual  labor,  no  matter  how  long  after  quitting 
the  service,  whether  as  a  result  of  that  service  or 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    151 

not,  no  matter  what  the  nature  of  his  necessities, 
became  entitled  to  a  pension. 

The  result  was  immediate  and  overwhelming,  in 
its  effects  upon  the  public  treasury.  In  1890  the 
annual  figure  of  the  pension  list  rose  at  once  to 
$106,936,855.07  from  $87,624,779.11  in  1889.  In 
1893,  it  had  reached  the  figure  of  $159,357,557.87. 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1873,  had  revised  and  con- 
solidated the  existing  Pension  Laws.  Pensions 
were  granted  for  every  disability,  occasioned  while 
"in  the  service"  and  "in  the  line  of  duty." 

So  the  law  remained  until  the  Act  of  June  27, 
1890.  So  it  should  have  remained  forever.  It  was 
as  liberal  as  the  largest  generosity  could  dictate. 
No  person  who  had  any  meritorious  claim  upon 
the  bounty  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
by  reason  of  disease  or  disability  contracted  in 
"  the  service  "  in  the  Army  or  Navy  in  the  Civil 
War  could  fail  to  get  reHef  under  the  laws  then 
existing. 

But  then  came  the  Act  of  June  27,  1890,  which 
awarded  pensions  of  from  $6  to  $12  a  month 
to  all  persons  who  served  ninety  days  or  more  in 
the  Army  or  Navy,  who  "  are  sufferers  from  a  men- 
tal or  physical  disability  of  a  permanent  char- 
acter not  the  result  of  their  own  vicious  habits, 
which  incapacitates  "  them  from  earning  a  support. 


152  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

That  Act  further  allowed  pensions  to  dependent 
widows  and  minor  children  without  regard  to  the 
cause  of  the  soldier's  death. 

On  the  face  of  it,  it  is  evident  no  honest  purpose 
could  possibly  have  caused  the  passage  of  that 
Act.  The  Act  was  a  fraud  from  beginning  to  end. 
Its  purpose  was  a  fraud.  The  result  has  been  to 
legalize  the  abstraction  of  many  hundreds  of  mil- 
lions of  dollars  from  the  United  States  Treasury, 
and  to  constitute  a  gigantic  scheme  of  public 
plunder. 

But  now  we  come  to  still  more  recent  action 
of  our  public  authorities  in  this  matter  of  pensions, 
contained  in  Order  No.  78,  issued  from  the  De- 
partment of  the  Interior  on  March  15,  1904,  under 
the  direct  act  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

Order  No.  78  reads  as  follows:  — 

"Whereas  the  Act  of  June  27,  1890,  as  amended, 
provides  that  a  claimant  shall  'be  entitled  to  receive  a 
pension  not  exceeding  $12  per  month  and  not  less  than 
$6  per  month  proportioned  to  the  degree  of  inability 
to  earn  a  support,  and  in  determining  such  disability 
each  and  every  infirmity  shall  be  duly  considered  and 
the  aggregate  of  disabilities  shown  to  be  rated;'  and 
Whereas  old  age  is  an  infirmity,  the  average  nature  and 
extent  of  which  the  experience  of  the  Pension  Bureau 
has  established  with  reasonable  certainty;  and 

"Whereas  thirty-nine  years  will  have  elapsed  on 
April  13,  1904,  since  the  Civil  War,  and  there  are  many 
survivors  over  sixty-two  years  of  age,  now,  therefore: 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    153 

"Ordered  (1)  In  the  adjudication  of  pension  claims 
under  said  Act  of  June  27,  1890,  as  amended,  it  shall  be 
taken  and  considered  as  an  evidential  fact,  if  the  con- 
trary does  not  appear,  and  if  all  other  legal  require- 
ments are  properly  met,  that  when  a  claimant  has  passed 
the  age  of  sixty-two  years,  he  is  disabled  one-half  in 
ability  to  perform  manual  labor  and  is  entitled  to  be 
rated  at  $6  per  month;  after  sixty-five  years  at  $8  per 
month;  after  sixty-eight  years  at  $10  per  month,  and 
after  seventy  years  at  $12  per  month. 

"(2)  Allowance  at  higher  rate  not  exceeding  $12 
per  month  will  continue  to  be  made  as  heretofore  where 
disabilities  for  age  show  a  condition  of  inability  to  per- 
form manual  labor. 

"(3)  This  order  shall  take  effect  April  13,  1904,  and 
shall  not  be  deemed  retroactive.  The  former  rules  of 
the  Office  fixing  the  different  minimum  and  maximum 
at  sixty-five  and  seventy-five  years  respectively,  are 
hereby  modified  as  above." 

The  statement  was  made  by  the  Acting  Com- 
missioner of  Pensions,  in  a  letter  dated  the  21st 
of  March,  1904,  that,  "there  are  supposed  to 
be  living  to-day  about  875,000  ex-Union  soldiers 
of  the  Civil  War.  Of  these  there  are  pensioned 
under  the  Act  of  July  14,  1862,  known  as  the 
General  Law,  about  265,000;  and  under  the 
Act  of  June  27,  1890,  about  428,000,  aggregating 
693,000;  which  deducted  from  the  whole  num- 
ber of  survivors,  leaves  182,000,  who  have  not 
applied  for  pensions.  To  state  definitely  how 
many  of  this  number  failed  to  serve  the  required 


154  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ninety  days  and  received  honorable  discharge 
would  be  impossible.  One  fourth  seems  a  fair 
estimate,  and  reduces  the  number  to  136,500.  To 
say  that  75,000  of  these  have  reached  the  age 
of  sixty-two,  and  will  apply,  seems  a  reasonable 
estimate.  If  these  75,000  are  all  placed  on  the 
roll  at  $6  a  month  or  $72  a  year,  the  output  for 
pensions  will  be  increased  $5,400,000  annually." 

The  action  of  the  President  in  making  this 
increase  of  pension  burdens,  was  an  undoubted 
violation  of  law.  Moreover,  every  well-informed 
man  in  Washington  has  known  for  years,  that 
this  entire  pension  business  was  honeycombed 
with  fraud  from  top  to  bottom.  The  action  of 
the  President  had  no  possible  justification. 

But  it  may  be  said,  these  are  matters  of  ancient 
history.  They  happened,  when  the  machinery  of 
our  national  government  was  undeveloped;  when 
it  was  subjected  to  a  new  and  severe  strain,  for 
which  the  people  were  wholly  unprepared.  No 
such  thing,  it  may  be  said,  could  happen  to-day, 
with  our  long  experience  in  the  administration 
of  large  aflFairs. 

Let  us  come,  then,  to  more  recent  history.  Let 
us  examine  a  few  of  the  facts  from  the  events  of 
the  late  "war"  —  so-called  —  with  Spain. 

In  the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  we  have 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    155 

had  an  object  lesson,  on  a  large  scale,  of  the 
necessity  of  thorough  preparation  and  honest 
administration.  No  doubt,  there  may  be  cases, 
where  war  will  be  forced  upon  a  people,  without 
the  opportunity  for  making  due  preparation.  A 
wise  and  discreet  government,  however,  will  almost 
always  be  able  to  avoid  war.  Or,  if  not,  they  will 
postpone  it  to  the  latest  possible  moment,  until 
due  preparation  has  been  made. 

Before  making  our  recent  assault  on  Spain, 
it  would  have  been  quite  easy,  with  our  vast  re- 
sources in  men  and  money,  to  delay  the  so-called 
"war,"  at  least  until  our  Army  and  Navy  should 
have  been  got  in  a  state  of  comparatively  com- 
plete preparation.  Our  resources  in  men,  money, 
and  material,  were  practically  inexhaustible.  A 
slight  delay,  we  know,  would  have  ensued  peace, 
and  avoided  war  altogether.  But  assuming  that 
we  were  to  be  driven  into  hostilities,  by  dema- 
gogues and  contractors,  delay  would  at  least  have 
given  time  for  preparation. 

Let  us  examine  the  facts. 

Secretary  Alger,  in  his  book  entitled,  "  The  Span- 
ish-American War,"  begins  chapter  24,  at  page 
455,  with  the  following  statement:  — 

"It  is  doubtful  if  any  nation  rated  as  a  first-class 
power  ever  entered  upon  a  war  of  oflFense  in  a  condi- 


156  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

tion  of  less  military  preparation  than  was  the  United 
States  in  1898.  At  that  time  there  were  not  sufficient 
reserve  supplies  in  the  possession  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment to  fully  equip  10, 000  men  in  addition  to  the  regular 
army  as  it  then  stood." 

"In  discussing  the  unpreparedness  for  war  in  an- 
other chapter  of  this  book,  it  has  been  shown  that  a  small 
number  of  Krag-Jorgensen  magazine  rifles  and  carbines 
—  and  the  small  arm  was  the  only  element  of  equip- 
ment of  which  there  was  a  reserve  —  was  barely  suffi- 
cient to  meet  the  needs  of  the  increase  in  the  regular 
army  to  61,000.  The  entire  body  of  volunteers  outside 
of  the  three  volunteer  cavalry  regiments  were  at  first 
furnished  with  single-loading  Springfield  45-hundredth3 
calibre  rifles,  because  there  were  no  other  weapons  in 
the  possession  of  the  War  Department. 

"We  saw  also  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  did  not  provide  smokeless  powder  for  the  Spring- 
field rifles  nor  for  the  field  artillery  in  the  early  part 
of  the  war,  simply  for  the  reason  that  it  had  none  to 
provide.  No  type  of  smokeless  powder  had  been  adopted 
even  for  either  of  these  important  adjuncts  of  war.  The 
issuing  of  smokeless  powder  was  subsequently  depend- 
ent upon  the  output  of  the  few  plants  in  the  United 
States  capable  of  manufacturing  it.  We  have  seen  that 
the  War  Department  did  not  even  own  or  control  a  single 
transport,  and  there  was  no  troop  ship  on  the  Atlantic 
or  Pacific  Oceans  available  to  the  United  States;  that 
many  elements  of  field,  siege  and  sea-coast  artillery  were 
in  a  transitional  state;  that  the  military  establishment 
was  palpably  deficient  in  trained  artillery ists;  that  the 
regular  army  had  not  been  mobilized  since  the  Civil 
War,  —  one-third  of  the  century  since  the  army  as  a 
whole  or  any  great  part  of  it  had  been  brought  together; 
that  there  was  no  strategic  staff,  and  no  large  number 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    157 

of  oflScers  who  were  experienced  in  the  concentration 
of  troops,  or  in  battalion,  division,  or  corps  manoeuvres; 
that  there  was  no  place  in  the  United  States  especially 
adapted  or  prepared  for  army  mobilization,  and  that 
neither  the  army  nor  any  officer  in  it  had  any  experience 
in  moving  or  operating  under  the  new  conditions  in- 
cidental to  a  campaign  in  the  Tropics.  When  the  crisis 
so  often  predicted  by  military  experts  at  last  came,  it  found 
us  totally  unprepared  for  war,  and  with  problems  to  be 
met  at  home  and  abroad,  which  were  both  unusual  and 
difficult." 

These  general  statements  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  it  will  be  well  to  reinforce  with  evidence  of 
details. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  an  official  let- 
ter written  to  the  Commissary-General  of  Sub- 
sistence, dated  at  Siboney,  Cuba,  July  7,  1898, 
which  appears  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  for  1898,  vol.  I,  part  1,  page  568:  — 

"You  are  already  acquainted  with  the  loading  at 
Tampa  that  I  hoped  to  straighten  out,  when  we  un- 
loaded somewhere  on  the  Island,  but  the  opportunity 
has  not  come,  although  we  landed  on  the  22nd  of  June, 
at  Daiquiri  first.  The  troops  were  run  ashore  without 
rations,  and  I  was  directed  to  open  depots,  200,000 
rations  at  each,  and  feed  soldiers,  civilian  employees, 
Cubans,  etc.  To  do  this  was  simply  impossible,  but  not 
so  to  try,  and  we  pegged  away  night  and  day,  meeting 
demands. 

"At  Daiquiri  there  is  a  pier  to  which  our  transports 
could  not  go,  but  I  took  a  lighter,  transferred  from 


158  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

transport  thereto,  ran  in  and  unloaded,  succeeded  in 
obtaining  not  more  than  about  60,000  rations  on  shore, 
and  these  were  issued  rapidly.  But  we  kept  right  along. 
Siboney,  being  about  seven  miles  nearer  to  Santiago, 
with  a  bad  road,  became  the  base,  although  furnishing 
no  advantage  beyond  propinquity,  as  it  was  in  the 
open,  no  landing,  everything  depended  upon  the  calm  of 
the  surf,  tvhich  was  uncertain.  Here  I  would  proceed 
as  before,  running  in  the  lighter  as  far  as  I  could,  then 
transferring  stores  into  a  small  boat,  about  ten  tons,  bor- 
rowed from  the  Navij,  and  pulled  ashore  bij  hand.  To 
supply  an  army  in  this  ivay  was  severe,  but  when  new 
regiments  came  without  a  ration,  and  increasing  my 
work,  the  job  looked  insurmountable.  I  worked  day  and 
night,  men  getting  sick,  stevedores  striking,  new  hands 
insufficient  and  inefficient,  supplemented  by  a  rough 
sea,  until  I  got  down  to  1,000  rations  ashore.  /  got 
through,  but  the  Lord  knows  how." 

Imagine  the  situation.  An  army  of  nearly  twenty 
thousand  men  dependent  for  all  its  supplies  on 
a  single  rowboat.  It  is  difficult  to  find  imbecility 
even  remotely  approaching  this  in  all  military 
history. 

The  report  of  Captain  J.  G.  Newgarden,  As- 
sistant Surgeon  of  the  United  States  Army,  with 
the  Third  United  States  Cavalry,  which  appears 
at  page  813,  of  the  same  volume,  contains  the 
following,  among  other  statements: — 

"We  arrived  at  Daiquiri,  Cuba,  on  June  22nd,  and 
went  into  camp  on  the  side  of  a  hill  about  one  mile  from 
the  lauding  place.    I  was  unable  to  take  any  supplies 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     159 

along,  not  having  any  transportation  for  the  same.  I 
succeeded  in  obtaining  an  emergency  case  from  Major 
McCreery  while  in  camp;  a  mackintosh  and  a  woolen 
blanket  constituted  my  protection  from  the  elements. 
The  brigade  surgeon  offered  me  for  use  with  the  regi- 
ment a  medical  and  surgical  pannier,  but  7io  transpor- 
tatim,  having  been  provided  for  them  I  was  obliged  to 
refuse  them  with  regret.  On  June  25th,  I  made  personal 
and  thorough  effort  to  secure  transportation  and  sup- 
plies, hut  without  success.  I  applied  personally  to  the 
Major-General  commanding  on  board  the  Seguranca 
and  requested  a  mule  for  a  mount,  but  was  refused." 

The  report  of  the  Surgeon-General  contains  the 
following  statement :  — 

"The  landing  of  the  Fifth  army  corps  on  the  27th  of 
June,  at  Daiquiri,  was  accomphshed  in  a  brilliant  man- 
ner. The  escapes  from  death  by  drowning  were  many. 
That  there  were  only  two  casualties  of  this  nature  is 
really  remarkable,  all  of  the  circumstances  being  con- 
sidered. As  is  well  known,  the  troops  went  on  shore 
with  only  such  rations,  shelter  tents  and  cooking  appa- 
ratus as  they  were  able  to  carry  on  their  persons.  But 
the  same  is  true  of  all  medical  officers  and  men  of  the 
Hospital  Corps  assigned  to  duty  with  the  several  or- 
ganizations. This  prevented  the  transportation  of  any 
medical  supplies  beyond  what  could  be  carried  in  the 
hand." 

The  Surgeon-General  makes  the  following  fur- 
ther statement  on  page  788 :  — 

"Concerning  the  medical  officers  and  men  of  the 
hospital  corps  who  were  with  the  expedition,  I  cannot 


160  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

speak  too  highly.  They  shared  all  the  hardships  that 
came  to  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  not  only  during  the  as- 
sault and  siege  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  but  in  the  far  more 
trying  battle  with  disease,  tvhich  day  after  day  ravaged 
our  camps  and  threatened  annihilation  as  a  fighting  force 
to  the  gallant  troops  who  had  won  one  of  the  most  splen- 
did victories  of  history.^' 

The  lack  of  preparation  in  our  United  States 
service  in  the  year  1898  came  from  precisely  the 
same  causes  which  were  responsible  for  the  lack 
of  preparation  in  the  Russian  Army;  that  is,  the 
wholesale  fraud  and  corruption,  which  had  then 
permeated  the  entire  administrative  force  at  Wash- 
ington. That  fraud  and  corruption  still  continue 
in  full  force. 

We  had  for  many  years  been  spending  enough 
money  on  both  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  to  have 
both  in  a  condition  of  complete  preparation,  for 
such  a  petty  affair  as  the  assault  on  Spain.  If  the 
money  spent  on  our  Army  and  Navy  in  the  last 
twenty-five  years  had  been  spent  honestly,  with 
reasonable  discretion,  in  ways  approved  by  com- 
petent officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  we  could 
have  easily  put  into  the  field,  on  short  notice,  an 
effective  fighting  army  of  one  hundred  thousand 
men. 

So,  too,  our  Navy,  with  an  honest  expenditure 
of  the  money  actually  laid  out,  could  have  been 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    161 

in  the  highest  degree  of  efficiency,  of  ships,  guns, 
and  men. 

What  is  to  be  said,  then,  of  the  conduct  of  the 
men,  who,  holding  high  pubhc  positions  at  Wash- 
ington, did  all  they  could  to  drive  this  country 
into  a  conflict,  for  which  its  preparation  was  such 
as  has  here  been  stated  ?  If  the  conflict  had  been 
forced  upon  us,  something  could  be  said  in  their 
behalf.  If  all  the  resources  of  diplomacy  had  been 
exhausted,  there  might  be  something  to  be  said 
in  their  defense.  There  is  every  reason  to  beUeve, 
that  a  courteous  continuance  of  diplomatic  ne- 
gotiations would  have  accomplished  in  no  long 
time  the  liberation  of  the  Cuban  people,  which 
has  always  been  given  by  the  politicians  as  the 
reason  for  this  so-called  Spanish  War,  together 
with  every  just  and  legitimate  end  desired  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States. 

But  that  was  not  the  purpose,  of  the  men  who 
promoted  the  attack  on  poor  old  Spain.  They 
were  simply  determined  to  have  a  "war,"  in  order 
to  acquire  cheap  mihtary  notoriety  and  fat  gov- 
ernment contracts.  It  was  a  war  for  public  plun- 
der and  private  gain.  As  was  the  case  with  the 
Russo-Japanese  war.  As  is  the  case  with  the  large 
majority  of  wars. 

Getting  into  a  war  is  a  thing  of  great  ease.    Get- 


162  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ting  out  of  it  may  be,  and  generally  is,  a  thing  of 
great  difficulty.  At  all  times,  under  modern  con- 
ditions, war  requires  thorough  elaborate  prepara- 
tion; organization,  drill,  discipline;  large  supplies; 
and  above  all,  adequate  transportation.  The  larger 
the  forces  engaged,  the  more  helpless  they  are, 
without  organization,  discipline,  supplies,  and 
transportation.  An  army,  under  such  conditions, 
becomes  a  mob.  The  larger  it  is,  the  greater  is 
its  helplessness. 

But  a  prevalent  impression  exists  that  since  the 
Spanish  affair  of  1898  a  great  advance  has  been 
made  in  this  matter  of  preparation ;  in  the  matter 
of  organization  and  equipment,  of  both  Army  and 
Navy. 

Such  is  not  the  fact.  No  doubt,  we  are  at 
present  engaged  in  the  construction  of  a  consid- 
erable number  of  battleships.  No  doubt,  we  are 
manufacturing,  and  purchasing,  large  quantities 
of  guns,  ammunition,  and  war  supplies.  There 
is  no  doubt,  ample  employment  for  the  con- 
tractors. 

Naval  designers  of  the  present  day  seem  to  have 
quite  forgotten  our  experiences  in  the  Civil  War, 
which  settled  for  a  long  time  to  come  many  of  the 
most  important  problems  of  naval  construction. 
Those  experiences,  too,  furnish  most  valuable  Ics- 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    163 

sons,  of  the  possibilities  of  speedy  construction,  to 
meet  new  emergencies,  or  new  naval  conditions.  It 
will  be  well  to  recall  a  few  facts  gathered  there- 
from. 

At  the  opening  of  the  Civil  War,  in  one  field  of 
our  naval  operations,  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  and  the  rending  in  two  of  the  Confederate 
land  forces,  it  became  necessary  to  construct  a  fleet 
of  iron-clads.  The  construction  of  those  iron-clads 
was  placed  in  the  hands  of  Captain  Eads,  who  had 
already  won  high  distinction  as  an  engineer,  and 
who  afterwards  achieved  an  international  reputa- 
tion as  the  first  living  authority  in  many  branches 
of  his  profession. 

Eads  was  employed  to  construct  seven  gunboats, 
which  according  to  his  contract  were  to  draw  six 
feet  of  water,  carry  13  heavy  guns  each,  to  be  plated 
with  2^-inch  iron,  and  have  a  speed  of  nine  miles 
an  hour.  The  boats  were  175  feet  long,  with  51^  feet 
beam.  Their  sides  sloped  at  an  angle  of  about 
35  degrees.  They  were  propelled  by  a  stern  wheel, 
which  was  entirely  covered  by  the  armor  at  the  rear. 
They  were  designed  to  have  three  bow  guns,  eight 
broadside  guns,  and  two  stern  guns.  Before  these 
seven  gunboats  were  completed.  Captain  Eads  also 
engaged  to  convert  the  Benton  into  an  armored 
vessel.  The  Benton  had  originally  been  a  snag-boat. 


164  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

She  became  the  most  powerful  iron-clad  of  the  fleet. 
She  had  been  originally  built  with  two  hulls,  about 
20  feet  apart,  braced  together.  She  was  converted 
into  a  war  vessel  of  about  75  feet  beam,  a  greater 
width  than  that  of  any  war  vessel  then  afloat,  and 
she  was  about  200  feet  long.  She  carried  16  guns, 
seven  32-pounders,  two  9-inch  guns,  and  seven 
army  42-pounders,  Captain  Eads's  contract  was 
signed  on  the  7th  of  August,  1861.  It  bound  him  to 
construct  the  seven  vessels  first  contracted  for, 
ready  for  their  crews  and  armament,  in  sixty-five 
days. 

The  engines  to  drive  that  fleet  were  yet  to  be  built. 
The  timber  to  form  their  hulls  was  uncut  in  the 
forest.  The  rollers  and  machinery  that  were  to 
forge  their  armor  were  not  yet  constructed.  They 
required  twenty-one  steam  engines  and  thirty-five 
steam  boilers.  Within  two  weeks,  not  less  than  four 
thousand  men  were  engaged  in  the  various  details 
of  their  construction.  On  the  12th  of  October,  1861, 
the  first  of  those  iron-clads,  at  first  named  the  St. 
Louis,  afterwards  the  De  Kalb,  with  her  boilers  and 
engines  on  board,  was  launched  in  Carondelet, 
Missouri,  forty-five  days  from  the  laying  of  her  keel. 
Ten  days  afterwards,  the  Carondelet  was  launched. 
The  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  Mound  City,  Cairo,  and 
Pittsburgh  followed  in  quick  succession.  The  eighth 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    165 

vessel,  the  Benton,  was  undertaken  before  the  hulls 
of  the  first  seven  had  fairly  assumed  shape.  Within 
one  hundred  days  Captain  Eads  completed  a  squad- 
ron, of  eight  steamers,  aggregating  five  thousand 
tons,  capable  of  steaming  nine  knots  an  hour,  each 
well  armored,  fully  equipped,  and  all  ready  for  their 
armament,  which  was  to  comprise  one  hundred 
and  seven  large  guns. 

Meantime,  there  were  hindrances,  nearly  fatal, 
by  the  administration  officials  at  Washington.  On 
one  pretext  or  another,  stipulated  payments  for  the 
work  were  delayed  by  the  War  Department  under 
Simon  Cameron.  The  default  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment assumed  such  magnitude  that  nothing  but 
the  assistance  rendered  by  Captain  Eads's  friends, 
after  he  had  exhausted  his  own  large  private  means, 
enabled  him  to  complete  the  fleet.  The  consequence 
was,  that  the  vessels  were  not  completely  finished 
until  January  15,  1862.  That  involved  a  loss  of 
time,  under  extremely  critical  circumstances,  of  at 
least  three  months.  That  loss  of  time  was  caused 
by  the  inefficiency  and  corruption  of  the  War  De- 
partment. 

The  story  of  the  Monitor  is  quite  similar. 

Her  keel  was  laid  in  the  shipyard  of  Thomas  F. 
Rowland  in  Greenpoint,  Brooklyn,  in  October, 
1861.    She  was  launched  on  the  30th  day  of  Janu- 


166  ORGANIZED    DEMOCRACY 

ary,  1862.  She  was  commissioned  on  the  25th 
day  of  February,  1862.  Nine  days  later  she  left 
New  York  for  Hampton  Roads,  where  on  the  9th 
of  March  occurred  her  contest  with  the  Merrimac. 
Her  crew  was  made  up  largely  of  men  from  Dela- 
mater's  Iron  Works. 

Her  preliminary  history  is  interesting. 

At  the  very  opening  of  hostilities,  Norfolk  and 
the  navy-yard  were  abandoned  by  the  United 
States  authorities.  This  was  early  in  the  spring  of 
1861.  Norfolk  was  only  about  twelve  miles  from 
Fort  Monroe,  which  was  then  held  by  a  consider- 
able force  of  regulars.  A  few  companies  of  those 
regulars,  with  a  reasonable  force  of  artillery,  could 
have  occupied  and  commanded  the  town  and  navy- 
yard,  and  kept  open  the  channel.  At  the  time 
of  the  abandonment,  a  large  number  of  ships  that 
were  there  were  burnt.  There  were  left  at  the  navy- 
yard,  at  the  time  of  its  evacuation  by  our  forces, 
upwards  of  twelve  thousand  heavy  guns.  These 
guns  were  distributed  through  the  different  points 
in  the  Confederacy,  and  subsequently  served  as 
the  armaments  for  the  Confederate  fortifications 
all  the  way  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Mississippi 
River.  They  were  used  to  fortify  Norfolk,  and  the 
batteries  on  York,  Potomac,  James,  and  Rappa- 
hannock Rivers.    They  were  also  put  in  service  at 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     167 

Richmond,  Charleston,  Mobile,  New  Orleans,  and 
Vicksburg. 

The  Merrimac,  which  was  thereafter  converted 
into  an  iron-clad  by  the  Confederate  naval  author- 
ities, was  among  the  vessels  abandoned  by  the 
Washington  administration  at  this  Norfolk  navy- 
yard.  The  South  had  in  its  entire  territory  only 
one  place  where  guns  or  armor  could  be  manu- 
factured. That  was  the  Tredegar  Iron  Works  at 
Richmond.  The  Southern  States  were  altogether 
deficient  in  material,  mechanics,  and  money. 

Commodore  Tattnall,  formerly  in  the  United 
States  Navy,  took  command  of  the  Norfolk  navy- 
yard  on  the  29th  of  March,  1861.  The  Merrimac. 
in  the  mean  time,  had  been  put  in  the  dry  dock  for 
repairs.  Steps  were  taken  immediately  to  convert 
her  into  an  iron-clad.  It  was  early  in  June,  1861, 
that  Mr.  Mallory,  Confederate  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  decided  to  reconstruct  the  Merrimac,  and 
convert  her  into  an  iron-clad.  The  reconstruction 
was  immediately  begun,  with  the  result  that  she 
was  ready  for  action  before  the  8th  of  March,  1862, 
a  period  of  eight  months. 

The  possibilities  of  speedy  construction  which 
then  existed  at  the  North  have  been  already  evinced 
by  the  account  of  Captain  Eads's  operations  in  the 
construction  of  the  iron-clads  on  the  Mississippi 


168  ORGANIZED    DEMOCRACY 

River.  At  the  East,  means  and  facilities  for  naval 
construction  were  vastly  superior  to  any  then  avail- 
able in  the  West.  In  the  city  of  New  York  alone 
were  several  large  establishments  for  the  construc- 
tion of  marine  engines  and  steam  vessels.  Living 
at  that  time  in  the  city  of  New  York  was  Ericsson, 
who  had  designed  the  Princeton  for  our  govern- 
ment, the  first  ocean-going  man-of-war  propelled 
by  a  steam  propeller,  with  her  machinery  wholly 
under  the  water  Une.  Ericsson  had  had  a  large  ex- 
perience in  engineering  work  of  all  kinds.  He  had 
years  before  designed  the  locomotive  Novelty,  which 
competed  in  England,  in  the  year  1831,  with  Ste- 
venson's Rocket,  and  at  that  time  accomplished  its 
mile  in  fifty-three  seconds,  although  the  prize  of  the 
competition  was  by  the  liberal-minded  English  au- 
thorities awarded  to  Stevenson.  Ericsson's  genius 
as  an  engineer  had  been  made  prominent  in  many 
other  ways.  At  this  time  he  already  had  an  inter- 
national reputation. 

Armor-plating,  too,  was  no  new  thing.  R  had 
been  used  in  1858  in  the  French  steam  frigate  La 
Gloire.  The  English  admiralty  had  also  promptly 
begun  the  construction  of  armored  war  vessels  with 
the  Warrior.  The  Warrior  had  been  finished  and 
equipped  for  a  considerable  time  before  the  open- 
ing of  our  Civil  War. 


THE   COST   OF   MACHINE  POLITICS    169 

While  Mr.  Welles,  our  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and 
his  advisers,  were  considering  the  question  of  naval 
armor,  it  was  reported  at  Washington  that  the  Mer- 
rimac  had  been  raised,  cut  down  to  her  berth  deck, 
and  that  a  very  substantial  construction  of  timber 
was  being  made  on  that  deck,  evidently  with  a  view 
to  covering  it  with  armor. 

Our  Navy  Department  thereupon  waited  until 
the  month  of  August,  1861,  before  they  adver- 
tised for  plans  or  offers  for  iron-clad  steam  batter- 
ies. Ericsson  was  already  master  of  the  subject. 
He  submitted  at  once  proposals  to  construct  ves- 
sels. Those  proposals  were  rejected.  Thereafter, 
however,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  did  accept 
Ericsson's  proposal  to  build  an  iron-clad  steam 
battery,  and  instructed  him  to  commence  its  con- 
struction.   The  result  was  the  Monitor. 

As  before  stated,  the  Monitor  was  a  special  con- 
struction for  a  special  purpose.  The  work  on  the 
Merrimac  had  already  progressed  so  far  that  it  was 
impossible  to  provide  any  vessel  of  large  dimen- 
sions in  time  to  meet  her.  The  sloping  sides  which 
the  Merrimac  was  to  have,  which  were  covered 
with  two  thicknesses  of  bar  iron,  very  ingeniously 
combined,  were  well  calculated  to  resist  spherical 
shot,  the  only  kind  of  solid  shot  then  in  use  in  our 
navy.  The  shallow  waters  of  the  coast  in  the  South- 


170  ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY 

em  States  required  craft  of  very  light  draft.  Other 
conditions  existing  at  the  time  practically  compelled 
special  features  in  the  construction  of  the  Monitor, 
which  would  not  have  been  adopted  by  Ericsson 
in  war  vessels  constructed  for  general  purposes. 
The  turret,  which  was  the  main  feature  of  the  Mon- 
itor, was  not  a  new  device,  but  dated  back  almost 
as  far  as  the  first  introduction  of  artillery.  Ericsson 
was  familiar  with  all  the  learning  upon  the  subject. 
He  has  stated  that  about  1820  he  had  been  taught 
by  his  instructor  in  fortification  and  gunnery,  that 
a  position  assailable  from  all  sides  should  be 
defended  by  mounting  the  guns  on  a  turn-table. 
Ericsson  has  published  an  engraving  of  the  side  ele- 
vation of  a  floating,  revolving,  circular  tower  which 
was  brought  out  in  the  year  1807.  The  raft,  on 
which  the  turret  was  mounted,  and  which  caused 
the  Monitor  to  be  named  a  "  cheesebox  on  a  raft," 
was  simply  Ericsson's  device  for  the  construction 
of  a  floating  battery,  to  be  used  in  shallow  inside 
waters.  It  was  not  his  intention  that  the  Monitor 
should  be  constructed  for  an  ocean-going  man- 
of-war. 

The  Confederate  authorities,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  took  steps  for  the  conversion  of  the  Merri- 
mac  in  June.  It  was  August  before  the  Washing- 
ton administration  took  any  steps  of  any  kind,  so 


THE   COST  OF  MACHINE   POLITICS     171 

far  as  the  records  show,  to  meet  the  conditions  that 
were  then  developing,  conditions  which  threatened 
the  existence  of  our  Navy,  and  of  our  commerce 
all  over  the  world;  and  it  was  not  until  October, 
1861,  in  spite  of  all  Ericsson's  efforts,  that  the  keel 
of  the  Monitor  was  laid  in  Rowland's  shipyard  at 
Greenpoint,  in  Brooklyn.  It  was  the  30th  of  Jan- 
uary, 1862,  that  she  was  launched.  Thereafter  she 
was  commissioned  on  the  25th  of  February,  and 
turned  over  to  the  government.  Nine  days  later, 
she  left  New  York  for  Hampton  Roads,  and  on 
the  9th  of  March,  she  had  her  battle  with  the  Mer- 
rimac,  the  result  of  which  is  a  matter  of  familiar 
history. 

If  Ericsson's  efforts  had  been  properly  sec- 
onded by  the  Washington  administration,  the  Mon- 
itor could  have  been  ready  for  sea,  fully  armed, 
equipped,  and  manned,  within  a  little  more  than 
a  hundred  days  from  the  commencement  of  her 
construction. 

It  is  easily  seen  from  the  foregoing  statement 
that  it  was  the  most  gross  imbecility  on  the  part 
of  the  Washington  administration  that  in  the  first 
place  permitted  the  possibility  of  the  Merrimac 
being  used  by  the  Confederate  authorities;  and 
in  the  second  place  delayed  the  construction  of 
armor-clad  vessels  on  our  part  to  a  time  so  late  as 


172  ORGANIZED    DEMOCRACY 

to  make  it  easy  for  the  Confederate  naval  officers 
to  destroy  the  Cumberland  and  the  Congress,  at  a 
great  loss  of  life,  and  to  threaten  seriously  for  a 
considerable  time  the  operation  of  the  land  forces 
under  General  McClellan  against  Richmond. 

The  difference  between  Richmond  and  Washing- 
ton at  that  time  was  simply  this :  At  Richmond  mili- 
tary operations  both  by  land  and  by  sea  were  con- 
trolled and  conducted  by  military  men — by  soldiers 
and  sailors,  who  had  been  trained  and  experienced 
in  their  respective  professions.  At  Washington,  the 
control  of  both  the  War  and  Navy  Departments 
was  in  the  hands  of  incompetent  and  corrupt  poli- 
ticians. Here  was  the  secret  of  the  fact  already 
stated,  that  the  Civil  War  was  protracted  to  a  pe- 
riod at  least  double  what  was  needed  for  its  suc- 
cessful prosecution,  and  at  an  expenditure  of  life 
and  money  much  more  than  twice  anything  that 
was  requisite. 

The  result  of  the  engagement  between  the  Moni- 
tor and  Mcrrimac  was  such  that  the  London 
"  Times  "  made  this  declaration :  — 

"Whereas  we  had  available  for  immediate  purposes 
149  first-class  war  ships,  we  have  now  two,  those  two 
being  the  Warrior  and  her  sister  Ironsides.  There  is  not 
now  a  ship  in  the  English  Navy  apart  from  those  two 
that  it  would  not  be  madness  to  entrust  to  an  engagement 
with  that  little  Monitor." 


THE   COST  OF  MACHINE   POLITICS     173 

The  English  Admiralty  at  once  proceeded  to 
reconstruct  their  navy,  cutting  down  their  largest 
ships,  and  converting  them  into  turret  and  broad- 
side iron-clads.  The  same  course  was  taken  in 
France,  which  had  at  that  time  only  one  sea-going 
iron-clad  man-of-war.  The  Emperor  Napoleon 
at  once  appointed  a  commission  to  devise  plans 
for  rebuilding  his  navy.  So  did  all  of  the  other 
maritime  powers.  The  United  States  took  the  lead 
in  this  movement  of  naval  reconstruction,  and  at 
the  close  of  our  war  led  all  other  nations  in  the 
numbers  and  eiEciency  of  its  iron-clad  fleet.  Naval 
warfare  experienced  a  revolution. 

Our  present  large  annual  expenditure  on  our 
Army  and  Navy  is  wholly  needless. 

We  do  not  need  a  large  regular  Army.  We 
do  need  organization,  drill,  and  discipline,  after 
regular  methods,  of  our  militia.  The  militia,  pro- 
perly organized,  equipped,  and  thoroughly  drilled, 
can  be,  and  should  be,  always  have  been,  and 
always  will  be,  our  mainstay  and  our  security, 
for  conditions  of  war. 

Similarly,  it  is  not  expedient  at  the  present  time, 
that  we  should  go  to  a  large  expenditure  in  the 
construction  of  modem  battleships.  The  modem 
battleship  is  an  extremely  intricate  machine,  which 
thus  far  has  never  stood  the  test  of  continuous 


174  ORGANIZED    DEMOCRACY 

accurate  fire  from  heavy  guns.  Thus  far,  when- 
ever exposed  to  such  fire,  it  has  collapsed.  Wit- 
ness the  results  with  the  Spanish  ships  in  our 
encounters  in  1898;  the  Chinese  ships  in  the  battle 
of  Yalu;  and  the  Russian  ships  in  the  recent  en- 
gagements with  the  Japanese.  The  vessels  of  the 
Japanese  Navy,  and  of  our  own  Navy,  escaped 
with  comparatively  little  loss  almost  solely  by 
reason  of  the  lack  of  skillful  fire  on  the  part  of 
their  adversaries.  The  large  battleships  have  de- 
monstrated themselves  to  be  unwieldy,  slow,  and 
extremely  vulnerable.  We  already  know,  that  they 
are  failures. 

The  reason  of  their  being  failures  is  not  hard 
to  ascertain.  The  modern  battleship  violates  all 
the  fundamental  principles  of  naval  construction, 
as  advocated  and  practiced  by  the  greatest  naval 
engineers  of  the  last  century,  Eads,  Ellet,  Erics- 
son, and  Coles. 

Those  well-established  principles  of  naval  con- 
struction require,  in  every  war  vessel,  the  three  fol- 
lowing features: — 

I.  Minimum  of  surface  above  the  water  line 
exposed  to  fire. 

II.  Maximum  of  speed  and  fuel-carrying  capacity. 

III.  Maximum  of  gun  power,  comprising  length 
of  range  and  power  of  penetration. 


THE   COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     175 

Our  heavy  battleships,  those  now  in  existence,  and 
those  in  process  of  construction,  are  constructed 
in  absolute  defiance  of  these  well-estabUshed  prin- 
ciples. 

They  have  almost  a  maximum  of  exposed  sur- 
face above  the  vi^ater  line.  They  have,  considering 
proper  standards,  a  very  low  rate  of  speed.  They 
have  very  far  from  the  maximum  of  gun  power. 
In  each  one  of  these  three  fundamental  essentials 
of  naval  construction  they  are  known  to  be  utterly 
wanting. 

War  vessels  need  always  to  be  constructed  with 
reference  to  the  particular  conditions  under  which 
they  are  to  be  used.  In  our  Civil  War,  EUet  and 
Eads  in  a  marvelously  short  space  of  time  impro- 
vised fleets  of  gunboats,  largely  from  river  steam- 
boats, which  were  well  fitted  for  the  particular 
work  they  were  to  accomplish,  and  which  accom- 
plished that  work  with  great  success.  The  Moni- 
tor was  a  special  construction,  to  meet  a  special 
need.  She  was  finished  inside  of  a  hundred  days 
from  the  time  her  keel  was  laid.  Two  Staten  Island 
ferry-boats,  which  had  their  machinery  largely 
above  the  water  line,  were  converted  into  ex- 
tremely serviceable  craft,  for  operations  on  the 
southern  bayous.  At  all  times,  ships  constructed 
for  a  special  purpose,  like  our  heavy  battleships. 


176  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

even  if  they  do  not  possess  the  highest  degree  of 
vulnerabiUty,  may  turn  out  to  be  almost  entirely 
useless.  Moreover,  the  large  battleship  of  the 
present  day  requires  such  a  long  period  of  time 
for  its  construction,  that  it  may  almost  be  said 
to  be  obsolete  before  its  completion.  Apart  from 
other  objections,  the  intricacy  of  its  machinery 
alone  is  well  nigh  a  complete  condemnation  of  the 
wisdom  of  its  designing. 

Naval  problems,  and  naval  conditions,  are  al- 
ways in  a  state  of  transition.  This  is  the  case, 
even  in  times  of  peace.  But  in  any  and  every  war, 
naval  problems  and  conditions  are  special,  and 
need  to  be  met  with  special  means  and  devices. 

Another  fact  becomes  at  this  time  most  mate- 
rial. It  is  this.  We  may  now  be  on  the  eve  of  a 
new  revolution  in  the  matter  of  fuel  and  motive 
machinery  for  ocean-going  steamships.  Recent 
experiments  by  naval  authorities  would  seem  to 
indicate  that  there  is  at  least  a  large  possibility, 
that  we  shall  find  it  wise,  in  the  immediate  future, 
to  substitute  petroleum  in  some  of  its  forms  for 
coal,  as  the  fuel  of  our  war  vessels.  The  turbine 
propeller  may  at  a  very  early  date  supplant  the 
present  form  of  the  screw.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  is  most  unwise  for  us  at  the  present 
time  to  go  into  a  large  expenditure  for  a  fleet  of 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    177 

large  war  vessels,  which  may  turn  out,  when 
constructed,  to  be  entirely  useless.  It  is  quite 
needless. 

We  may  now  consider  further  facts  as  to  the 
management  of  the  Navy. 

For  the  year  ending  June  30,  1903,  the  expendi- 
ture for  the  Navy  Department  was  $82,618,034.18. 
That  was  an  increase  over  the  corresponding  ex- 
penditure for  the  year  1902  of  $14,814,905.94. 

But  the  administration  is  making  still  further 
large  increases  in  the  expenditure  for  naval  con- 
struction. 

That  being  so,  it  becomes  interesting  and  per- 
tinent to  make  a  short  review  of  the  figures  as 
to  our  naval  expenditure  during  the  Civil  War, 
and  in  the  period  subsequent  thereto,  down  to  the 
present  time. 

The  expenditure  on  the  Navy  for  the  years  just 
preceding  and  during  the  Civil  War  was  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

For  the  year  1860 $11,514,649.83 

For  the  year  1861 12,387,156.52 

For  the  year  1862 42,640,353.09 

For  the  year  1863 63,261,235.31 

For  the  year  1864 85,704,963.74 

For  the  year  1865 122,617,434.07 

For  the  year  1866 717,629,808.56 

For  the  year  1867 31,034,011.04 


178  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

For  the  year  1868 $25,775,502.72 

For  the  year  1869 20,000,757.97 

For  the  year  1870 21,780,229.87 

For  the  year  1871 19,431,027.21 

For  the  year  1872 21,249,809.99 

For  the  year  1873 23,526,256.79 

For  the  year  1874 30,932,587.42 

For  the  year  1875 21,497,626.27 

For  the  year  1876 18,963,309.82 

For  the  year  1877 14,959,935.36 

For  the  year  1880 13,536,984.74 

For  the  year  1886 13,907,887.74 

For  the  year  1889 21,378,809.31 

For  the  year  1894 31 ,701 ,293.79 

For  the  year  1897 34,561,546.29 

For  the  year  1898 58,823,984.80 

For  the  year  1899 63,942,104.25 

For  the  year  1900 55,953,077.72 

For  the  year  1901 60,506,978.47 

For  the  year  1902 67,803,128.24 

For  the  year  1903 82,618,034.18 

Thereupon,  in  the  year  1904,  we  find  ourselves 
confronted  with  the  probability  of  an  expenditure 
for  the  Navy  for  the  next  fiscal  year  of  nearly  a 
hundred  millions  of  dollars,  with  the  probability 
of  a  very  large  increase  of  even  that  figure  in  the 
near  future. 

We  are  at  peace  with  all  the  world.  There  is 
not  the  slightest  necessity  for  this  large  expendi- 
ture. If  we  should  unavoidably  and  necessarily 
become  involved  in  a  war  with  any  foreign  power 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    179 

in  the  course  of  the  next  twenty-five  years,  which 
is  an  extreme  improbability,  we  could  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  with  our  present  resources 
and  faciUties  for  construction,  bring  into  exist- 
ence inside  of  two  months  a  large  fleet  of  vessels, 
of  almost  any  kind  that  would  be  required  for 
either  offensive  or  defensive  purposes,  that  would 
be  adapted  to  then  existing  needs.  The  money 
which  we  are  now  spending  on  large  battleships 
is  thrown  away.  Its  results,  in  the  shape  of  armored 
vessels,  will,  in  all  probability,  go  into  the  scrap 
heap  before  there  is  any  opportunity  to  use  them, 
provided  we  conduct  ourselves  towards  other  na- 
tions with  common  decency  and  common  cour- 
tesy. Utterly  unnecessary,  a  mere  wanton  waste 
of  money,  labor,  and  materials,  is  this  forty  or 
fifty  millions  of  dollars  a  year  which  we  are  now 
spending  in  the  construction  of  these  top-heavy 
vulnerable  craft,  with  defective  speed  and  defective 
gun  power.  Taking  them  at  their  best,  they  are 
inferior  for  effective  work  to  the  vessels  that  we 
could  provide  inside  of  sixty  days,  by  the  mere 
purchase  of  the  fastest  ocean-going  steamships 
at  any  particular  time,  and  their  conversion  into 
war  vessels  upon  the  ideas  of  Eads  and  Ericsson. 
In  a  recent  trial  by  the  Navy  Department  of  the 
Columbia  and  the  Minneapolis,  presumably  our 


180  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

two  fastest  armored  cruisers,  the  highest  speed 
reached  by  either  was  twenty  knots.  The  maximum 
speed  of  the  Rhode  Island  battleship  in  smooth 
water  is  nineteen  knots.  Ocean  steamships  almost 
without  number  make  now  a  speed  approximating 
twenty-five  knots.  A  modern  whaleback  ship,  with 
an  overdeck  of  steel,  with  low  revolving  turrets  on 
Ericsson's  methods,  carrying  two  or  three  rifled 
guns  of  the  longest  range  and  the  highest  power, 
would  sink  our  entire  fleet  of  battleships.  The  case 
would  be  merely  that  of  a  skillful  boxer,  who  is 
able  to  conquer  an  antagonist  of  much  heavier 
weight  by  superior  rapidity  of  movement,  hitting 
and  getting  away.  In  short,  our  large  battleships 
are  nothing  more  nor  less  than  large  floating 
targets. 

It  is  easily  seen,  that  the  present  time  is,  of 
all  times,  one  when  we  ought  by  every  possible 
means  to  avoid  war.  All  that  we  need  to  do,  to 
accomplish  that  end,  is  to  mind  our  own  business, 
and  treat  other  nations  with  common  decency  and 
common  courtesy.  Although  our  military  power 
is  not  to-day  developed  or  organized,  nevertheless 
it  is  evident  to  all  nations  that  we  are  the  strong- 
est nation  on  the  face  of  the  earth.  Every  people 
wishes  our  friendship.  None  will  venture  to  make 
an   unjustifiable   attack  upon  us.     Wherever  the 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    181 

rights  of  the  United  States  or  its  citizens  come  in 
question,  there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that 
those  rights  can  be  fully  secured  by  peaceful  means. 
The  possession  of  large  armaments  for  this  coun- 
try is  quite  needless.  It  is,  moreover,  a  standing 
incitement  to  lead  us  into  hostilities  without  ade- 
quate reason.  Every  one  agrees  that  this  coun- 
try should  at  all  times  be  properly  prepared  for 
war.  But  proper  preparation  for  war,  with  us, 
does  not  mean  the  construction  of  large  naval 
armaments,  or  the  maintenance  of  a  large  standing 
army. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  another  case  of  needless  and 
useless  waste  of  public  money  now  in  progress,  the 
Panama  Canal. 

The  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  carries 
with  it  three  certainties :  First :  An  enormous  money 
expenditure;  Second:  A  long  period  of  time  before 
its  completion,  during  which  the  interest  on  the 
investment  would  be  entirely  lost;  Third:  A  large 
increase  over  the  estimates  of  the  cost  of  construc- 
tion. 

The  purpose  to  be  attained  by  the  construction 
of  the  Canal  is,  of  course,  the  transportation  of 
freight  and  passengers  from  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Pacific  in  large  ocean-going  ships,  without  transfer, 
or  breaking  bulk.    Of  course,  too,  time  is  of  the 


182  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

utmost  importance.  Communication  from  the  At- 
lantic to  the  Pacific  should  be  accomplished  at  the 
earliest  possible  time,  and  at  the  least  possible 
cost. 

Now,  it  happens  to  be  the  fact,  that  two  methods 
of  transit  for  large  ocean-going  vessels,  propelled 
either  by  sail  or  steam,  have  already  been  examined, 
and  approved,  by  the  highest  engineering  authori- 
ties, either  one  of  which  gives  us  the  largest  degree 
of  certainty,  of  speedy  means  of  communication 
between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  within  a  very  short 
period  of  time,  and  at  a  very  low  figure  of  money 
expenditure. 

Those  two  routes  are.  First:  the  route  over  the 
Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  by  means  of  a  ship  rail- 
way; Second:  the  route  to  the  east  of  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama,  called  the  Darien  route,  using  the 
river  Atrato  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  as  a  canal 
for  upwards  of  one  hundred  miles,  with  a  short 
cut  at  the  head  of  ship  navigation  on  that  river  to 
the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Singularly  enough,  both  these  routes,  whether 
intentionally  or  otherwise,  have  been  quite  disre- 
garded, during  all  the  recent  discussions  of  the 
question  of  interoceanic  transit.  It  was  evidently 
for  the  interest  of  the  parties  who  were  attempting 
to  negotiate  a  sale  to  our  government  of  the  French 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     183 

rights,  that  both  of  these  other  routes  should  be 
kept  out  of  consideration.  No  criticism  is  here 
made  on  account  of  that  fact  against  the  persons 
who  were  engaged  in  negotiating  that  sale.  Never- 
theless the  fact  remains,  that  there  are  these  other 
two  routes  for  interoceanic  transit;  that  they  are 
far  less  expensive  than  the  Panama  route;  that 
either  one  of  them  can  be  constructed  in  a  much 
shorter  period  of  time;  and  that  each  of  them  has 
been  approved  by  the  highest  engineering  talent 
in  the  civilized  world. 

A  very  short  statement  of  facts  will  lay  the  whole 
situation  before  the  reader. 

The  scheme  for  inter-oceanic  transit  by  the 
Tehuantepec  route  was  originally  developed  and 
elaborated  by  the  great  engineer.  Captain  Eads. 
Eads's  scheme  was  for  a  ship  railway.  He  urged 
a  ship  railway  at  Panama  in  preference  to  the 
scheme  of  a  canal.  In  a  letter  to  the  New  York 
"Tribune,"  on  June  10,  1879,  after  the  completion 
of  his  great  work  on  the  jetties  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi,  Captain  Eads  said: — 

"  My  own  studies  have  satisfied  me  of  the  entire  feasi- 
bility of  such  transportation  by  railroad,  and  I  have  no 
hesitation  in  saying  that  for  a  sum  not  exceeding  one- 
third  of  the  estimated  cost  of  the  canal,  namely,  about 
$50,000,000,  the  largest  ships  which  enter  the  Port  of  New 
York  can  be  transferred  when  fully  loaded  with   abso- 


184  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

lide  safety,  across  the  Isthmus  on  a  railway  constructed 
for  the  purpose,  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the  mo- 
ment they  are  taken  in  charge  in  one  sea  until  they 
are  delivered  into  the  other  ready  to  depart  on  their 
journey." 

Briefly  stated,  the  transportation  of  ships  by 
ship  railway  consists  in  floating  the  ship  into  a 
cradle  or  dry  dock  in  the  port  of  one  ocean,  raising 
that  cradle  or  dry  dock  by  machinery,  and  placing 
it  on  a  car  propelled  over  a  six-rail  railroad,  equiva- 
lent to  the  ordinary  railroad  of  three  tracks.  In  the 
construction  of  such  a  railroad  it  is  necessary  to 
eliminate  curves.  The  elimination  of  the  curves  is 
accomplished  by  the  use  of  turn-tables,  where  it 
becomes  necessary  to  change  the  direction  of  the 
track.  Eads's  entire  scheme  was  elaborated  by  him 
with  full  specifications  and  working  models;  and 
his  estimates  were  worked  out  with  minute  detail. 
The  practicability  of  his  enterprise  was  approved 
by  the  leading  engineers  of  both  England  and  the 
United  States.  His  plans  and  preliminary  prepa- 
rations had  the  approval  of  over  fifty  promi- 
nent naval  architects,  shipbuilders,  navigators,  and 
engineers  in  the  United  States  and  Europe.  He 
expended  about  $500,000  in  surveys  and  engineer- 
ing work  on  this  scheme.  If  he  had  lived,  the  proba- 
bility is  very  strong,  that  his  genius  and  energy 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     185 

would  have  been  able  to  carry  through  the  con- 
struction of  the  railway  according  to  his  designs. 
But  his  death,  in  1887,  removed  the  necessary 
motive  power. 

The  route  contemplated  began  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  in  the  harbor  of  Goatzacoalcos.  On  the 
Pacific  coast,  the  railway  was  to  have  its  terminus 
near  the  city  of  Tehuantepec.  The  advantages  of 
the  Tehuantepec  route  over  the  Panama  and  the 
Nicaragua  routes,  in  the  opinion  of  Captain  Eads, 
were  very  great.  They  were  fully  detailed  by  him, 
but  it  is  unnecessary  to  go  into  those  details  here. 
For  our  present  purpose,  it  is  sufficient  to  say,  that 
Eads's  estimate  of  the  entire  cost  of  construction 
of  his  ship  railway  complete,  including  harbors, 
docks,  railway,  and  general  plant  and  machinery 
for  transporting  vessels  of  5000  tons  gross  weight, 
was  less  than  $75,000,000. 

It  may  be  added,  that  the  general  outline  of  Eads's 
scheme  was  communicated  by  him  orally  to  the 
British  Association  of  Engineers  at  its  meeting  at 
York,  England,  in  1881.  The  Committee  of  Com- 
merce of  the  United  States  Senate  between  that 
date  and  August,  1884  (the  precise  date  I  am  not 
now  able  to  give),  made  by  unanimous  vote  a 
favorable  report  to  the  Senate,  recommending  that 
a  bill  should  be  passed  to  promote  the  construction 


186  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

of  Eads's  ship  railway.  A  concession  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  railway  was  obtained  from  the 
Mexican  government  by  Eads  in  1881,  which  ex- 
tended over  a  period  of  ninety-nine  years  from  its 
date.  An  article  published  in  the  London  "  Times," 
used  the  following  language  in  relation  to  the  en- 
terprise :  — 

"All  the  points  we  have  advanced,  and  the  general 
feasibility  of  the  scheme,  are  successfully  demonstrated 
by  a  large  working  model,  of  the  whole  of  the  appliances 
which  were  recently  inspected  in  operation  at  127  Long- 
acre,  London.  .  .  .  As  it  is  intended  to  construct  the  line 
for  profit,  the  works  would  not  be  of  such  proportions, 
either  in  the  docks,  cradles,  or  railway,  as  to  carry  the 
Great  Eastern  ;  although  if  in  the  future  the  transport 
of  such  large  vessels  should  be  required  and  promised 
to  be  profitable,  it  would  be  practicable  to  carry  them 
by  increasing  the  width  of  the  roadbed,  the  size  of  the 
cradles,  and  the  floatation  powers  of  the  openings  and 
turn-tables.  Ships  of  5000  tons  gross  weight  will  include 
ninety  per  cent  of  the  present  tonnage  of  the  world;  and 
the  ship  railway  will  be  constructed  to  accommodate  this 
as  the  maximum-sized  vessels.  The  single  track  is  con- 
sidered to  be  capable  with  only  the  five  turn-tables  that 
are  necessary  to  change  the  direction  of  the  road  in  difii- 
cult  parts  of  the  line,  to  permit  of  ten  or  twelve  ships  start- 
ing from  each  end  of  the  line  to  pass  each  other  daily, 
and  to  accomplish  the  trip  in  from  fifteen  to  eighteen 
hours  without  any  difficulty.  If  these  vessels  averaged 
fifteen  hundred  tons  each,  they  would  amount  to  at  least 
one-fourth  more  than  the  Suez  Canal  is  accommodating 
to-day.  In  regard  to  the  cost  of  the  ship  railway  complete, 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     187 

it  is  stated,  that  from  the  careful  estimates  based  upon 
the  survey,  the  entire  project,  including  harbors,  docks, 
roadway,  and  general  plant  and  machinery  for  transport- 
ing vessels  of  5000  tons  gross  weight,  will  be  about 
£15,000,000." 

Full  details  as  to  this  Tehuantepec  route,  and  its 
great  superiority  from  a  commercial  point  of  view 
over  the  Panama  and  other  routes,  are  contained 
in  United  States  Senate  Document  No.  34,  of  the 
54th  Congress,  First  Session,  ordered  to  be  printed 
by  the  Senate,  December  20,  1895.  That  document 
is  a  reprint  of  a  lecture  by  Elmer  L.  Corthell,  one 
of  the  most  eminent  living  railway  engineers. 

We  now  proceed  to  give  a  statement  of  some  of 
the  facts  relating  to  the  Darien  route,  by  the  river 
Atrato. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  for  the 
year  1873,  contains  the  following  statement  as  to 
the  canal  to  be  constructed  by  what  is  termed  the 
Darien  route :  — 

"Briefly  stated,  the  route  selected  by  Commander 
Selfridge  includes  one  hundred  miles  of  river  navigation 
of  the  Atrato,  which  has  been  carefully  sounded,  and 
found  to  be  fully  capable  of  being  navigated  by  the  largest 
class  of  ocean  steamers.  Between  the  River  Atrato  and 
the  Pacific,  a  canal  or  artificial  cut  is  made  but  twenty- 
eight  miles  in  length.  The  canal  for  twenty-two  miles 
of  its  distance  passes  through  a  plain  with  a  gradual 
rise  of   ninety  feet.     There  will  then  reniain  six  miles 


188  ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY 

to  the  Pacific,  of  which  three  are  a  moderate  open  cut 
and  three  miles  of  tunnelHng.  It  is  estimated  that  the 
work  will  cost  between  fifty  millions  and  sixty  mil- 
lions of  dollars,  and  that  it  can  be  completed  within  ten 
years." 

Commander  Selfridge's  report,  which  appears 
in  the  printed  volume  of  Report  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  for  1873,  at  pages  164  to  181,  contains 
the  following  statements :  — 

"That  the  Atrato  is  entirely  and  wholly  capable  of 
ship  navigation  to  the  point  at  which  we  wish  to  leave  it, 
is  a  fact  that  no  longer  admits  of  any  doubt. 

"From  ocean  to  ocean,  then,  the  only  barriers  are  the 
half  mile  of  sand  bar  at  the  Atrato 's  mouth,  and  the 
twenty-eight  miles  intervening  at  the  mouth  of  the  Napipi, 
between  the  Atrato  and  the  Pacific,  through  which  an 
artificial  cut  or  canal  must  be  made." 

The  length  of  the  Atrato  River  available  for  ship 
navigation,  as  above  mentioned,  is  upwards  of  100 
miles.  There  can  be  little  doubt,  that  the  twenty- 
eight  miles  of  continuation  from  the  head  of  navi- 
gation on  the  river  Atrato  could  be  completed  with 
great  speed,  and  economy  of  construction,  by  incor- 
porating in  the  Darien  scheme  the  use  of  the  ship 
railway  on  the  general  designs  of  Captain  Eads. 
Moreover,  with  the  increased  speed  of  construc- 
tion under  modem  mechanical  methods,  it  would 
seem  highly  probable  that  the  Darien  route  could 


THE   COST   OF  MACHINE   POLITICS     189 

be  completely  finished  for  use  within  one  or  two 
years. 

The  cost  of  construction  by  the  Darien  route  was 
estimated  by  Commander  Selfridge  on  two  different 
methods.  The  most  expensive  one,  after  making 
due  allowances  of  twenty-five  per  cent  for  con- 
tingencies, was  $90,000,000.  Selfridge's  estimates 
were  approved  by  Benjamin  H.  Latrobe,Esq.,  the 
distinguished  engineer  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad. 

The  statements  here  made  are  taken  from  official 
documents,  now  on  file  in  the  proper  departments 
in  Washington,  and  are  all  based  on  schemes  and 
estimates  approved  by  the  highest  engineering  au- 
thorities in  the  world. 

The  practical  result,  which  will  be  accomplished 
by  pursuing  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal  over  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  in  accordance  with  the  present 
plans,  or,  speaking  with  more  accuracy,  with  the  pre- 
sent absence  of  any  plan,  will  be  the  expenditure 
of  upwards  of  two  thousand  millions  of  dollars, 
extending  over  a  long  period  of  years,  with  the 
appointment  of  a  large  number  of  public  officials. 
In  other  words,  managed  as  nearly  everything  else 
has  been  managed  by  our  national  government,  the 
construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  as  now  contem- 
plated will  constitute  another  huge  corruption  fund. 


190  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

So  far  as  to  the  uses  of  money  for  the  purposes 
of  corruption. 

Corruption,  however,  on  the  part  of  our  public 
officials,  however  bad  it  may  be,  is  not  to-day  our 
chief  difficulty.  The  worst  feature  of  our  present 
system  is,  that  it  destroys  the  possibility  of  select- 
ing men  with  a  view  to  their  fitness  for  the  special 
work  which  they  are  to  do  in  their  special  offices. 
At  every  turn,  in  the  selection  of  men  for  high 
public  office,  we  practically  ignore  the  question  of 
fitness  for  their  work.  We  make  the  pretense  — 
of  selecting  our  highest  national  officials  by  reason 
of  their  "  party  principles."  But  what  connection 
is  there  between  the  administration  of  the  War 
Department,  or  the  Navy  Department,  or  the  State 
Department,  or  any  of  the  departments,  and  "  party 
principles  "  ?  As  matter  of  practice,  "  party  princi- 
ples "  concern  notliing  but  the  distribution  of  "  the 
spoils,"  the  payment  for  the  work  of  operating  the 
election  machine. 

We  are  all  doing  our  best,  with  our  present 
machinery.  Our  present  results  are  the  best  that 
are  possible,  under  our  present  system  of  perpet- 
ual revolution.  People  and  politicians,  we  are  all 
doing  as  well  as  we  can  under  our  present  politi- 
cal system.  The  citizens  have  not  sufficient  time 
—  for  the  operation  of  the  great  election  machine. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    191 

Public  officials  have  not  the  time  —  to  learn  their 
work,  and  to  do  their  best.  No  official  is  free  —  to 
give  us  his  best  service.  We,  the  people,  are  not 
free — to  select  our  best  men.  Our  present  term 
system,  and  any  conceivable  term  system,  whether 
the  term  be  long  or  short,  is  utterly  irrational  and 
unpractical.  It  is  unpractical,  because  it  is  irra- 
tional. Men  do  not  ripen  and  decay  in  one,  two, 
or  four  years.  They  are  not  beets  or  pumpkins. 
They  require  time  —  to  learn  how  to  do  their  best 
work.  Instead  of  a  term  system,  we  must  have  a 
time  system. 

It  is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  under 
our  present  political  system  we  put  a  premium  on 
inefficiency  and  corruption.  As  matter  of  fact,  we 
make  it  for  the  interest  of  our  public  servants 
to  be  unfaithful  to  their  public  duties.  We  make 
infideHty  in  our  public  service  pay  —  and  pay 
better  than  fidelity.  To  our  public  servants  we 
hold  out  no  prospect  of  continuance  in  our  ser- 
vice, or  of  advancement,  as  the  reward  for  faithful 
and  efficient  public  work.  In  any  private  call- 
ing, men  who  do  work  of  the  best  kind  are  virtu- 
ally sure  of  advancement.  They  rise  to  the  top. 
But  a  man  has  no  such  possibility  as  that  in  our 
public  employment.  The  Civil  Service  reformers 
are  most  earnest  in  their  efforts  to  secure  men 


192  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

who  can  pass  examinations,  at  the  bottom.  But 
what  we  need  is  competent  men  at  the  top;  men 
of  brains  and  experience;  not  talkers,  but  work- 
ers; not  men  who  are  profuse  in  professions  and 
protestations,  but  men  who  give  quiet,  efficient 
performance. 

Quite  apaVt,  however,  from  the  mere  losses  in 
money  which  result  from  our  present  political  sys- 
tem, the  most  serious  consideration  is  to  be  found 
in  the  demoralization  of  our  entire  public  service, 
that  comes  from  the  supremacy  of  the  machine 
politicians.  The  supreme  power  in  the  body  pol- 
itic is  money  —  money  which  is  used  corruptly. 
These  great  political  organizations,  which  we  term 
"parties,"  are  maintained  by  money.  It  is  im- 
possible to  maintain  them  otherwise.  Every  can- 
didate who  gets  a  nomination  at  their  hands,  has 
to  pay  for  it  in  money.  Our  so-called  popular 
elections  are  carried  largely  by  money.  Practi- 
cally —  nearly  all  the  highest  places  in  our  differ- 
ent governments,  local,  state,  and  national,  are 
bought  and  sold,  for  money. 

It  is  not  intended  that  the  transactions  are 
such  in  form.  It  is  not  often  the  case  that  an  ex- 
press agreement  is  made  in  so  many  words,  that  a 
nomination,  or  appointment,  is  to  be  paid  for  at  a 
specific  figure  in  dollars  and  cents.    But  when  Mr. 


THE   COST  OF  MACHINE   POLITICS     193 

Lincoln's  friends  made  the  agreement  that  Mr. 
Cameron  should  have  a  cabinet  appointment  in 
payment  for  the  votes  of  the  Pennsylvania  del- 
egation, it  was  perfectly  well  understood,  by  the 
parties  to  the  transaction,  that  Mr.  Cameron 
would  use  his  powers  as  he  afterwards  did.  His 
subsequent  course  of  action  was  precisely  what  was 
to  be  expected,  and  what  was  expected;  expected 
by  Mr.  Lincoln.  When  Mr.  Lincoln  carried  out  the 
agreement  made  by  his  friends,  by  putting  a  man 
whom  he  knew  to  be  notoriously  corrupt  and  dis- 
honest into  his  most  important  cabinet  position,  he 
knew  perfectly  well,  that  the  appointment  meant  the 
loss  of  many  thousands  of  lives  and  many  hundreds 
of  millions  of  dollars,  to  the  people  who  were  strug- 
gling to  support  the  government.  He  knew  per- 
fectly well,  that  success  in  the  war  would  be  largely 
a  matter  of  money;  and  that  it  was  almost  an 
impossibility  for  him  to  do  anything  so  dangerous 
to  our  cause  as  to  appoint  Mr.  Cameron.  Is  it 
possible  to  conceive  anything  more  demoralizing  to 
the  entire  force  of  government  employees,  and  to 
the  people,  than  such  an  appointment?  In  sub- 
stance, in  its  practical  effect,  the  transaction  was 
neither  more  nor  less  than  the  sale  of  a  cabinet  posi- 
tion for  money.  Only  a  few  years  ago,  the  state- 
ment was  often  repeated  in  the  public  press,  and,  so 


194  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

far  as  my  knowledge  goes,  it  has  never  been  denied, 
that  a  high  cabinet  position  was  given  in  return  for 
the  contribution  of  four  hundred  thousand  dollars  to 
the  "  campaign  fund  "  of  one  of  the  two  "  grand  old 
parties."  It  is  seldom  the  case  that  the  candidate 
for  our  high  elective  offices  does  not  pay  a  large 
amount  of  money  to  his  party  "campaign  fund." 
No  doubt,  we  do  not  call  this  bribery.  No  doubt, 
under  the  letter  of  the  law,  it  is  not  bribery.  But 
what  can  be  more  ruinous  to  the  honesty  and  effi- 
ciency of  our  public  service  ?  We  have,  no  doubt, 
become  accustomed  to  these  transactions.  They 
are  e very-day  affairs.  Indeed,  that  is  the  worst 
feature  of  the  entire  situation.  The  parties  to  such 
transactions  consider  that  they  are  doing  nothing 
to  which  exception  can  be  taken.  It  is  the  fact, 
that  our  present  political  machinery  cannot  be 
operated  in  any  other  way.  The  money  must  be 
had.  In  the  first  instance,  it  must  be  paid  by  the 
candidates  or  their  friends.  Considering  the  entire 
situation,  however,  the  practical  working  of  the 
machinery  is,  that  our  highest  offices  are  bought 
and  sold  for  money;  and  the  action  of  our  highest 
public  officials  is  thereby  placed  under  the  control 
of  money. 

The  facts  and  figures  here  given,  as  was  stated 
in   the  beginning  of  this  chapter,   concern   only 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    195 

the  administration  of  the  national  government. 
Under  the  national  government  alone,  the  losses 
in  money,  to  say  nothing  of  the  needless  loss  of 
life  in  the  Civil  War,  have  gone  into  the  thousands 
of  millions. 

But  losses  of  the  same  kind,  due  to  the  same 
cause,  are  the  regular  daily  result  of  "machine 
politics  "  in  our  state  and  local  governments.  The 
aggregate  of  these  losses  is  beyond  the  possibility 
of  computation.  We  have  been  in  the  habit  of 
thinking  that  corruption  in  our  public  affairs  was 
mainly  restricted  to  the  governments  of  our  large 
cities.  But  that  is  an  error.  The  largest  losses 
take  place  in  the  operations  of  our  national  gov- 
ernment. But  thereto  we  must  add  the  fact,  that 
losses  of  the  same  kind  take  place  under  every 
state  government,  and  to  a  greater  or  less  extent, 
under  every  local  government.  Everywhere  those 
losses  are  in  proportion  to  the  size  of  our  pub- 
lic treasuries.  It  has  been  impossible  here,  and 
it  is  needless,  for  the  purpose  of  our  present  study, 
to  go  into  the  figures  of  the  losses  to  the  Ameri- 
can people,  due  directly  to  our  present  political 
system,  in  our  state  and  local  governments.  It  is 
easy  to  see,  that  those  losses  must  of  necessity  go 
each  year  into  the  hundreds,  and  probably  thou- 
sands, of  millions. 


196  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

But  the  money  loss  alone  does  not  represent 
the  largest  part  of  the  injury  to  public  interests, 
which  is  due  to  "machine  politics."  The  greatest 
evil  from  which  we  suffer  is  in  the  non-enforce- 
ment of  the  laws.  During  the  last  year,  this  en- 
tire people  has  been  stirred  more  deeply  than  at 
any  time  since  the  period  of  the  Civil  War,  by  the 
disclosures  of  corruption  among  our  highest  pub- 
lic officials.  Disclosures  of  abuses  in  the  conduct 
of  the  affairs  of  large  moneyed  institutions  were 
bad  enough.  But  the  worst  feature  in  the  situa- 
tion is,  that  those  abuses  were  ever  possible.  They 
were  made  possible  by  the  connivance  of  high  pub- 
lic officials.  There  is  even  a  worse  feature  in  the 
situation  than  that.  The  abuses  go  unpunished. 
Fine  words,  fine  speeches,  as  to  the  excessive  accu- 
mulations of  wealth  in  the  hands  of  individuals 
and  large  corporations,  those  we  have  in  abun- 
dance, from  the  highest  sources.  But  here  have 
been  many  instances  of  offenses  against  both  the 
civil  and  criminal  law,  and  the  chief  offenders  are 
not  brought  to  justice.  Occasionally  some  inferior 
subordinate  goes  to  prison.  But  the  men  at  the 
head,  the  chief  offenders,  in  some  mysterious  way, 
all  escape.  Laws  we  have  in  abundance.  But 
the  laws  are  not  enforced.  That  is,  they  are  not 
enforced   against   the   rich   and   strong.     Indeed, 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS    197 

the  chief  occupation  of  some  of  our  highest  pro- 
secuting officers  at  the  present  day  would  seem 
to  be  to  devise  reasons  for  the  law's  non-enforce- 
ment. In  former  times,  when  grave  crimes  were 
committed,  we  had  indictments  by  grand  juries, 
followed  by  convictions,  and  appropriate  sen- 
tences. But  in  these  modem  days,  when  there 
has  been  a  homicide,  or  an  embezzlement  of  trust 
funds,  we  have  a  sensational  procedure  before  a 
petty  magistrate,  in  order  to  discover,  in  advance, 
whether  evidence  shall  be  laid  before  a  grand  jury. 
Every  opportunity  is  given  for  delay,  for  the  pur- 
chase or  removal  of  witnesses  by  guilty  parties. 
And  the  result  is,  that  time  passes  by,  some  new 
sensation  occupies  the  public  attention,  and  per- 
sons guilty  of  the  gravest  crimes  known  to  the  law 
go  unpunished.  In  our  great  metropolis,  in  the 
very  worst  days  of  a  notorious  political  organi- 
zation, criminals  were  indicted,  convicted,  and 
punished,  in  due  course  of  law,  with  reasonable 
promptitude.  But  to-day  homicides  almost  without 
number  are  reported  in  the  daily  press,  with  no 
effort,  so  far  as  one  can  learn,  on  the  part  of  our 
public  prosecutors  to  enforce  the  law,  and  secure 
protection  for  human  life.  The  same  is  true  as  to 
the  protection  of  property.  The  same  conditions 
exist  throughout  the  country.    Crime  goes  unpun- 


198  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ished.  Apparently,  no  serious  attempt  is  made  to 
enforce  the  criminal  law. 

This  condition  is  due  directly  to  "machine 
politics."  Prosecuting  officials,  and  high  officials 
of  all  kinds,  are  largely  under  the  control  of  the 
election  machine,  which,  in  its  turn,  is  under  the 
control  of  our  large  modem  masses  of  men  and 
money  —  the  one  as  much  as  the  other.  The  pro- 
fessional politician  is  dependent,  for  his  existence, 
and  his  substance,  on  two  things  —  money  and 
votes.  He  must  have  money  to  control  votes.  He 
must  have  votes  to  control  money.  However  good 
may  be  his  wishes,  or  his  purposes,  he  is  always  a 
dependent.  He  is  not  a  free  man.  He  is  the  slave 
of  the  election  machine;  and  the  election  machine 
is  the  slave  of  votes  and  money. 

Mr.  Lincoln,  to  take  the  highest  type  of  a 
"machine  politician,"  was  never  a  free  man  — 
was  never  free  to  act  on  his  own  best  judgment 
of  what  would  really  serve  the  highest  public  inter- 
ests. His  use  of  the  powers  of  his  office  was  always 
largely  dominated  by  "  party  considerations ; " 
which  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that  the  inter- 
ests of  the  nation  were  sacrificed  to  the  needs  of 
his  own  part  of  the  election  machine. 

So,  too,  to-day,  the  fact  that  these  recent  abuses 
in  large  financial  institutions  have  been  possible. 


THE  COST  OF  MACHINE  POLITICS     199 

and  that  they  go  unpunished,  is  due  to  "machine 
politics,"  and  to  nothing  else. 

Evidently,  then,  it  is  an  impossibility  to  make 
any  full,  or  even  proximate,  computation  of  the 
"cost  of  machine  politics."    It  is  infinite. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   NECESSITY   OF   REORGANIZATION 

Escape  from  these  conditions  is  an  impossibility 
so  long  as  we  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  elec- 
tion machine. 

The  supremacy  of  the  election  machine  will  con- 
tinue precisely  so  long  as  we  continue  the  system 
of  tenure  by  election,  under  the  form  of  any  term 
system.  To  escape  the  result,  we  must  do  away 
with  the  cause.  No  system  of  laws  can  be  devised, 
which  will  at  once  abolish  the  corrupt  use  of  money 
in  politics.  But  it  is  easily  possible  to  devise 
changes  in  our  present  political  system,  which  will 
make  the  power  of  money  in  politics  much  less 
than  it  is  now. 

Money  ought  to  be  a  great  power  in  the  state. 
Indeed,  we  might  almost  go  so  far  as  to  say,  that 
any  system  of  laws  which  gives  the  highest  degree 
of  security  to  money  will,  at  the  same  time,  give 
the  highest  degree  of  security  to  life,  liberty,  and 
property  of  all  kinds. 

But  money  must  not  be  the  supreme  power  in 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION    201 

the  state.  It  must  not  be  a  power  above  the 
law. 

What  we  should  endeavor  to  accomplish,  and 
what  it  is  possible  for  us  to  accomplish,  is  to  abol- 
ish the  present  supremacy  in  our  practical  poli- 
tics, not  merely  of  large  masses  of  money,  but 
also  of  large  masses  of  men  —  of  large  and  power- 
ful combinations,  of  both  capitalists  and  laborers, 
if  we  are  to  use  those  names.  For,  if  we  give  things 
their  right  names,  we  must  remember  that  every 
capitalist  is  a  laborer,  and  every  laborer  is  a 
capitalist;  and  the  interests  of  the  two  are,  in  the 
long  run,  completely  harmonious.  The  protection 
of  each  requires  nothing  more  than  the  constant 
impartial  enforcement  of  the  laws. 

Now  can  any  thinking  man  really  continue  to  be 
of  the  opinion,  that  it  is  possible  to  secure  the  con- 
stant impartial  enforcement  of  the  laws,  under 
a  continuance  of  our  present  political  system  of 
"  machine  pohtics  "  ? 

"  Machine  politics  "  has  for  its  very  essence  the 
leadersliip  of  demagogues,  and  the  supremacy  of 
money.  Our  large  political  organizations,  which  we 
term  "parties,"  are,  at  all  times,  dominated  by 
money.  Also,  at  all  times,  they  use  for  stalking- 
horses,  for  political  bell-wethers,  the  men  who  hap- 
pen for  the  time  to  be  "  popular  "  —  men  who  are 


202  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

fluent,  and  often  eloquent  talkers  —  men  who  are 
talkers,  rather  than  doers.  As  a  rule,  the  efficient 
workers  are  not  prolific  talkers.  They  have  not  the 
time.  Indeed,  we  may  almost  go  so  far  as  to  say, 
that  the  men  who  are  at  any  time  "  popular,"  are 
unfit  for  any  high  place  in  our  public  service.  To 
a  great  extent,  that  has  always  been  the  case.  But 
it  is  more  so  to-day  than  ever.  The  men  who  are 
effective  workers  are  generally  quiet  men,  men 
of  few  words,  who  have  neither  the  time  nor  the 
inclination,  to  make  themselves  "popular." 

Quite  aside  from  that,  however,  we  have  the 
further  fact,  that  the  most  efficient  public  service 
requires  such  a  use  of  official  power  as  will  cer- 
tainly make  a  man  "unpopular." 

Here  we  strike  political  fundamentals.  We  had 
hoped,  by  making  our  highest  public  servants  peri- 
odically dependent  on  a  popular  vote,  to  enforce 
responsibility  to  "the  people."  What  we  really 
secure  is  responsibility  to  the  election  machine. 
That  is  a  very  different  thing.  As  we  have  already 
seen,  the  rule  of  the  election  machine  is  the  most 
subtle  foe  to  free  democratic  government.  For 
the  time,  it  has  made  free  democratic  government 
an  impossibility. 

The  only  possible  avenue  of  escape  from  the 
tyranny  of  the  election  machine  is  in  its  abolition. 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION     203 

The  only  possible  means  for  the  abolition  of  the 
election  machine  is  the  abolition  of  the  cause  of 
its  existence. 

The  cause  of  its  existence  is  our  system  of  ten- 
ure by  election.  That  one  cause  has  invariably 
produced  that  one  result.  Until  recent  times,  it 
has  worked  the  wreck  of  every  attempt  to  estab- 
lish democratic  institutions. 

It  has  almost  passed  into  a  political  truism, 
that  no  pohtical  regime,  and  no  political  institu- 
tion, can  long  continue  its  existence,  in  opposition 
to  a  deep-seated,  well-founded  conviction  in  the 
community,  that  its  continued  existence  will  work 
serious  injury  to  the  public  interests. 

Nevertheless,  the  fact  remains,  that  every  in- 
telligent, thoughtful  people  is  conservative.  It  may 
almost  be  said,  that  its  conservatism  is  in  pro- 
portion to  its  intelligence.  There  is  generally  a 
strong  inclination,  especially  in  any  community 
where  there  is  a  large  accumulation  of  wealth,  to 
let  well  enough  alone;  to  avoid  new  experiments; 
especially,  to  avoid  experiments  that  are  fundamen- 
tal and  radical. 

That  is  reasonable,  and  right.  Experiments  that 
are  fundamental,  and  radical,  should,  no  doubt, 
be  avoided  —  in  general. 

But  what  are  we  to  do,  when  existing  evils  are 


204  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

fundamental,  and  radical?  What  are  we  to  do, 
when  the  existing  political  system,  in  its  funda- 
mental, essential  features,  is  such  as  to  make  it 
a  practical  impossibility,  that  public  opinion,  or 
rather  the  public  judgment,  should  be  the  su- 
preme controlling  force  in  the  state  ?  The  very 
essence,  the  very  purpose,  of  democratic  institu- 
tions, is  the  supremacy  of  the  will  of  the  people. 
But  what  are  we  to  do,  when  the  institutions  are 
so  framed  as  to  make  it  an  utter  impossibility 
that  the  will  of  the  people  should  be  supreme, 
that  is,  supreme  as  the  force  of  regular  daily 
control  ? 

Yet  that  is  our  condition  to-day.  The  will  of 
the  people  is  suppressed,  and  blocked,  at  every 
turn,  by  the  impossibility  of  getting  any  sub- 
stantial improvement  under  our  present  politi- 
cal institutions. 

Naturally,  rightly,  we  are  averse  to  making  new 
experiments.  But  what  are  we  to  say  to  the  policy 
of  continuing  an  old  experiment,  which  has  al- 
ready failed  in  the  past,  and  which  we  know  will 
continue  to  fail  in  the  future;  when,  in  addition, 
we  know  that  the  injurious  results  of  that  failure 
in  the  future  will  steadily  increase  ?  For  here  we 
have  another  certainty:  that,  with  our  continued 
increase  in  population  and  wealth,  there  will  be 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION    205 

a  continued  increase  in  the  power  of  the  machine 
pohticians,  and  their  abuse  of  that  power. 

If  the  positions  hereinbefore  stated  are  sound, 
there  would  seem  to  be  no  room  for  doubt  or 
argument,  as  to  the  overwhelming  necessity  of 
a  fundamental  reorganization  of  our  political 
system. 

But  then,  how  is  the  situation  as  to  its  prac- 
ticability ?  Is  it  feasible  ?  Does  it  admit  of 
actual  accomplishment?  For  practical  men,  men 
of  affairs,  always  avoid,  or  intend  to  avoid,  the 
impossible.  Therefore  we  are  confronted  with  the 
question  of  practicability. 

That  depends,  in  my  opinion,  on  the  answers 
to  these  three  following  questions :  — 

I.  Is  there  to-day  a  general  conviction,  through 
the  entire  community,  of  a  need  of  reorganization  ? 
II.  Is  such  reorganization  demanded,  by  the 
community's  financial  and  industrial  interests  ? 

III.  Is  it  possible,  to-day,  to  combine  all  the 
forces  of  the  community,  both  the  pohticians  and 
the  people,  in  an  effort  for  reorganization  ? 

For,  if  reorganization  must  be  had  in  face  of  the 
united  opposition  of  the  machine  politicians,  the 
present  problem  would  be  even  graver  than  it  is. 
Yet  it  would  not  do  to  concede,  even  then,  that  the 
situation  was  desperate. 


806  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

These  questions  will  be  considered  in  the  order 
in  which  they  have  been  stated. 

First:  Is  there  to-day  a  general  conviction, 
through  the  entire  community,  of  the  need  of 
reorganization  ? 

My  answer  to  this  question  is  in  the  affirmative. 

That  does  not  imply,  that  the  entire  commu- 
nity is  as  yet  agreed  as  to  the  precise  form,  which 
should  be  given  to  the  measures  of  reorganiza- 
tion. Such  an  agreement  would  take  time  and 
careful  deliberation;  deliberation  of  such  a  char- 
acter as  went  to  the  framing  of  our  National  Con- 
stitution in  1787;  such  deliberation  as  then  went 
to  the  framing  of  our  different  State  Constitu- 
tions. It  would  be  expecting  altogether  too  much, 
even  with  our  rapid  modem  processes  of  thought 
and  action,  that  tliis  American  people  should  be 
agreed  in  advance,  as  to  the  form  and  details  of 
the  reorganization  which  we  require.  But  the  evi- 
dence is  to  my  mind  very  clear  and  conclusive, 
that  the  need  of  reorganization  of  some  kind, 
thorough  and  fundamental,  has  already  become  a 
matter  of  general  conviction. 

Whenever  a  people  invents,  and  adopts,  a 
phrase,  a  name,  then  we  may  be  certain  that  that 
people  realizes  the  practical  existence  of  the  tiling 
for  which  the  name  stands. 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION    207 

This  American  people  has  now  long  used  the 
name  "  machine  pohtics."  It  has  now  long  recog- 
nized the  fact,  that  the  fundamental  practical  diffi- 
culty, which  always  stands  in  the  way  of  the  honest 
and  efficient  doing  of  public  work,  is  "machine 
poKtics."  The  ordinary  daily  expression  is,  that 
in  order  to  have  any  piece  of  public  work  really 
done  well,  it  must  be  "  taken  out  of  politics." 

Moreover,  it  is  the  common  conviction  of  that 
fact,  among  intelligent  men,  that  constitutes  to- 
day the  force  which  keeps  the  most  valuable 
men  in  the  community  "out  of  politics."  They 
are  well  aware,  that  they  cannot  go  into  the  pub- 
lic service  on  the  same  basis  on  which  they  stand 
in  private  callings.  In  the  private  callings,  as  a 
rule,  in  the  long  run,  honest,  efficient  work  of  the 
highest  kind  brings  a  man  reasonably  large  re- 
wards, in  money  and  reputation.  But  more  than 
that,  work  of  the  highest  order  brings  promo- 
tion. That  condition  does  not  exist  in  pubUc  life. 
In  public  life,  any  man  who  wishes  poHtical  ad- 
vancement must  do  the  bidding  of  the  machine 
poHticians.  To  the  people  he  can  give  fine  phrases, 
"sounding  and  glittering  generalities,"  protesta- 
tions of  devotion  to  all  that  is  respectable  and 
reputable.  But  he  must  not  be  independent.  He 
must  be  submissive  to  the  election  machine. 


208  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

This  condition  of  affairs  exists  to-day  in  this 
country  everywhere,  through  our  entire  political 
life;  throughout  our  local,  state,  and  national 
governments.  It  is  the  general  consciousness  of 
that  fact,  which  is  indicated  by  the  phrase  "ma- 
chine politics." 

Therein  is  the  answer  to  the  first  of  our  three 
questions. 

Second:  Is  such  reorganization  demanded  by 
the  community's  financial  and  industrial  inter- 
ests? 

All  business  interests  are  more  or  less  exposed 
to  the  action  of  public  oflScials.  Taxation,  alone, 
affords  the  means  of  striking  every  large  property 
interest  in  the  community.  The  tariff,  our  sys- 
tem of  duties  on  imports,  affords  the  means  of 
striking  the  large  majority  of  our  large  commer- 
cial interests.  The  question  of  the  currency,  in 
its  main  features,  seems  at  last  to  have  been  put 
on  a  basis  secure  against  assault.  But  questions 
of  taxation,  and  of  the  tariff,  have  now  been 
used  for  many  years  as  the  regular  daily  means 
for  compelling  large  money  payments  to  the  ma- 
chine pohticians.  The  payments  are  veiled  under 
the  form  of  voluntary  contributions  to  the  "legiti- 
mate expenses"  of  the  two  political  parties.  But 
as  matter  of  fact  and  substance,  these  contribu- 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION    209 

tions  are  forced  levies,  to  pay  for  official  action, 
which  will  inure  to  the  benefit  of  favored  private 
interests.  Capitalists  and  business  men,  the  large 
majority  of  them,  do  not  wish  conditions  of  cor- 
ruption. They  do  not  wish  to  be  compelled  to 
purchase  protection  against  the  action  of  legis- 
lative and  other  officials  by  the  payment  of  money. 
But  they  are  compelled  to  submit  to  existing  con- 
ditions. The  machine  poUticians  control  legisla- 
tion and  the  action  of  taxing  officials;  and  they 
use  their  power  to  compel  the  payment  of  large 
revenues.  The  amount  of  those  revenues  no  one 
can  know.  But  the  figures  are  very  large.  They 
are  of  many  millions. 

But  there  is  still  another  feature  of  the  situa- 
tion; that  is,  the  element  of  uncertainty  and  dis- 
trust that  is  brought  into  the  business  world  by 
these  quadrennial  presidential  elections,  arising 
from  the  possibiUty  of  large  changes  in  the  finan- 
cial policy  of  the  national  government,  which  may 
come  from  changes  in  the  personahty  of  the  houses 
of  Congress,  and  our  chief  administrative  officials. 

Once  in  four  years  we  have  a  national  revolu- 
tion. No  business  man  can  tell  what  will  be  its 
result.  For  aught  he  can  know,  there  may  be 
injected  into  our  national  councils  a  mass  of  new, 
ignorant,  untrained  men,  who  will  inaugurate  a 


210  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

volume  of  crazy,  crack-brained  legislation,  which 
will  involve  a  complete  disarrangement  of  existing 
business  conditions.  The  result  is  a  feeling  of  doubt 
and  uncertainty  in  the  business  world,  for  several 
months  before  each  presidential  election,  which 
has  at  times  operated  almost  as  a  complete  stop- 
page of  trade  and  commerce  in  many  branches. 

A  few  years  since,  one  of  our  leading  newspa- 
pers printed  a  series  of  interviews  with  leading 
New  York  business  men,  on  the  money  damage  to 
the  country's  business  interests  caused  by  these 
periodic  presidential  elections.  A  few  extracts  will 
be  given  from  them. 

The  President  of  one  of  our  largest  railroads  said: 

"The  cost  to  the  country  of  the  Presidential  election 
is  almost  incalculable.  It  has  jar  exceeded  anything  ever 
dreamed  of  hj  the  founders  of  the  constitution,  and  accu- 
mulates with  each  election. 


"Here  are  figures  for  you. 

"It  is  an  underestimate,  that  the  national  commit- 
tees will  spend  a  half  million  of  dollars  each,  and  indi- 
viduals as  much  more.  This  money  goes  in  the  direct 
work  of  the  canvass,  printing,  speakers,  workers,  and 
the  aged  and  infirm  voter  business.  Then  the  uniformed 
companies,  with  their  music,  halls,  transportations,  and 
so  on  will  use  up  not  less  than  four  million  dollars  more. 

"There  are  frequent  suspensions  of  various  industries 
and  a  general  check  upon  expansion  and  enterprise.    Mill 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION    211 

owners  and  merchants  keep  close  within  necessary 
demands,  waiting  for  the  policy  which  the  result  may 
determine.  Neio  enterprises  halt  and  partially  completed 
ones  go  slow.  The  internal  business  of  the  country  which 
would  be  done  in  the  four  months  of  the  Presidential 
campaign  would  amount  to  about  $5,000,000,000  under 
normal  conditions.  Ten  per  cent  of  this  is  stopped  owing 
to  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  effect  upon  trade  of  the  dif- 
ferent policies  of  the  parties  and  the  doubt  of  the  result. 

"The  Presidency  of  the  United  States  is  a  business, 
like  every  other  thing.  If  the  President  has  not  had  suf- 
ficient opportunities  for  study  and  experience,  I  should 
say  that  for  the  first  three  years  of  his  term  he  is  going 
to  school,  and  as  he  must  act  while  he  is  learning,  the 
country  and  its  commercial  interests  are  necessarily  the 
victims  of  his  experiments." 

The  then  President  of  the  New  York  Chamber 
of  Commerce  said :  — 

"The  agitation  consequent  upon  a  Presidential  cam- 
paign always  decreases  and  disarranges  commerce;  and 
if  commerce  suffers,  every  pursuit  and  profession,  with 
the  single  exception  of  the  newspapers,  is  similarly  af- 
fected, and  it  is  perhaps  a  question  if  what  the  news- 
papers gain  by  an  increased  circulation  in  a  general 
election  is  not  lost  by  the  lessened  ability  of  commercial 
men  to  support  their  ordinary  amount  of  advertising. 

"Aside  from  the  absolutely  necessary  and  what  should 
be  unnecessary  expenses  incident  to  a  general  election, 
which  probably  exceed  a  million  of  dollars  in  a  city  like 
New  York,  it  is  a  moderate  estimate  to  conclude  that  mer- 
chants in  general  are  subjected  to  a  loss  of  ten  per  cent 


212  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

iipon  the  profits  of  the  six  months'  business  during  the 
Presidential  campaign,  and  this  takes  no  account  of  the 
loss  of  valuable  time  which  every  good  citizen  now  gives 
or  should  give  to  political  affairs. 

"Besides,  what  commerce  demands  is  stability;  un- 
certainty is  disastrous.  Revolutionary  changes  are  fatal 
to  business;  even  salutary  reforms  in  business  matters 
should  not  be  sudden  or  violent.  Festina  lente  should 
be  the  motto." 

The  President  of  another  large  railroad  company 
said :  — 

"I  am  no  man  at  figures,  and  therefore  I  can't  tell 
you  what  is  the  actual  cost  to  the  country  of  a  Presi- 
dential election.  But  I  will  tell  you  that  the  loss  to  busi- 
ness interests  is  very  large.  No  matter  which  party  event- 
ually is  successful,  the  preparations  for  the  struggle  and 
the  doubt  and  anxiety  surrounding  the  result  are  sure 
to  have  a  deleterious  effect  upon  the  affairs  of  the  entire 
community.  A  Presidential  election  occurring  every  four 
years  does  a  great  deal  of  harm,  from  which  it  takes  the 
country  a  long  time  to  recover." 

The  President  of  the  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Company  said:  — 

"I  have  repeatedly  said  during  the  last  twenty  years, 
that  I  believed  it  cost  the  country  more  to  make  a  Presi- 
dent than  it  costs  to  run  the  government  during  a  four 
years'  administration,  leaving  out  of  account,  of  course, 
the  item  of  interest  on  the  public  debt.  This  may  be  a 
large  estimate,  but,  when  all  the  estimates  of  cost  to  the 
country  arc  taken  into  consideration,  I  still  believe  that 
it  would  be  fully  sustained. 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION    213 

"This  year  was  the  first  time  that  I  have  seen  an 
election  for  President,  a  Governor  and  State   oflScers, 
for  Mayor  and  city  and  county  officers,  all  coming  on 
the  same  day  and  the  votes  for  all  deposited  at  the  same 
time.    The  necessary  effect  of  all  these  elections  com- 
ing at  the  same  time  is  to  increase  the  power  of  machine 
politics  and  paralyze  independent  voting.      The  number 
of  officers  to  be  elected,  and  the  number  of  voters  who  are 
looking  for  favors  from  some  one  or  other  of  them,  give 
power  to  the  machine  to  hold  a  strict  rein  on  party  lines, 
and  mark  and  punish   every  bolt  in  the  direction  of 
independence.     We  have  here,  in  our  telegraph  system, 
the  best  barometer  in  the  world  as  to  the  effect  of  Presi- 
dential elections  upon  business.     We  know  of  the  dis- 
turbance they  occasion  throughout  the  entire  mercantile 
community  better  than  any  one  else,  and  I  can  tell  you 
the  effects  are  tremendous.    With  ourselves  it  does  not 
make  so  much  difference,  for  we  largely  make  up  from 
poHtical  sources  and  the  newspapers  the  falling  off  in 
the  volume  of  commercial  business  done  over  our  wires. 
The  mass  of  telegraphic  political  correspondence  and 
press  despatches  is  enormous.    But  it  is  vastly  different 
in  commercial  life.    In  many  branches  of  buMness  there 
is  almost  complete  stagnation  for  a  long  time  before  and 
for  quite  a  while  after  Presidential  eledimis.    Even  now 
trade  is  only  beginning  to  show  signs  of  returning  ani- 
mation in  many  quarters." 

These  opinions  cannot  be  successfully  contro- 
verted. They  are  statements  of  actual  existing 
conditions,  from  practical  business  men.  These 
conditions  are  due  to  our  system  of  perpetual  peri- 
odic revolution. 


214  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

These  revolutions  inflict  severe  money  loss  not 
on  the  capitalists  alone,  but  on  the  entire  com- 
munity. Whatever  interferes,  periodically  and  per- 
manently, with  the  conduct  of  our  large  business 
enterprises,  touches  the  income  and  earnings  of 
every  workingman,  whether  he  works  with  liis 
hands  or  his  head.  The  capitalist,  the  employer, 
may  be  the  one  who  feels  the  injury  most  directly 
in  the  first  instance.  But  the  injury  does  not  stop 
with  him.  In  the  end,  those  who  suffer  most  are 
the  poor  and  weak.  The  rich  and  strong  can  en- 
dure their  losses.  The  most  severe  sufferers  are  the 
employees,  so-called,  who  are  dependent  on  their 
regular  wages  for  their  daily  support. 

As  to  this  point,  then,  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
that  reorganization  is  imperatively  demanded  by 
all  the  financial  and  business  interests  of  the  com- 
munity. 

We  come,  then,  to  our  next  question. 

Third:  Is  it  possible,  to-day,  to  combine  all 
the  forces  of  the  community,  the  politicians  and 
the  people,  in  an  effort  for  reorganization  ? 

That  depends,  mainly,  on  the  answer  to  an- 
other question:  Is  it  for  the  interest,  for  the  mere 
money  interest,  of  the  entire  community,  of  the 
politicians  as  well  as  the  people,  that  we  should 
have  such  reorganization  ? 


THE  NECESSITY  OF   REORGANIZATION    215 

My  answer  to  this  question  is,  that  it  is  most 
decidedly  for  the  common  interest,  for  the  mere 
money  interest,  of  the  entire  community  —  of  the 
"machine  politicians"  as  well  as  the  people — to 
put  an  end,  at  once,  finally  and  forever,  to  this 
system  of  perpetual  periodic  revolution. 

The  "machine  politicians"  are  themselves  the 
greatest  sufferers  from  present  conditions.  They 
would  be  the  men  who  would  be  most  directly, 
most  immediately,  and  most  largely  benefited  by 
the  proposed  reorganization.  The  reorganization 
can,  too,  be  easily  given  such  a  form,  in  my  opin- 
ion, as  to  enlist  their  earnest  support. 

Let  us  see  how  this  is. 

Let  us  take  first  the  case  of  the  national  govern- 
ment. Suppose  we  were  to  make  our  reorganiza- 
tion take  this  form:  Consohdate  the  two  houses 
of  Congress,  with  their  existing  membership,  in  a 
single  popular  assembly.  Abolish  the  term  limita- 
tion for  those  present  members;  give  to  the  result- 
ing popular  assembly,  the  power  of  removal  of  the 
President  by  a  two-thirds  vote.  Take  away  at  the 
same  time  their  power  over  appointments.  Have 
subsequent  elections  of  new  members,  and  of  a 
President,  whenever  there  shall  be  vacancies,  and 
not  otherwise. 

There  is  at  least  a  possibility,  if  not  a  probabil- 


216  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ity,  that  such  a  scheme  would  secure  the  support 
of  the  existing  members  of  Congress  of  both  par- 
ties. For  it  would  practically  secure  them  their 
present  places  for  a  considerable,  and  indefinite, 
period.  The  present  members  of  Congress  com- 
prise the  most  powerful  men  in  both  the  great 
"  parties,"  from  all  parts  of  the  nation.  The  power 
of  such  a  combination  of  men  is  beyond  estimate. 

We  may  at  once  assume,  that  even  the  power 
of  such  a  combination  of  men  would  be  unequal 
to  the  accomplishment  of  so  great  a  change  in 
our  political  system,  unless  the  change  were  really 
for  the  best  interests  of  the  entire  people.  If, 
however,  the  change  were,  in  fact,  for  the  best 
interests  of  the  entire  people,  then  there  would 
be  a  strong  possibility  —  to  say  the  least  —  of 
carrying  it  through,  with  such  combined  support. 

The  final  question  then  is,  would  a  change  of 
our  national  government,  in  that  form,  be  for  the 
best  interests  of  this  entire  people  ? 

My  answer  is,  that  it  would. 

The  first  and  chief  point  would  be,  that  we 
should  at  once  make  those  members  of  Congress 
free  and  independent.  We  should  at  once  make 
it  possible  for  them  to  give  us  their  best  work 
without  fear  of  the  election  machine.  That  would 
be,  of  itself,  an  immense  advance. 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION    217 

This  plan  would  have  another  great  advan- 
tage. It  would  meet  the  views  of  the  conservative 
element  in  the  nation,  by  removing  all  danger  of 
any  sudden  revolutionary  interference  with  existing 
financial  and  industrial  conditions.  The  Senate, 
with  its  existing  membership,  would  be  a  compo- 
nent part  of  the  newly  organized  Congress.  That 
would  be  an  ample  security  against  any  violent  or 
sweeping  interference  with  large  vested  financial 
and  industrial  interests. 

This  plan,  too,  would  proceed  on  the  basis  here- 
tofore indicated,  of  accomplishing  a  revolution  in 
methods,  and  not  in  men. 

Whenever  such  a  change  should  be  made,  we 
must  take  our  chances  with  men.  We  have  to  take 
those  chances  now.  Even  now,  the  regular  daily 
control  of  national  affairs  is  in  the  hands  of  those 
men  who  are  now  in  Congress. 

Such  a  change  would  give  us  a  great  improve- 
ment over  existing  conditions.  The  men  now  in 
power  are,  upon  the  whole,  a  better  body  of  men 
with  whom  to  begin  our  new  experiment,  than 
any  other  body  whom  we  could  reasonably  ex- 
pect to  get.  For  they  already  have  considerable 
knowledge  of  public  affairs,  and  have  experi- 
ence. This  will  always  be  the  case.  Certainly  our 
present  system  of  popular  election  does  not  from 


218  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

year  to  year  tend  to  give  any  improvement  in 
the  quality  of  our  representatives  in  Congress. 
But  after  all  is  said,  our  chief  practical  difficulty 
in  obtaining  honest  and  efficient  administration, 
even  under  existing  conditions,  lies  in  the  con- 
trol of  our  members  of  Congress,  and  our  chief 
executives,  by  the  machine  politicians.  Our  pre- 
sent congressmen  —  practically  all  of  them  — 
are  men  of  ability  decidedly  above  the  average. 
A  large  number  of  them  are  men  of  really  large 
capacity,  who  would  be  able  to  give  us  excellent 
work,  if  we  only  gave  them  time,  and  freedom. 
The  thing  which  we  must  accomplish,  is  a  change 
of  methods.  Perpetual  periodic  changes  of  men 
—  that  we  have  tried  now  for  many  years.  We 
have  now  made  a  prolonged  and  thorough  test 
of  the  process  of  continuous  periodic  revolution. 
We  have  learned  by  actual  experience  its  out- 
side practical  possibilities.  We  no  longer  need 
to  depend  on  theory.  The  men  in  power  to-day 
are  as  good  as  any  that  we  have  any  reasonable 
chance  of  getting  under  our  present  system.  It 
is  a  virtual  certainty,  that  these  men  will  give  us 
better  work,  if  we  give  them  time,  and  freedom, 
than  will  be  possible  under  present  conditions. 
It  is  a  virtual  certainty,  that  a  change  of  system, 
retaining  these  men  now  in  office,  will  give  us  bet- 


THE   NECESSITY  OF  REORGANIZATION   219 

ter  practical  results  than  these  repeated  changes  of 
men,  which  constitute  our  outside  possibility  under 
our  present  form  of  governmental  organization. 

Sooner  or  later,  we  must  make  a  change  in 
methods.  We  cannot  long  permit  existing  condi- 
tions. The  drain  on  all  the  community's  forces,  on 
its  time,  its  labor,  its  money,  is  wholly  needless, 
and  is  fast  approaching  the  limits  of  endurance. 
We  had  best  make  the  change  at  once,  even  if  we 
take  some  chances  of  partial  failure.  The  men 
now  in  power  in  our  national  government,  if 
they  are  made  secure  in  their  places,  will  have  the 
largest  possible  inducement  to  give  us  their  best 
work.  The  bad  work  that  we  get  from  them,  even 
now,  is  due  rather  to  their  lack  of  freedom,  than 
to  any  bad  intentions  on  their  part.  Those  same 
men  will  do  better  under  new  conditions,  than  new 
men  under  conditions  now  existing. 

Freedom,  independence,  coupled  with  respon- 
sibility, is  the  essential  condition  of  faithful  and 
efficient  public  service.  If  we  make  our  public 
servants  free,  and  independent,  at  the  same  time 
having  adequate  security  for  the  enforcement 
of  oflScial  responsibility,  the  able  men  in  our  na- 
tional legislature,  of  whom  there  are  many,  will 
speedily  come  to  the  front,  will  take  control  of 
the  situation,  and  will  purify  our  national  admin- 


220  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

istration.  We  cannot  get  purity  from  stagnation. 
Nor  can  we  get  healthy,  vigorous  action  from  men 
in  fetters.  In  any  event,  we  must  trust  men.  We 
can  trust  them  all  the  better,  if  we  give  them  a 
free  head,  and  a  free  hand. 

A  like  method  of  reorganization  could  be  used 
for  our  different  state  and  municipal  governments. 
In  every  case  our  effort  should  be,  to  effect  a 
permanent  revolution  in  methods,  in  the  place  of 
these  perpetual  revolutions  in  men;  and  to  enlist, 
so  far  as  we  can,  the  support  of  the  machine  politi- 
cians in  accomplishing  that  revolution. 


CHAPTER  V 

GENERAL   CONSIDERATIONS. 

Government  is  the  agency,  on  which  we  depend 
for  the  security  of  life,  liberty,  and  property;  for 
all  that  makes  life  worth  living;  for  the  safety  of 
the  individual;  for  securing  to  the  individual  the 
possibility  of  developing  himself,  on  his  own  lines, 
working  out  his  own  career,  making  the  most  of 
his  own  powers,  in  short,  living  his  own  life. 

In  the  last  century  we  have  heard  much  of 
individuaUsm ;  of  individualism  as  opposed  to 
authority;  especially  the  authority  of  government. 
It  has  been  hastily  assumed,  that  there  was  a 
necessity  of  opposition  between  the  two. 

That  is  an  error.  Individualism  cannot  exist,  that 
is,  it  cannot  exist  in  full  force  and  virtue,  without 
the  authority  and  protection  of  government.  More- 
over, the  authority  of  government  must  be  backed 
by  force  —  by  the  power  of  the  entire  community. 
That  force  and  power  must  be  exercised  by  the 
community's  wisest  heads. 

So,  too,  as  to  freedom.     Freedom  cannot  have 


222  ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY 

an  existence,  without  the  protection  of  the  law. 
That  protection  it  cannot  have  without  govern- 
ment. Government  cannot  do  its  whole  duty,  can- 
not adequately  serve  its  ends,  unless  it  be  strong 
—  unless,  too,  it  acts  with  vigor  and  speed,  and  at 
the  same  time,  with  wisdom.  It  must  embody  the 
force  of  the  entire  community  in  a  single  hand. 
That  hand  must  be  guided,  and  controlled,  by  a 
single  brain,  and  a  single  will  —  the  brain  and 
will  of  the  entire  people. 

We  must  abandon,  finally,  the  primitive  idea, 
that  "government  by  the  people"  means  govern- 
ment by  everybody;  or  government  by  average 
ordinary  men  taking  turns,  rotatory  government. 
Rotatory  government  is  not  democracy.  Neither 
is  democracy  mass  rule.  Mass  rule  is  mob  rule. 
Rotatory  government  is  "machine  politics."  No 
sane  man  advocates  the  rule  of  the  mob.  But 
that  is  what  we  must  have,  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  unless  we  have  genuine  government  by  the 
people,  acting  through  men  carefully  selected.  Se- 
lection, selection  of  the  fittest,  is  the  essence  of 
wise  and  eflScient  government  —  the  essence  of 
democracy. 

Democratic  institutions  have  come  into  ex- 
istence for  practical  reasons.  They  have  been  the 
result  of  the  efforts  of  practical  men;    of  efforts 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  223 

to  devise  political  machinery  which  will  give  us 
better  practical  results  than  can  be  attained  from 
any  hereditary  system.  Hereditary  systems  have 
been  tested  in  many  forms.  They  always  have 
been,  and  always  must  be,  failures.  Especially, 
they  are  quite  inadequate  to  deal  with  our  large 
modem  social  forces. 

Democratic  institutions,  however,  as  before 
stated,  have  not  yet  been  made  a  final  success. 
They  are  still  in  their  experimental  stages.  Prior 
to  the  experiment  in  our  own  great  political  lab- 
oratory, initiated  in  1787,  they  had  never  been 
tried  on  any  large  scale.  Up  to  that  time,  efforts 
at  popular  government  had  in  the  main  been 
limited  to  single  cities,  to  small  separate  com- 
munities. Our  experiment  of  1787  was  the  first 
in  the  world's  history,  wherein  the  attempt  had 
been  made  to  weld  together  in  one  democratic 
organism  large  independent  communities,  with 
large  territories,  and  large  populations. 

The  men  who  inaugurated  that  experiment 
were  far  from  sanguine  as  to  its  results.  Some  of 
them  were  pessimistic  to  an  extreme.  They  feared, 
that  the  attempt  to  establish  a  supreme  national 
government  would  result  in  a  new  tyranny. 

Time,  however,  has  now  demonstrated  the 
possibility    of    operating    democratic    institutions 


224  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

on  a  large  scale,  governing  by  their  agency  large 
territories,  and  large  populations. 

Nevertheless,  this  first  experiment  in  demo- 
cracy on  a  large  scale  has  developed  working 
defects  in  the  forms  of  political  machinery  hith- 
erto in  use.  Especially,  it  has  developed  defects 
in  the  machinery  for  securing  the  formation,  and 
the  supremacy,  of  the  will,  and  the  judgment, 
of  the  people.  We  thought  to  have  government, 
of  the  people,  by  the  people,  for  the  people.  Our 
practical  result  —  thus  far  —  is  tyranny,  of  the 
people,  by  the  election  machine,  for  the  election 
machine. 

Organization  is  as  much  a  necessity  in  gov- 
ernments, as  in  all  collections  of  men,  wherein 
combined  common  action  is  to  be  taken  by  men 
in  large  numbers.  The  larger  the  numbers,  the 
greater  the  necessity  of  organization.  Without 
organization,  a  "people"  becomes  a  mob. 

We  are  to-day  confronted  with  an  alternative, 
between  a  continuance  of  our  futile  attempt  at  mass 
rule  and  the  establishment  of  organized  democracy. 
From  that  alternative  there  is  no  escape. 

Our  experience  has  now  taught  us,  that  the  prac- 
tical result  of  any  system  of  periodic  popular  elec- 
tion is  to  put  government  in  the  hands  of  a  body 
of  men  who  make  vote  hunting  and  place  hunting 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  225 

a  trade;  who  buy  and  sell  votes,  oflBces,  and  offi- 
cial action,  as  articles  of  merchandise,  for  money. 
The  theory  is,  that  the  supreme  power  in  the  state 
is  the  will  of  the  people.  The  actual  practical 
result  is,  that  the  supreme  power  in  the  state 
is  money. 

Our  existing  conditions  can  be  obviated,  and 
avoided,  only  by  right  organization.  That  organ- 
ization must  take  such  form  as  to  make  it  possible 
for  the  people  to  select  fit  men  to  be  the  head  of 
the  body  politic,  and  to  keep  them  there;  to  train 
them  in  the  school  of  experience;  to  give  them 
time  to  accomplish  substantial  results,  to  show  the 
stuff  they  are  made  of;  to  use  them  so  long  as  they 
are  individually  and  separately  fit  for  their  indi- 
vidual separate  work;  to  change  them  singly,  as 
such  changes  become  necessary;  to  promote  men 
from  the  ranks,  as  they  show  themselves  fit  for 
promotion;  to  retire  and  pension  our  pubhc  ser- 
vants, when  they  have  served  us  faithfully  for  a 
sufficiently  long  time.  In  short,  we  must  so  reor- 
ganize our  pohtical  system  as  to  bring  the  people's 
brains  to  the  top;  to  give  free  play  to  the  normal 
natural  pohtical  forces,  to  the  forces  of  mental 
gravitation.  Gravitation,  in  things  of  the  mind, 
works  upward.  Brains  are  hke  cream.  They  rise 
to  the  top.     But  perpetual  stirring  of  the  political 


226  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

caldron  makes  it  impossible  for  the  cream  to  rise. 
In  short,  conditions  of  perpetual  revolution  make 
impossible  the  operation  of  the  regular  political 
forces,  after  normal  natural  methods.  We  must 
put  an  end  to  this  process  of  perpetual  periodic 
revolution.  We  must  establish  the  supremacy 
of  the  judgment  and  the  will  of  the  people.  We 
must  put  an  end  to  the  supremacy  of  the  election 
machine. 

That  is  a  thing  quite  within  our  political  possi- 
bilities, with  the  new  light  that  we  have  acquired 
from  our  experience  in  the  last  century.  It  is  quite 
practicable  for  us,  to-day,  to  install  a  new  form  of 
political  machinery ;  or,  to  speak  with  more  accu- 
racy, to  do  a  work  of  reconstruction,  and  reorganiza- 
tion, in  the  development  of  democratic  institutions. 

The  tendency  in  democratic  development  is, 
distinctly  and  unmistakably,  towards  the  adoption 
of  the  popular  assembly  as  the  organ  of  supreme 
control  in  the  body  politic;  an  organ  having  its 
own  continuous  life;  with  a  steady  continuous 
outflow  of  old  blood;  a  steady  continuous  slough- 
ing off  of  old  fibre;  and  a  corresponding  continuous 
inflow  of  new  blood,  and  growth  of  new  fibre  in 
place  of  old. 

A  really  representative  popular  assembly,  se- 
lected by  a  free  process  of  popular  election,  is  now 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  227 

easily  within  our  political  possibilities.  Give  us  a 
process  of  really  free  popular  election,  allow  the 
citizens  in  each  constituency  to  have  the  use  of  that 
process  in  the  selection  of  the  individual  members 
of  the  popular  assembly,  and  we  shall  have  as 
near  to  a  certainty  as  we  can  get  in  human  affairs, 
that  that  assembly  will  be  composed  of  men,  each 
one  of  whom  will  be  a  man  of  exceptional  ability, 
of  exceptional  integrity,  of  sound  judgment,  and 
closely  in  touch  with  the  interests  of  his  own  dis- 
trict. We  shall  have  as  near  to  a  certainty  as  we 
can  get  in  human  affairs,  that  that  assembly  will  be 
composed  of  men  of  all  shades  of  opinion,  on  the 
important  questions  of  the  day.  Such  a  body  of 
men,  while  its  action  will  not  be  perfect,  will  be 
the  best  body  of  men  available,  for  forming  wise 
judgments  on  the  management  of  our  daily  public 
interests. 

In  trusting  the  supreme  control  of  public  affairs 
to  such  a  body  of  men,  we  shall  not  place  our 
dependence  on  the  ability  and  integrity  of  any 
single  man,  or  of  any  small  number  of  men.  Our 
dependence  will  be  on  the  ability  and  integrity  of 
the  entire  body,  composed  of  men  selected  by  the 
severe  process  of  the  deliberations  of  an  electoral 
college  or  convention  —  recnforced  and  supported 
at  all  times  by  the  sunlight  of  pubhcity.  Of  course. 


228  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

we  must  assume,  that  at  times  single  individuals, 
even  if  selected  by  this  most  careful  of  processes, 
will  prove  false  to  their  trusts.  But  we  must  also 
assume,  that  it  will  seldom  happen,  that  any  large 
number  of  such  men  will  betray  the  interests  com- 
mitted to  their  charge.  It  is  now  an  old  truth,  that 
the  possession  of  power  brings  the  sense  of  respon- 
sibility. When  the  possessor  of  power  is  free,  is 
free  to  act  on  his  own  best  judgment,  if  he  is  placed 
in  the  focus  of  the  public  gaze,  we  have  the  strong- 
est security  practicable  for  wise  action.  In  a  repre- 
sentative popular  assembly,  of  reasonably  large 
numbers  of  men,  whose  tenure  of  office  does  not 
depend  on  money  or  votes,  we  shall  find  our  strong- 
est security,  not  for  action  that  will  be  perfect,  but 
for  action  that  will  be  the  best  available  from 
merely  human  agencies.  It  will  be  action  of  a  far 
higher  order  than  any  that  we  can  get  from  any 
assembly  of  men  who  are  selected  and  controlled 
by  the  election  machine. 

The  superiority  of  the  practical  results  obtain- 
able from  such  a  body  of  men  to  anytliing  that  it 
is  possible  for  us  to  get  from  our  present  state  and 
national  legislatures,  with  all  the  agencies  and 
influences  procurable  from  our  present  political 
system,  is  beyond  calculation.  The  power  on 
which  we  must  depend,  as  the  great  motive  power 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  229 

in  democratic  government,  is  the  power  of  free 
thought.  That  power  is  destroyed  by  the  election 
machine.  That  power  we  can  get,  and  use,  as  the 
regular  motive  force  in  the  body  politic,  only  when 
we  give  to  our  public  servants  full  and  complete 
freedom  —  while,  at  the  same  time,  we  insure  full 
responsibility  to  the  people,  directly  or  indirectly, 
on  the  part  of  every  single  public  official. 

The  term  "representative,"  when  used  in  this 
connection,  under  any  correct  theory  of  demo- 
cratic government,  means,  not  that  the  "repre- 
sentative," so  called,  is  to  "represent"  his  con- 
stituents' opinions ;  or  that  he  is  to  act  on  his 
constituents'  opinions;  but  that  he  is  to  act  for 
them,  as  their  attorney  or  agent,  on  his  own  best 
judgment;  that  he  is  to  take  part,  on  their  behalf, 
in  the  joint  deliberations  of  their  general  assem- 
bly; that  he  is  to  contribute  his  part,  in  the  shape 
of  his  own  best  thought,  to  those  deliberations; 
that  his  thought  is  to  be  free;  his  action  is  to  be 
free;  to  the  end,  that  the  thought  and  action  of 
the  entire  assembly  may  be  free.  So,  only,  will 
it  be  possible,  to  get  that  assembly's  wisest  action. 
So,  only,  will  it  be  possible,  to  get  the  wisest  prac- 
ticable action  of  "the  people,"  whom  that  assem- 
bly "represents,"  for  whom  it  acts.  The  citizens 
of  each  constituency  must   select   their   represen- 


230  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

tative,  not  because  he  "represents"  the  present 
opinions,  of  a  majority  of  the  citizens,  on  some 
few  public  questions,  which  have  a  deep  pubhc 
interest  at  that  particular  time.  They  must  select 
him  by  reason  of  his  own  personal  qualities;  his 
individual  calibre  and  character;  his  ability  to 
do  good  practical  work  in  the  deliberations  of  the 
popular  assembly;  to  do  good  service  in  enabling 
that  assembly  to  form  the  people's  wisest  judgment 
on  the  large  public  questions  of  the  future. 

"  Issues,"  and  "  platforms, "  always,  of  necessity, 
largely  concern  questions  of  the  past.  Or,  if  they 
concern  questions  of  the  present,  they  concern 
those  questions  in  relations  already  known.  More- 
over, they  are  always  vague  and  valueless.  But 
the  questions  on  which  our  popular  assembhes 
are  to  act  are  the  new  questions  of  the  future. 
Those  new  questions  of  the  future,  when  they 
come  up  for  action,  will  present  new  relations. 
They  will  arise  in  new  forms,  not  yet  known  and 
understood.  Those  questions  must  be  decided, 
under  the  new  conditions  of  the  future.  They 
must  be  decided  by  the  popular  assembly's  free 
thought,  by  its  best  judgment. 

Democracy's  chief  essential  feature  should  be 
the  supremacy  of  the  people's  brain,  the  popular 
assembly;  a  single  organ,  brought  into  being  by 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  231 

the  process  of  natural  selection,  the  selection  of 
single  men,  by  reason  of  their  special  fitness  for 
their  special  work. 

The  practical  result,  which  will  be  accomplished 
by  democracy  in  that  form,  that  is,  which  will 
be  accomplished  more  nearly  and  surely  than 
under  existing  conditions,  will  be  the  supremacy 
of  free  thought,  the  thought  of  the  whole  people. 
What  we  shall  get  will  be,  not  the  hasty  prejudice 
of  the  moment,  even  though  it  be  the  prejudice 
of  a  majority  of  the  entire  multitude;  but  the 
calm,  deliberate  judgment  of  the  entire  people, 
thinking  as  a  unit,  judging  as  a  unit,  acting  as  a 
unit. 

We  have  been  losing  sight  of  the  fundamental 
nature  of  the  process  of  joint  united  deUberation, 
by  a  people,  as  a  people.  We  have  been  confusing 
that  process  with  the  other  process,  of  making  a 
mere  enumeration  of  the  individual  prejudices, 
or,  if  you  please,  opinions  —  of  a  mere  majority 
of  the  citizens  in  mass.  The  processes  are  essen- 
tially different.  The  one  has  httle  or  no  practical 
value,  as  a  power  for  the  steady,  wise  control  of 
the  forces  of  a  large  community.  The  other  is  the 
best  process  that  can  be  devised,  so  long  as  human 
nature  remains  what  it  now  is,  for  forming  and 
uttering  the  judgment,  and  the  will,  of  a  people. 


232  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

thinking  and  acting  as  a  people,  and  not  as  a  mere 
affffresation  of  individuals. 

The  present  prevalent  idea  as  to  the  nature  of 
democracy  is,  that  it  means,  to  some  extent,  a  lack 
of  authority,  a  lack  of  control;  in  fact,  that  it 
means  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  license. 

Even  at  the  risk  of  repetition,  let  it  be  said,  de- 
mocracy means  something  far  different.  It  means, 
that  there  must  be  in  the  state  a  supreme  author- 
ity; a  power  of  supreme  control;  which  will  have 
greater  wisdom,  greater  strength,  and  greater  sta- 
bility, than  anything  practicable  under  any  other 
form  of  government.  At  the  same  time,  demo- 
cracy, rightly  organized,  will  give  a  more  perfect 
security  for  genuine  freedom,  than  government  in 
any  other  form.  Freedom,  in  any  correct  sense 
of  the  word,  cannot  exist  without  governmental 
control,  a  control  which  is  strong,  firm,  and  irre- 
sistible. If  every  man  is  free  to  do  as  he  wishes, 
the  result  will  be  constant  interference  with  the 
freedom  of  others.  Freedom  can  have  no  real  ex- 
istence, unless  it  be  freedom  for  all  the  individual 
members  of  the  community;  and  unless  that  free- 
dom for  all  be  equal.  In  order  to  secure  free- 
dom of  that  kind,  there  must  be  laws;  made,  and 
enforced,  by  some  common  supreme  authority. 
That  authority  must  be  the  government.    Govern- 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  233 

merit,  whenever  necessary,  must  use  force,  all  the 
force  that  is  necessary,  to  compel  complete  obedi- 
ence to  those  laws.  Without  force,  wliich  can  be 
so  used,  government  has  no  practical  value.  Demo- 
cratic government,  in  its  more  finished  form,  will 
be  a  government  wherein  the  judgment  of  the 
people  is  the  final  supreme  authority,  and  in  which 
that  authority  is  backed  by  the  united  forces  of 
the  entire  community,  consolidated  under  a  single 
will,  the  will  of  the  people,  a  stronger  will  than 
the  will  of  any  one  man,  or  any  few  men.  Demo- 
cratic government  implies  a  higher  authority,  and 
a  higher  degree  of  strength,  than  government  of 
any  other  form. 

Good  government  is  the  fundamental  essential 
of  the  world's  healthy  Ufe;  of  the  life  of  every 
people,  and  every  individual.  The  functions  of 
government  are  constantly  growing;  they  are  be- 
coming, if  not  wider,  at  least  more  complex.  Edu- 
cation, the  care  of  the  poor  and  the  weak,  the 
management  of  the  public  highways,  the  regula- 
tion of  commerce,  the  protection  of  all  the  relations 
of  life,  upon  which  each  individual  depends  for 
his  fullest  individual  development,  and  the  fullest 
enjoyment  of  his  individual  rights  and  liberties  — 
all  these  fall  within  the  sphere  of  government. 
The   full   development,    and   the   most   complete 


234  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

happiness,  of  every  individual,  depend  on  having 
the  work  of  government  in  the  hands  of  able,  wise, 
and  experienced  men.  It  cannot  be  left  in  the 
hands  of  professional  politicians,  who  have  neither 
the  capacity,  the  knowledge,  or  the  training,  which 
are  absolutely  requisite,  if  these  large  public  in- 
terests are  to  be  handled  with  wisdom. 

Democratic  government,  rightly  organized,  will 
give  us  greater  efficiency  of  administration  than 
government  in  any  other  form.  It  has,  no  doubt, 
not  yet  been  fully  developed.  When,  however,  it 
is  fully  developed,  its  administrative  results  will  be 
as  much  superior  to  anything  previously  accom- 
plished, as  the  performances  of  the  steam  engine, 
the  telegraph,  and  the  telephone,  are  superior  to 
the  mechanical  results  of  the  earlier  centuries. 
We  can  make  as  great  advances  in  politics,  as 
we  have  in  our  industries.  Our  industrial  pro- 
gress, even  now,  is  the  marvel  of  the  world.  Our 
political  progress  can  be  no  less  so.  For  the  same 
reasons. 

The  reason  for  our  wonderful  industrial  pro- 
gress is  mainly  to  be  found  in  our  conditions  of 
industrial  freedom;  in  the  ease  with  which  men 
find  their  right  places;  the  ease  with  which  men 
of  merit  rise  to  the  top.  No  doubt,  we  owe  much 
to  our  large  areas  of  rich  virgin  soil;  to  our  variety 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  235 

of  climate;  to  our  stores  of  iron  and  coal;  to  our 
lakes  and  rivers,  which  have  so  facilitated  our 
solution  of  the  problems  of  transportation.  Much, 
too,  is  due  to  blood,  to  the  mental  and  physical 
vigor  of  what  we  call  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  still 
in  this  country  the  dominant  race.  Nevertheless, 
the  combination  of  all  these  great  advantages  is 
not  sufficient  to  account  for  our  industrial  results, 
which  are  to-day  the  marvel  of  the  civiUzed  world. 
Their  main  cause  is  to  be  found  in  our  conditions 
of  industrial  freedom.  In  our  private  business  call- 
ings, every  individual  has  a  full  opportunity  of 
rising  to  that  place  in  the  world  for  which  he  is 
fit;  to  a  position  as  high  as  his  abilities  can  take 
him.  The  entire  industrial  world  is  open  to  him. 
The  possibility  of  rising  to  the  top,  the  possibility 
of  achieving  a  large  success,  is  the  spur  in  the  side 
of  the  young  men,  who  are  seeking  their  fortunes  in 
the  industrial  world.  The  certainty,  that  indus- 
trial brains  will  bring  industrial  leadership,  there 
is  the  great  stimulus  to  our  industrial  activity,  and 
the  chief  cause  of  our  industrial  success. 

In  the  world  of  industry,  too,  we  have,  not  only 
freedom  of  development,  and  movement,  but  we 
have  freedom  of  industrial  thought.  Old  methods 
are  compelled  to  face  new  ones;  to  vindicate  their 
right  to  survival,  in  the  free  competition  of  indus- 


236  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

trial  ideas.  In  our  industrial  world,  barring  the 
tariff,  freedom  of  thought  and  action  are  prac- 
tically without  limitation. 

For  a  time  we  had  the  same  kind  of  freedom  in 
our  political  world.  Until  the  later  and  more  per- 
fect development  of  the  election  machine,  there 
was  always  the  possibility  —  that  any  young  man 
of  large  mental  capacity,  who  "  went  into  pohtics," 
as  the  phrase  is,  would  get  legitimate  advancement, 
by  a  legitimate  use  of  the  same  methods  that  would 
secure  him  advancement  in  any  private  business 
or  profession;  that  is,  by  honest  hard  work  in  the 
line  of  his  special  calling.  To  satisfy  one  of  the 
accuracy  of  this  statement,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
read  the  biographies  of  our  statesmen  of  the  ear- 
lier half  of  the  last  century.  Brains  then  brought 
to  their  possessor  the  same  kind  of  preferment  in 
public  life,  that  was  gained  by  the  use  of  brains 
in  the  private  callings. 

No  doubt,  brains,  such  as  they  are,  are  still 
required  in  the  profession  of  "  politics  "  as  it  exists 
to-day.  But  it  would  hardly  be  contended,  that  the 
conditions  which  insure  success  in  "  politics  "  to-day 
are  the  same  with  those  which  insured  that  success 
a  hundred  years  ago.  Money  was  no  doubt  a  power 
in  politics  in  the  earlier  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury.   But  it  was  not  such  a  power  as  it  is  now. 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  237 

Democracy  has,  for  its  first  fundamental  essen- 
tial, political  freedom.  Every  individual  citizen 
should  have  the  full  and  free  opportunity  of  rising 
to  that  place  in  the  public  service  to  which  his 
abilities  entitle  him;  and  of  rising  to  that  position 
by  the  use  of  legitimate  methods,  by  faithful  pub- 
lic service.  Not  only  is  that  opportunity  the  right 
of  the  individual.  It  is  also  for  the  interest  of  the 
people.  The  people  needs  for  its  service  its  best 
brains.  It  needs  its  best  men.  It  is  absurd  in  the 
extreme,  to  suppose  that  our  vast  public  interests 
can  be  well  handled  by  men  of  only  ordinary  capa- 
city, and  ordinary  experience.  The  men  for  the 
people's  service  must  be  its  best.  The  best  brains 
in  the  community  must  have  the  possibility  of  ris- 
ing in  our  public  service  to  the  highest  places. 

There  we  strike  the  essential  fundamental  vice 
of  our  present  system  of  machine  politics.  Men 
cannot  rise  to  the  highest  places  in  the  state  by 
the  legitimate  use  of  their  brains.  The  supremacy 
of  brains  and  character  in  the  state  is  an  impossi- 
bility —  with  any  system  of  machine  politics.  The 
practical  difficulty  is,  that,  with  machine  politics, 
we  do  not,  and  cannot,  have  free  elections;  the 
people  cannot  make  its  own  free  choice  of  the  men 
who  are  to  hold  the  places  at  the  head.  Many 
thoughtful  men  have  come  to  distrust  the  process 


238  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

of  popular  election,  as  a  process  for  getting  men 
of  ability  and  character  in  the  public  service.  But 
our  elections  to-day  are  not  free.  The  process  of 
popular  election,  even  in  its  present  faulty  form, 
has  abundantly  vindicated  the  right  of  the  pro- 
cess to  our  confidence,  if  used  in  the  right  form, 
and  within  its  right  limits.  This  American  people, 
to-day,  the  citizens  in  our  large  cities,  as  well  as 
the  citizens  in  the  rural  districts,  the  vast  majority 
of  them,  are  agreed  on  one  thing:  they  wish  their 
public  affairs  to  be  in  the  hands  of  men  of  capacity 
and  character.  They  wish  something  more  than 
mere  ordinary,  average  men.  They  wish  the  best. 
They  will  elect  the  best,  if  they  have  a  process  of 
really  free  popular  election,  whereby  they  can  put 
their  heads  together;  can  confer,  deliberate,  and 
finally  form  their  own  common  judgment,  upon 
the  merits  of  candidates,  and  put  that  judgment 
into  effect  in  their  choice  of  their  public  servants. 
Freedom,  in  the  process  of  popular  election, 
with  the  limitation  of  that  process  to  its  legitimate 
function,  the  function  of  original  selection,  dis- 
continuing its  use,  or  rather  its  abuse,  in  the  futile 
attempt  at  the  enforcement  of  responsibility  to  the 
citizens  in  mass,  that  is  almost  the  sum  and  sub- 
stance of  our  present  political  needs.  That  is  the 
chief  feature  of  the  reorganization  here  suggested. 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  239 

But  in  order  to  secure  freedom  in  the  process 
of  popular  election,  we  must  abolish  the  secret 
ballot  and  the  term  system.  We  must  substitute 
in  their  place  the  public  meeting.  We  must  substi- 
tute tenure  at  the  will  of  the  people,  for  tenure  at 
the  will  of  the  election  machine. 

It  is  hopeless  to  take  refuge  in  any  less  funda- 
mental measure,  in  anything  less  than  fundamental 
organic  reconstruction.  We  must  deal  with  causes, 
not  Math  surface  symptoms.  We  must  have  a  ra- 
tional, common  sense,  practicable  political  system. 

The  election  machine  is  a  very  perfect  contriv- 
ance for  carrying  elections.  And  if  we  continue  to 
turn  government  into  one  vast  election  machine, 
then  it  may  be  conceded,  that  we  already  have 
nearly  as  good  an  apparatus  as  can  be  devised  — 
for  that  purpose.  Our  American  fertility  of  in- 
ventive genius  has  here  stood  us  in  good  stead. 
It  has  constructed  the  best  possible  machine  —  for 
the  work  to  be  done. 

If,  however,  government  is  to  be  something 
more  than  an  election  machine,  if  it  is  to  be  an 
organized  body  of  men  who  are  fitted  to  handle 
large  pubUc  interests  with  wisdom,  in  such  a  way 
as  will  best  serve  the  highest  interests  of  the  entire 
people,  then  we  must  have  something  far  different. 
Then  we  must  have,  at  the  head  of  each  body  poli- 


240  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

tic,  men  who  are  carefully  selected  for  their  work, 
doing  that  work  under  the  constant  supervision 
and  control  of  the  popular  assembly,  the  people's 
brain,  an  organ  composed  of  the  people's  best  fibre, 
selected  by  the  people's  own  judgment,  by  the  pro- 
cess of  popular  election,  which  is,  for  this  purpose, 
the  process  of  nature.  Nothing  less  will  meet  our 
needs. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  the  change  here  sug- 
gested would  create  an  aristocracy. 

So  it  would. 

Every  government  should  be,  so  far  as  is  prac- 
ticable, an  aristocracy;  a  government  by  the  peo- 
ple's best  men.  Democracy,  rightly  organized,  will 
be  an  elective  aristocracy.  By  this  it  is  not  meant, 
that  the  process  of  popular  election  is  absolutely 
certain,  in  every  instance,  to  select  the  very  best 
man  who  might  possibly  be  found  in  the  commu- 
nity by  the  use  of  infinite  knowledge,  and  infi- 
nite wisdom.  Even  the  process  of  popular  election 
is  human.  It  uses  imperfect  human  beings.  Its 
results  will  be  imperfect.  My  meaning  is,  that, 
in  the  long  run,  in  the  large  majority  of  instances, 
the  process  of  popular  election,  if  used  in  the  right 
form,  and  within  right  limits,  is  more  certain  than 
any  other  human  process,  to  give  us  the  best  men 
at  the  time  available,  for  the  highest  classes  of 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  241 

public  work.  In  other  words,  the  judgment  of 
any  community,  as  to  the  fitness  of  men  for  the 
highest  classes  of  public  work,  in  communities 
such  as  ours,  with  their  large  intelligence,  with  all 
the  modern  machinery  for  acquiring  knowledge, 
with  the  modern  press  for  full  and  free  public 
discussion,  is  the  best  judgment  available,  for  the 
selection  of  the  men  who  are  to  be  the  community's 
head.  The  judgment  of  the  community  will  al- 
most invariably  be  based  on  reputations.  Repu- 
tations are  almost  invariably  accurate  indices  of 
calibre  and  character.  Reputations  are  character 
barometers.  The  process  of  popular  election,  se- 
lecting men  on  their  reputations,  will  seldom  go 
wrong. 

At  this  point  of  our  study,  we  may  gather  some 
instructive  lessons  from  what  is  termed  "parlia- 
mentary government,"  as  it  exists  in  England.  In 
the  first  place,  it  illustrates  most  forcibly  the  safety 
of  the  concentration  of  the  power  of  general  super- 
vision and  control  in  a  single  popular  assembly, 
even  if  that  assembly  be  not  completely  "repre- 
sentative." No  practical  evil  has  ever  resulted 
from  this  concentration.  So  far  as  my  reading  goes, 
there  are  few  instances  on  record,  of  hasty,  ill-con- 
sidered action  on  the  part  of  the  British  House  of 
Commons,  in  its  entire  history.     Political  narrow- 


242  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

ness,  excessive  conservatism,  mainly  due  to  class 
prejudices,  there  have  been,  no  doubt,  in  abun- 
dance. But  there  are  few  instances,  so  far  as  my 
reading  goes,  of  action  that  has  been  hasty,  ill-con- 
sidered; and  no  instance  within  my  recollection, 
of  action  that  involved  any  danger,  or  evil,  which 
resulted  from  the  concentration  of  the  power  of 
supreme  supervision  and  control  in  the  hands  of 
a  single  popular  assembly. 

In  the  next  place,  there  could  be  no  evidence 
so  conclusive,  as  to  the  safety  of  the  people's  hber- 
ties  in  the  hands  of  a  popular  assembly  whose 
members  are  free  from  the  direct  control  of  the 
mass  of  citizens.  The  British  House  of  Commons 
has  never  been  really  "  representative  "  of  the  entire 
people.  Its  members  never  have  been  selected  by 
a  process  of  free  popular  election.  It  has  always 
been,  and  still  is,  representative  —  in  the  main  — 
of  the  landed  gentry.  Its  members  never  have  been, 
and  are  not  now,  chosen  bv  the  free  voice  of  the 
entire  people.  I^aying  quite  aside,  for  the  moment, 
the  point  of  any  property  qualification  for  voters, 
a  large  majority  of  the  members  of  the  British 
House  of  Commons,  even  now,  hold  their  seats, 
not  by  anything  that  can  be  properly  termed  a  pop- 
ular vote,  but  by  reason  of  their  ownership  of  the 
land,  and  their  family  influence.     Until  recently. 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  243 

the  large  majority  of  those  members  have  almost 
owned  their  seats,  as  part  of  their  landed  property. 
A  large  number  of  them,  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses, are  still  in  that  situation.  In  other  words, 
a  large  proportion  of  the  members  of  the  British 
House  of  Commons  have  at  all  times  been  quite 
independent  of  any  control  by  voters;  have  been 
free  to  act  on  their  own  independent  judgments, 
without  regard  to  the  opinions,  or  the  votes,  of 
any  so-called  constituents.  The  result  has  been,  in 
the  main,  highly  beneficial  to  the  large  majority 
of  pubUc  interests.  No  doubt,  there  has  been  a 
large  weight  of  class  prejudice  to  overcome.  But 
the  class  prejudice  has  been  overcome,  not,  in  gen- 
eral, by  reason  of  the  fears  of  any  popular  vote,  or 
of  unpopularity,  but  by  the  mere  legitimate  exer- 
cise of  the  power  of  free  thought  among  free  men. 
Making  all  allowance  for  some  slowness  of  move- 
ment, arising  from  the  ignorance  and  incapacity 
of  many  of  its  members,  we  shall  still  find  the  fact 
to  be,  that  no  other  legislative  assembly  can  show 
so  long  a  record  of  wise  legislation,  and  of  legis- 
lation so  uniformly  in  the  direction  of  securing 
full  protection  for  the  lives,  liberties,  and  property 
of  the  entire  body  of  citizens,  as  is  to  be  found  in 
the  history  of  the  British  House  of  Commons.  Its 
individual  members,  the  large  majority  of  them. 


244  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

have  not  been  in  sympathy  with  progress,  or  with 
new  ideas.  Yet  they  have  been  compelled  to  yield 
to  progress,  and  to  new  ideas.  Progress  has  come. 
New  ideas  have  worked  their  way,  have  conquered 
opposition.  Property  in  House  of  Commons  seats, 
inherited  with  their  land,  for  such  it  has  been 
in  practice,  has  been  the  means  of  giving  to  the 
English  people  the  service  of  many  of  its  greatest 
statesmen,  under  what  has  been  practically  a  ten- 
ure for  life.  To  its  "  pocket  boroughs,"  the  English 
people  is  largely,  if  not  mainly,  indebted,  to-day, 
for  its  present  stage  of  political  progress;  for  its 
present  degree  of  advance  in  the  direction  of  free 
political  thought,  as  embodied  in  its  legislation,  and 
for  its  present  position  in  the  great  march  towards 
democracy. 

There  could  be  no  more  clear  and  conclusive 
object  lesson,  as  to  the  needlessness  of  the  term 
system,  as  a  protection  for  the  people's  liberties, 
and  the  people's  rights.  Such  is  the  power  of  free 
thought  and  free  speech,  that  almost  any  body  of 
men,  of  reasonably  large  numbers,  elected  by  a 
process  of  free  popular  election,  who  are  free  to 
act  on  their  own  judgments,  are  virtually  certain 
to  take  wise  action  for  the  protection  of  public 
interests.  Free  thought  —  and  free  speech  —  those 
are  the  securities,  and  they  are  adequate  securi- 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  245 

ties,  for  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people.  It 
is  in  the  practical  suppression  of  free  thought  and 
free  speech,  that  we  find  the  conclusive  condem- 
nation of  our  own  present  political  system.  If 
the  members  of  the  supreme  popular  assembly 
really  "  represent,"  fully  and  fairly,  all  classes  and 
interests  in  the  community,  all  shades  of  opinion, 
as  they  will  do,  if  they  are  selected  by  a  process 
of  really  free  popular  election  in  the  different  elec- 
tion districts,  we  shall  have  the  strongest  security 
possible,  with  mere  human  agencies,  for  the  wise 
and  efficient  administration  of  public  affairs,  and 
the  protection  of  the  people's  liberties  and  the 
people's  rights. 

Political  systems  must  be  judged  by  their  capa- 
city to  produce  practical  results.  So  judged,  any 
and  every  hereditary  system  is  fatally  defective. 
Inheritance  does  give  a  good  practical  system  for 
the  transmission  of  property.  But  the  people's 
offices  are  not  property.  They  are  places  for  hard 
work,  to  be  filled  by  able,  well-trained  servants, 
who  are  to  be  selected  by  reason  of  their  fitness 
for  the  public  service.  Any  political  system,  where- 
undcr  the  headship  of  the  state  passes  by  inherit- 
ance, is  an  unsound  system.  It  is  founded  on  false 
principles.  It  produces  a  condition  of  unstable 
equilibrium. 


24©  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

At  this  point,  it  will  be  well  to  consider  briefly 
the  part  played  by  what  is  termed  "  parliamentary 
government"  in  the  development  of  democratic 
institutions. 

What  is  termed  "parliamentary  government" 
is  a  temporary  device,  to  accomplish  the  double 
purpose,  of  retaining  the  hereditary  principle,  and 
yet  evading  its  unavoidable  evils.  It  is  a  forced 
concession  to  the  demand  for  democracy.  It  is 
a  device  of  transition.  It  cannot  long  endure.  It 
stands  condemned,  by  the  laws  of  political  dy- 
namics; by  its  lack  of  capacity  to  produce  satis- 
factory practical  results.  It  is  a  passing  stage  in 
the  development  of  democracy. 

So,  too,  with  the  election  machine.  It,  too,  stands 
condemned,  by  the  laws  of  political  dynamics; 
by  its  lack  of  capacity  to  produce  satisfactory 
practical  results.  It  gives  us  talkers  instead  of 
workers;  demagogues  instead  of  statesmen;  "plat- 
forms," and  "  issues,"  instead  of  practical  adminis- 
trative results.  It  must  give  way  to  democracy,  to 
genuine  "government  by  the  people." 

In  every  nation,  at  every  period,  there  have  been 
men  of  large  ability,  of  high  integrity,  of  broad,  gen- 
erous public  spirit,  who  have  been  eager  to  enter 
the  service  of  the  people.  The  term  system,  with 
every  people  that  has   ever  made  use  of  it  for 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  247 

any  considerable  time,  has  always  been  a  fatal 
barrier,  which  has  in  general  kept  such  men  apart 
from  the  control  of  public  affairs.  Periodic  voting, 
by  the  citizens  in  mass,  by  the  secret  ballot,  al- 
ways furnishes  a  ready  and  easy  means,  whereby 
cheap,  noisy  demagogues  can  overpower  wise, 
working  statesmen.  The  combination  of  those 
two  pieces  of  political  machinery  has  never  been 
tested  with  so  great  thoroughness  as  by  the  peo- 
ple of  these  United  States  in  the  last  half  century. 
Political  machinery  and  political  processes,  like 
industrial  machinery  and  industrial  processes, 
sometimes  require  to  be  used  on  a  large  scale, 
before  their  working  results  become  fully  appar- 
ent. It  was  necessary  that  the  combination  of  the 
term  system  and  the  secret  ballot  should  be  put 
into  operation  on  a  large  scale,  before  there  could 
be  satisfactory  proof  of  their  pernicious  practical 
results.  We  have  experimented  with  that  combina- 
tion on  a  large  scale.  We  now  know  —  to  a  cer- 
tainty —  its  actual  practical  results. 

There  is  a  tendency  at  the  present  day  to  under- 
rate the  importance  of  political  institutions.  An 
idea  widely  prevalent  is,  that  every  people  has  as 
good  political  institutions  as  it  deserves;  that  the 
practical  operation  of  government,  under  institu- 
tions of  any  form,  depends  mainly,  almost  wholly 


248  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

on  the  character  of  the  people;  and,  that  any 
people  can  get  nearly  as  good  working  results 
under  institutions  in  one  form  as  another.  The 
position  is  seldom  stated  in  this  extreme  form. 
But  practically,  this  is  an  accurate  statement  of 
a  widely  prevailing  belief. 

This  belief  involves  a  great  error. 

Political  institutions  are  the  tools,  the  machin- 
ery, of  politics,  of  government.  They  are  as  impor- 
tant, in  matters  of  government,  as  they  are  in  our 
industries.  Man's  possibilities  of  performance,  in 
any  and  every  direction,  are  limited  by  his  tools, 
his  machinery.  "The  man  behind  the  gun,"  to 
use  a  phrase  of  the  day,  is  of  vital  importance.  The 
gun,  in  the  hands  of  the  man,  is  of  nearly  as  great 
importance.  Man  cannot  go  beyond  the  limita- 
tions of  his  implements. 

Our  men  are  of  the  best.  But  our  political  tools, 
our  political  machinery,  are  susceptible  of  great 
improvement. 

We  must  have  the  best  institutions.  The  indus- 
trial well-being,  the  moral  and  intellectual  well- 
being,  of  the  entire  community,  and  of  every  one 
of  its  individual  members,  depend  largely  on  our 
form  of  government,  on  the  character  of  our 
political  institutions. 

Still  another  belief  has  a  wide  vogue  in  the  polit- 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  249 

ical  discussions  of  the  day.  It  is,  practically,  that 
political  institutions  develop  of  themselves,  with- 
out the  agency  of  man ;  that  we  inherit  them ;  that 
we  must  accept  them,  and  submit  to  them.  This 
belief,  too,  is  not  often  stated  in  this  extreme  form. 
But  the  statement  here  made  gives  its  real  force. 
The  belief  is  an  offshoot,  a  corollary,  from  the 
current  doctrine  of  "evolution,"  so  called.  Life 
and  institutions,  political  and  other,  are  vaguely 
assumed  to  be  a  necessary,  inevitable  result  of 
pre-existing  causes;  to  be  something  from  which 
we  cannot  escape,  of  our  own  independent  volition, 
and  independent  effort. 

Directly  the  reverse  is  the  fact.  We  make,  and 
change,  our  own  political  institutions.  In  these 
modem  times,  as  soon  as  any  intelligent  people 
reaches  the  conviction  that  its  political  institutions 
are  unsatisfactory,  that  those  institutions  do  not 
give  satisfactory  working  results,  that  people  will, 
in  time,  change  its  institutions.  The  change  may 
be  slow  or  quick;  it  may  be  violent  or  peaceful. 
But  as  soon  as  any  people  becomes  an  intelligent, 
thinking  people,  whenever  the  working  results  of 
its  form  of  government  become  unsatisfactory,  that 
people  certainly  will,  in  time,  begin  to  think  of  the 
reasons  for  those  results,  of  their  causes.  In  time, 
it  will  try  to  find  remedies  for  working  defects,  and 


2o0  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

will  try  to  put  those  remedies  into  practical  opera- 
tion. 

This  has  been  the  real  reason  for  every  political 
revolution  that  the  world  has  ever  seen  —  the 
dissatisfaction  of  a  people  with  actual  working 
results. 

Of  course,  with  most  peoples,  inasmuch  as  most 
of  them  are  slow  and  ignorant,  the  processes  of 
revolution  will  be  slow,  and  ill-advised.  Those 
processes  will  often  be  the  results  of  ignorant 
impulse,  rather  than  of  sound  political  thought 
and  judgment.  The  reason  is,  that  few  peoples 
have  as  yet  given  careful  study,  and  thorough 
thought,  to  the  science  of  politics,  to  the  science  of 
political  dynamics.  The  materials  for  such  study 
and  thought  have  not  long  been  in  existence. 

But  this  American  people  is  extremely  conser- 
vative. It  is  difficult,  almost  impossible,  to  induce 
it  even  to  take  into  consideration  any  suggestion  of 
a  fundamental  change  in  its  fabric  of  government. 
In  order  to  induce  such  consideration,  we  must 
present  a  case  of  pressing  necessity. 

Is  there,  then,  such  a  necessity? 

My  answer  to  this  question  is,  that  there  is  such 
a  necessity ;  and  that  it  is  pressing  and  overwhelm- 
ing. 

The  reasons  are  these :  — 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  251 

Destruction  of  the  election  machine  is  the  abso- 
lute essential,  if  we  are  to  secure  any  genuine  polit- 
ical freedom;  either  for  the  people  in  the  choice 
of  their  public  servants,  or  for  their  servants  in  the 
discharge  of  their  duties  to  the  people.  Genuine 
democracy,  genuine  "government  by  the  people," 
cannot  be  secured  without  the  destruction  of  the 
election  machine. 

Especially,  a  radical  reorganization  of  our  politi- 
cal system  is  an  absolute  necessity,  if  we  are  to  put 
an  end  to  the  present  pohtical  supremacy  of  money. 
By  no  possible  means  can  we  entirely  destroy  the 
power  of  money  in  poHtics.  It  is  not  desirable  that 
we  should  do  so.  Money  ought  to  be  a  great  power 
in  the  state.  It  always  will  be.  What  we  should 
attempt,  however,  is  to  take  from  money  its  present 
overwhelming  political  supremacy. 

That  supremacy  cannot  be  destroyed,  without 
a  thorough  reorganization  of  our  political  machin- 
ery. So  long  as  we  continue  our  present  system 
of  perpetual  periodic  term  elections,  so  long  it  will 
continue  to  be  necessary  to  furnish  these  immense 
amounts  of  money,  for  the  maintenance  of  our 
standing  armies  of  machine  politicians.  Plutocracy 
must  give  way  to  democracy,  if  we  are  to  have 
either  public  purity  or  governmental  efficiency. 
Plutocracy  will  continue,  however,  precisely  so  long 


252  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

as  we  coDtinue  to  turn  government  into  an  election 
,machine. 

Let  us  go  one  step  further. 

The  poUtical  Ufe  of  a  community,  Hke  the  Ufe 
of  an  individual,  of  any  human  organism,  must  be 
one  of  steady,  continuous  growth.  It  should  not  be 
a  series  of  revolutions.  Healthy  growth,  for  the 
body  politic,  as  for  the  single  individual,  consists 
in  a  process  of  steady,  gradual  renovation  of  all  the 
tissues;  of  the  different  cells,  organs,  and  members, 
of  the  entire  body  poUtic ;  by  the  gradual  and  con- 
tinuous substitution  of  new  fibre  for  old.  The  pro- 
cess of  perpetual  periodic  revolution,  of  perpetual 
periodic  decapitation,  for  that  is  the  real  essence 
of  our  present  term  system,  is  not  a  process  which 
conduces  to  a  continuous  healthy  growth. 

It  is  an  organic  necessity,  that  each  body  poUtic, 
each  separate  political  community,  should  be  under 
a  single  supreme  authority ;  the  authority  of  a  body 
of  men  carefully  selected,  representative,  whereby 
all  the  subordinate  organs  and  members  shall  be 
controlled  and  regulated;  under  which  the  opera- 
tions of  all  those  organs  and  members  shall  have 
unity,  and  harmony.  Concentration  —  and  con- 
solidation —  are  the  methods  of  the  modern  indus- 
trial world.  They  must  be  the  methods  of  our  new 
political   world.    Unity  of  poUtical  control,  unity 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  253 

of  political  action,  stability,  with  the  continuous 
steady  development  of  public  policies  —  these  are 
the  requisites  to  the  healthy  life  of  any  large  mod- 
ern community.  They  are  possible  only  under  a 
democracy;  under  a  single  head,  under  a  single 
brain;  under  the  rule  of  the  representative  popular 
assembly,  of  which  the  fibre  and  forces  will  be  con- 
stantly and  continuously  renewed  by  the  steady, 
continuous  change  of  its  individual  members.  In 
no  other  way  is  it  possible  to  have  a  healthy, 
vigorous,  poUtical  life. 

Democracy  has  hitherto  generally  been  consid- 
ered to  be  government  by  aggregations  of  the 
masses;  through  periodic  votes  of  majorities  of 
individuals. 

Government  in  any  such  form  can  —  by  the  ut- 
most possibility — be  nothing  but  a  series  of  revolu- 
tions. Those  revolutions  may  be  free  from  violence. 
They  may  be  had  under  the  strict  letter  of  the  law. 
Nevertheless,  they  will  be  revolutions.  They  will 
prevent  the  possibility  of  a  steady,  healthy,  organic 
growth.  Hitherto,  they  have  caused  disaster  to 
nearly  every  experiment  in  the  installation  of 
democratic  institutions. 

Democracy,  with  our  large  modem  masses  of 
wealth  and  population,  must  be  something  far  dif- 
ferent.   Democracy  must  be  the  government  of  a 


254  ORGANIZED   DEMOCRACY 

people  by  its  best  available  mind  and  thought. 
Democratic  government  must  secure  a  continuous 
organic  life,  under  continuous  organic  processes. 
It  must  secure  the  consolidation,  for  all  public  pur- 
poses, of  the  forces  of  the  entire  community,  under 
a  single  will,  controlled  by  the  community's  best 
judgment. 

In  short,  democracy  must  be  government  by  the 
people's  brain. 

Government  by  the  people's  brain  is  an  impos- 
sibility, under  the  supremacy  of  the  election  ma- 
chine. It  is  an  impossibility,  under  any  system 
of  periodic  revolution;  even  if  we  assume,  contrary 
to  the  fact,  that  at  each  revolution  we  are  to  get 
a  true  and  accurate  expression  of  the  individual 
opinions  at  that  time  of  a  majority  of  its  citizens. 
An  expression  of  a  mere  majority  of  opinions  of 
individual  citizens  is  not  an  expression  of  the 
judgment  of  the  entire  community. 

At  the  end  of  the  first  century  of  our  national 
existence,  we  find  ourselves  confronted  with  the 
necessity  of  another  contest  for  liberty;  another 
struggle  for  free  democratic  government;  another 
revolution. 

But  it  will  be  a  revolution  of  a  new  kind;  » 
lawful,  peaceful  revolution;  not  against  any  one 
man,  or  combination  of  men ;  but  against  a  political 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  255 

system;  and  not  against  a  system  which  has  been 
forced  upon  us  by  a  foreign  power,  but  against  one 
of  our  own  creation.  Strangely,  too,  the  very  fea- 
tures in  that  system,  on  which  we  have  depended 
for  securing  the  people's  liberties,  and  the  supre- 
macy of  the  people's  will,  are  the  ones  which  have 
turned  out  in  the  end  to  be  the  destroyers  of  both; 
of  the  people's  political  freedom,  and  the  people's 
political  power.  It  is  those  features,  which  have,  for 
the  time  being,  destroyed  democratic  government. 
Actual  experiment  —  an  experiment  of  more  than 
a  century  —  has  now  clearly  demonstrated,  that 
certain  pieces  of  our  political  machinery  have  been 
put  to  abnormal  and  excessive  uses.  The  machinery 
has  broken  down.  It  ser\'ed  well  enough  for  small 
communities,  and  small  political  forces.  It  will 
not  serve  the  needs  of  large  communities,  using  the 
large  political  forces  of  the  present  day.  It  is  as 
thoroughly  antiquated,  as  completely  out  of  date, 
as  the  old  corduroy  road,  or  plank  turnpike. 

Emancipation  is  the  end  to  be  accomplished; 
emancipation  of  the  citizen,  and  of  the  people, 
from  the  thralldom  of  machine  politics;  from  the 
tyranny  of  an  institution — a  tyranny  which  has 
become,  in  its  practical  results,  a  more  complete 
obstacle  to  political  progress  than  could  be  the 
tyranny  of  any  foreign  foe.    The  tyranny  of  a  for- 


256  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

eio:ii  foe  would  rouse  instant  armed  revolution. 
But  the  tyranny  of  an  institution,  especially  of 
an  institution  of  our  own  creation,  is  so  subtle, 
so  difficult  of  appreciation,  that  it  seems  at  first 
almost  impossible  to  convince  the  community  of 
its  nature  and  its  dangers. 

What  we  have  now  to  accomplish  is,  the  achieve- 
ment of  full  political  freedom  :  freedom  of  political 
thought;  freedom  of  political  speech ;  and  freedom 
of  political  action. 

Outside  of  the  sphere  of  practical  politics,  our 
freedom  of  thought,  speech,  and  action  may  be 
conceded  to  be  reasonably  complete.  Even  within 
the  sphere  of  practical  politics,  it  is  not  restricted 
by  the  letter  of  the  law.  So  far  as  concerns  the  letter 
of  the  law,  every  citizen  is  free  to  think,  and  vote, 
as  he  may  see  fit  ;  he  is  free  to  speak,  and  print, 
anything  he  may  see  fit,  in  the  way  of  legitimate 
criticism  on  public  men  and  their  action. 

But  in  actual  practical  politics,  the  individual 
citizen  has  nothing  that  can  be  correctly  termed 
freedom.  The  very  essence  of  the  citizen's  freedom, 
under  any  form  of  government  that  can  be  rightly 
termed  democratic,  is  that  the  citizen,  in  the  choice 
of  public  officials,  shall  be  free  to  act,  within  rea- 
sonable limits,  on  his  own  judgment.  No  doubt, 
he  must  act  in  combination  with  other  men.   In  so 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  257 

doing,  he  must,  to  a  considerable  extent,  be  willing 
to  surrender  complete  freedom  of  individual  action. 
But  the  citizen  must  have  far  greater  freedom  of 
action,  especially  of  combination,  than  he  gets,  or 
can  get,  as  matter  of  practice,  under  our  present 
political  system;  whereby  every  citizen  is  virtually 
compelled  to  become  the  blind  follower  of  one  or 
another  group  of  machine  politicians;  under  which 
he  becomes,  practically,  a  mere  attachment  to  the 
election  machine. 

When,  too,  we  consider  the  action  of  our  public 
officials,  we  shall  find  that  there,  too,  genuine  free- 
dom of  action  has  practically  disappeared.  Fifty 
years  ago,  when  a  public  measure  of  importance 
came  up  for  consideration  in  one  of  our  legisla- 
tive assembhes,  we  were  reasonably  certain,  that  it 
would  receive  a  free  public  discussion,  and  a  fair 
public  consideration,  on  its  merits.  Public  mea- 
sures were  —  in  the  main  —  decided  by  the  use  of 
the  natural,  normal  process  of  public  thought. 

To-day,  however,  free  public  discussion,  free 
public  deliberation,  upon  the  merits  of  important 
measures,  is  a  process  that  has  for  the  time  almost 
fallen  into  disuse.  Well-informed  men  no  longer 
expect,  that  an  important  public  measure  is  to  be 
fully  and  fairly  considered  on  its  merits,  in  any 
one  of  our  many  popular  assemblies.    The  action 


258  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

of  our  popular  assemblies,  on  the  large  majority  of 
large  public  questions,  is  secured  in  advance,  by 
the  virtual  purchase  of  their  members,  through 
the  payment  of  money,  or  other  valuable  con- 
siderations, to  powerful  machine  politicians.  In- 
deed, when  we  consider  the  extent  to  which  both 
citizens  and  public  officials  are  under  the  control 
of  the  machine  politicians,  and  how  completely 
the  machine  politicians  are  under  the  control  of 
money,  it  is  hardly  an  overstatement  to  say,  that 
under  our  present  political  system,  instead  of  es- 
tablishing the  supremacy  of  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple, we  have  established  the  supremacy  of  corrup- 
tion. It  is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say,  that  the 
body  poUtic  is  thoroughly  permeated  with  political 
pyaemia. 

The  subtlety  of  the  disease,  with  its  slow  and 
gradual  development,  has  blinded  us  to  its  real 
nature.  It  has  been  a  gradual  growth,  the  result 
of  our  great  increase  in  population  and  wealth.  Our 
increase  in  population  has  been  the  cause  of  the 
increase  in  the  volume  and  intricacy  of  our  elec- 
tion machinery,  with  the  consequent  increase  in 
the  use  of  money,  in  carrying  our  annual  elections. 
Our  increase  in  wealth  has  been  the  cause  of  the 
increase  in  the  money  value  of  the  control  of  gov- 
ernment officials.    The  two  causes  in  combination 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  259 

have  operated  to  take  the  selection  and  control  of 
our  public  officials  and  public  affairs  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  citizens,  and  vest  it  in  a  large  body  of 
men,  who  "  go  into  politics  "  to  serve  their  own  per- 
sonal ends;  oftentimes  for  the  reason  that  in  the 
natural  course  of  affairs,  on  their  own  merits,  or 
their  demerits,  they  have  fallen  into  the  ranks  of 
the  unemployed. 

The  magnitude  of  the  result,  the  completeness 
of  the  tyranny  which  we  have  established,  is  beyond 
calculation.  The  reason  is,  that  our  growth  in 
wealth  and  population  has  been  so  phenomenal. 
Our  election  machine  has  become  a  monstrosity. 
In  ancient  and  mediaeval  times,  we  have  seen  tyran- 
nies of  single  men,  or  of  single  classes.  But  their 
power  has  had  comparatively  narrow  limits;  for 
the  populations  and  resources  under  their  control 
have  been  comparatively  poor  and  weak.  But  here 
in  this  twentieth  century,  the  most  intelligent  people 
on  the  face  of  the  earth,  the  richest  people,  in  some 
ways  the  freest  people,  lives  under  a  despotism, 
which  works  a  virtual  destruction  of  the  people's 
freedom  of  choice  in  the  selection  of  its  public 
officials,  and  of  the  freedom  of  action  of  those  officials 
after  they  are  chosen.  The  large  majority  of  our 
citizens  are  virtually  disfranchised.  They  number 
to-day  nearly  eighty  millions.     The  public  officials 


260  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

who  are  selected,  and  therefore  controlled,  by  the 
election  machine,  comprise  the  entire  body  of  our 
local,  state,  and  national  officials.  Their  numbers 
go  into  the  hundreds  of  thousands,  if  not  already 
into  the  millions.  The  public  treasuries,  which  are 
under  the  control  of  our  self-appointed  despots, 
make  an  annual  expenditure  of  thousands  of  mil- 
lions. No  Roman  emperor,  and  no  king,  tsar,  or 
kaiser  of  modem  times,  has  ever  had  the  control 
of  such  immense  masses  of  wealth  and  population, 
as  our  machine  politicians  of  the  present  day. 

The  overthrow  of  their  power  is  a  mere  impos- 
sibility, through  these  annual  rotations  of  men,  by 
means  of  our  present  periodic  process  of  so-called 
popular  election.  Whenever,  at  one  of  our  annual 
elections,  we  work  the  overthrow  of  one  set  of  pub- 
lic officials,  all  that  we  accomplish  is  to  put  in 
their  places  another  set  of  men,  of  practically  the 
same  kind,  who  are  in  their  turn  the  creatures,  and 
the  puppets,  of  the  machine  politicians.  No  doubt, 
we  do  occasionally  compel  the  machine  politicians 
to  nominate  candidates  of  fairly  good  repute.  But, 
in  general,  the  men  so  nominated  are  men  who 
can  be  controlled,  and  used,  with  or  without  their 
knowledge,  by  the  skillful  men  who  pull  the  political 
wires.  These  occasional  elections,  of  very  respect- 
able men,  on  very  respectable  "  platforms,"  as  they 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  261 

are  termed,  give  no  substantial  improvement  in 
practical  results.  In  general,  in  the  long  run,  how- 
ever great  may  be  our  efforts,  however  often  we 
may  make  a  change  in  men,  it  is  quite  beyond 
our  power  to  accomplish  any  substantial  improve- 
ment in  methods.  So  long  as  we  maintain  this  sys- 
tem of  perpetual  rotation,  by  the  annual  election 
machine,  so  long  we  shall  maintain  its  results.  We 
shall  make  no  substantial  improvement  in  the 
administration  of  public  affairs,  so  long  as  we  main- 
tain our  present  system  of  rotatory  politics. 

It  is  frequently  said,  and  it  is  generally  believed, 
that  the  power  of  the  machine  politicians,  and  the 
resulting  abuses,  are  limited  to  local  municipal 
politics. 

But  this  is  a  great  error.  The  power  of  the 
machine  politicians  is  even  larger,  and  more  com- 
plete, in  the  national  government,  than  in  our  local 
and  state  politics.  The  petty  local  political  organi- 
zations are  of  slight  political  importance,  in  com- 
parison with  the  great  moneyed  organization,  which 
has  for  a  long  time  been  the  power  of  supreme 
control  of  our  national  government. 

This  organization  had  its  origin  at  the  time  of 
the  Civil  War.  Then  began  the  growth  in  our 
national  government  of  what  may  be  accurately 
termed  the  great  Senatorial  Trust. 


262  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

It  came  into  existence  in  this  way.    Our  heavy 
war  expenditure  made  it  necessary  to  make  large 
changes  in  the  tariff,  and  impose  heavy  duties  on 
imports.     No  revenue  bill,  and  no  appropriation 
bill,   could   pass   without   action   by  the   Senate. 
Thereby  resulted  the  Senate's  power  over  the  na- 
tional finances.    But  the  most  important  power  of 
the  Senate  lay  in  the  matter  of  appointments  to 
public  offices.    No  appointment  to  a  high  adminis- 
trative office  could  be  made,  without  a  vote  of  the 
Senate.    This  fact  soon  resulted  in  a  nearly  com- 
plete control  by  the  Senate  of  all  such  appoint- 
ments.   Very  early  the  custom  arose,  of  submitting 
to  the  respective  Senators  of  the  different  states  the 
appointments  to  office  in  those  states.    This  gave 
to  the  members  of  the  Senate   a  power  beyond 
calculation,  in  both  state  and  local  politics.   The 
control  of  the  tariff,  and  its  frequent  revision,  with 
the  control  of  the  currency,  and  the  pension  fund, 
the  monumental  fraud  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
together  with  the  control  of  the  appointments  to  all 
the  federal  offices,  have  enabled  one  organization 
of  machine  politicians  to    retain    for  forty  years 
an  almost  unbroken   dominance  in  the  national 
government;  and  thereby  to  compel  the  payment 
to  their  party  treasuries  of  very  large  amounts  of 
money,  from  all  the  business  and  industrial  inter- 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  263 

ests  affected  by  tariff  and  financial  legislation.  The 
sums  of  money  so  paid  have  gone  into  the  hun- 
dreds, and  probably  thousands,  of  millions.   ^Vhere 
any  local  political  organization  has  taken  dollars 
by  the  thousands,  or  tens  of  thousands,  the  great 
national  "machine"  has   taken    its   millions,  and 
hundreds  of  millions.    The  plunder  of  the  public 
by  our  local  political  organizations  is  a  thing  quite 
inconsiderable,  in  comparison  with  the  enormous 
amounts  that  have  been   paid  to  the  politicians 
who  have  had  the  control  of  the  national  govern- 
ment.  The  pension  frauds  alone  have  been  the 
means  whereby  plundering  politicians,  of  both  the 
"  grand  old  parties,"  have  stolen  from  our  national 
treasury  more  than  a  thousand  millions  of  dollars. 
Senatorial   combination  —  the   great   Senatorial 
Trust  —  constitutes  the  foundation,  and  the  bind- 
ing strength  of  the  great  national  election  machine, 
in  its  two  parts,  its  two  so-called  "parties."    Its 
members,  belonging  to  each  of  our  great  parties, 
are  admitted  into  all  manner  of  large  industrial 
and  financial  enterprises,  by  reason  of  their  power, 
not  only  in   the  national  government,  but  in  the 
state  and  local  governments.    Coal  companies,  iron 
and    steel  companies,  sugar   companies,   tobacco 
companies,  companies  for  the  mining  of  metals, 
companies  for  the  development  of    industries  of 


264  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

all  kinds,  for  the  use  of  electrical  power,  for  the 
virtual  ownership  of  our  public  highways  —  nearly 
all  the  largest  business  enterprises  of  our  modern, 
industrial  world,  find  themselves  virtually  com- 
pelled —  to  admit  these  pohtical  magnates  to  a 
share  in  their  financial  results.  Thence  come  the 
immense  fortunes,  which  are  amassed  by  the  mem- 
bers of  our  national  Senate,  accumulated,  not  from 
their  salaries,  not  as  the  result  of  their  individual 
lawful  business  labors,  but  as  the  price  of  their 
political  power  and  influence. 

In  nearly  every  state  in  the  Union,  the  pohti- 
cal power  of  the  United  States  senators  is  over- 
whelming. Every  local  organization,  no  doubt,  has 
its  own  "leaders,"  its  own  commanding  officers. 
But  in  state  pohtics,  and  in  national  pohtics,  the 
supreme  power  is  vested  in  the  great  Senatorial 
Trust.  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  New  York  —  what  is 
the  hmitation  that  any  intelligent  man  would  set, 
to  the  possibilities  of  accomplishment,  by  a  com- 
bination of  the  senators  from  those  three  states  ? 
Even  so  far  back  as  1860,  it  was  the  combination  of 
the  machine  politicians  from  Illinois,  Pennsylvania, 
and  New  York,  which  gave  the  presidency  to 
Mr.  Lincoln,  by  bargain  and  sale.  Every  President 
since  Mr.  Lincoln,  with  the  exception  of  the  Vice- 
Presidents  who  have   become    Presidents   by  the 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  265 

death  of  the  elected  President,  has  obtained  his 
nomination,  and  consequently  his  election,  from 
the  national  election  machine  —  virtually  by  power 
of  appointment.  In  the  exercise  of  that  power  of 
appointment,  the  controUing  element  has  been 
money. 

No  doubt,  it  is  an  impossibility  to  frame  any 
system  of  government  which  will  be  automatic; 
or  which  will  give  us  an  absolute  security  against 
the  corrupt  use  of  money.  But  it  is  a  possibiUty, 
and  a  possibility  easily  within  our  reach,  to  frame 
a  political  system,  under  which  the  power  of  money 
used  corruptly  shall  be  less,  and  much  less,  than 
it  is  with  us  to-day.  But  such  a  system  must  be  one, 
under  which  free  open  public  discussion,  the  normal, 
natural  processes  of  free  thought  and  free  speech, 
resume  their  places  as  the  fundamental  processes  in 
the  selection  of  our  highest  public  servants,  and  the 
control  of  public  affairs.  We  must  have  such  a  form 
of  government,  as  will  make  it  possible  for  us  to 
use  the  people's  best  judgment,  the  people's  best 
thought,  in  the  selection  of  the  men  at  the  head  of 
our  different  governments.  But  when  those  men 
are  once  selected,  we  must  give  them  our  confi- 
dence.  We  must  give  them  a  free  hand. 

No  government  can  be  operated,  except  on  the 
basis  of  confidence  in  men.    First,  we  must  have 


266  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

confidence  in  the  people ;  in  its  ability  to  make  a 
wise  selection  of  the  men  who  are  to  be  its  chosen 
rulers.  Thereafter,  we  must  have  confidence  in 
those  chosen  rulers.  We  have  made  an  experiment 
quite  long  enough  on  the  constitutional  basis  of 
distrust. 

We  must  revise  our  ideas  of  democratic  govern- 
ment from  the  very  foundation.  We  must  finally 
and  completely  abandon  the  idea,  that  democratic 
government  means  government  by  the  citizens  in 
mass,  in  any  fonn.  Only  by  the  representative 
popular  assembly,  by  no  other  organ,  by  no  other 
means,  so  long  as  human  nature  remains  what  it 
is,  is  it  a  possibility  for  any  community,  for  any 
large  number  of  human  beings,  to  form  and  utter 
their  united  common  judgment,  as  to  either  mea- 
sures or  men.  We  must  altogether  abandon  the 
idea  of  getting  action  by  a  people,  through  any 
mere  collection  of  the  separate  votes  of  individuals ; 
through  any  aggregated  action  of  the  citizens  in 
mass,  acting  directly  in  their  own  separate  individ- 
ual persons.  The  people's  judgment  must  be  the 
product  of  the  people's  united  common  thought. 
Such  thought  can  be  had  only  in  a  deliberative 
popular  assembly. 

The  fundamental  "  issue,"  it  is  seen,  in  the 
ultimate  analysis,  resolves  itself  into  one  between 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  267 

the  establishment  of  organized  democracy  and  a 
continuance  of  our  present  futile  attempt  at  mass 
rule.  The  changes,  here  suggested,  though  fun- 
damental, involve  nothing  new  or  untried  in  the 
way  of  poHtical  machinery.  They  involve  the  adop- 
tion only  of  methods  which  have  been  thoroughly 
tested;  and  found  by  actual  experience  to  be  the 
only  practicable  methods,  for  handUng  men  and 
affairs  on  any  large  scale.  Single-headed  admin- 
istration —  every  practical  man  knows  that  it  is 
absolutely  essential,  and  indispensable,  to  admin- 
istrative eflBciency.  Individual  responsibiUty  —  of 
the  single  administrative  head,  to  some  body  of 
men,  which  has  a  continuous  existence,  which  can 
meet,  deliberate,  and  act,  as  one  body,  which  is 
capable  of  forming  an  intelligent  reasonable  judg- 
ment —  is  absolutely  indispensable,  if  our  public 
affairs  are  to  be  administered  with  wisdom  and 
efficiency.  Vesting  the  supreme  control  of  public 
affairs,  subject  to  necessary  constitutional  restric- 
tions, in  a  carefully  selected  body  of  able,  experi- 
enced men,  is  evidently  the  only  practicable  means 
of  securing  wise  control. 

Periodic  mass  work,  in  any  form,  is  hopelessly 
inadequate ;  and  is  in  conflict  with  the  fundamental 
principles  of  democratic  government;  indeed,  of 
all  rational  government.     Democratic  government 


268  ORGANIZED  DEMOCRACY 

must  be  a  government  in  which  the  power  of  su- 
preme control  is  the  judgment  of  the  people,  not 
an  enumeration  of  the  opinions  of  single  citizens, 
even  if  it  were  practicable  to  get  such  an  enumer- 
ation by  this  machinery  of  annual  election.  But 
as  matter  of  actual  fact,  these  annual  elections  do 
not  give  us  even  as  much  as  that  valued  result. 

The  final  question  for  us  to  consider,  after  all  is 
said,  is  this:  Is  it  really  necessary,  for  the  perma- 
nent health  of  the  body  politic,  that  we  should  now 
make  a  thorough  reorganization  of  our  political 
system  ? 


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